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Abstract

VARIATIONS IN QUALITY OUTCOMES AMONG HOSPITALS
IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF HEALTH SYSTEMS, 1995 - 2000
By Askar S. Chukrnaitov, M.D., Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2005
Director: Gloria J. Bazzoli, Ph.D.
Professor, Department of Health Administration

Although prior research has found differences in costs and financial performance
across different types of hospital systems, there has been no systematic study of
variations in patient quality of care or safety indicators across different systems. Our
study examines whether five main types of health systems - centralized (CHS),
centralized physiciadinsurance (CPIHS), moderately centralized (MCHS), decentralized
(DHS), and independent (IHS) - as well as other hospital characteristics are associated
with differences in quality of patient care.
Data were assembled for 6 years (1995 - 2000) from multiple sources. We used 4
AHRQ risk adjusted inpatient quality indicators (IQIs) and 5 risk-adjusted patient safety

indicators (PSIs) as dependent variables. Random effects models were used in the
analysis.
It was found that the IQI and PSI models have different patterns. In the IQI
models, CHS hospitals have lower AMI, CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia mortality rates
than hospitals in other system types. The PSI models did not indicate any systems'
effects on adverse event rates. It was also found that system hospitals' compliance with
the JCAHO performance area indicator for availability of patient specific information
was associated with lower rates of CHF, Stroke, Pneumonia, and Infection due to medical
care.
The findings suggest that centralization of hospital structures may improve
internal clinical processes by enhancing coordination of activities, communication
between providers, timely adjustments of processes of care delivery and structures to
external pressures. A lack of systems' effect on adverse events may be explained by a
newness of the patient safety issues for hospitals and possible changes in reporting
patterns of medical errors after the Institute of Medicine report of 1999. A system
hospitals' compliance with the JCAHO performance area indicator may indicate
improvements in information and clinical record systems.
Hospital systems hold much potential for hospitals in improving patient quality of
care and safety because they provide a laboratory for studying the health care process and
sharing lessons across multiple institutions. Based on our findings, we recommend that
future studies use a combination of IQIs and PSIs when examining institutional quality of
care because both provide different and complementary information.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The Study Problem
This study will examine how the organizational structures of hospital systems
may affect quality of inpatient care. Contingency theory will be used to develop a
conceptual framework and hypotheses: To test these hypotheses, panel data will be used
on all general, acute hospitals in eleven states available for the 1995 - 2000 period
combined from seven well-established data sets. Findings from panel fixed effects or
random effects analyses will be compared with findings from cross-sectional three stage
estimation models to avoid some data limitations and increase internal validity of the
current study.
According to the Centers for ~ e d i c a r eand Medicaid Services (CMS) actuaries
report, the United States spent an estimated $1.5 trillion on health care in 2003, or 14.9
percent of a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $10.9 trillion; it is also projected that
$3.36 trillion, or 18.4 percent of a GDP of $18.24, the U.S. will spent by 2013
(Reinhardt, et al. 2004). Hospital inpatient spending increased at a rate of 4.1 percent in
2000, 8.7 percent in 2001, and 6.5 percent in 2003, down from 8.4 percent in 2002
(Strunk and Ginsburg, 2004). This new trend shows "a dramatic departure from the
trend in 1994-1998, when hospital inpatient spending was actually declining year to year
by as much as 5.3 percent (Strunk, Ginsburg and Gabel, 2001)."

Costs in the U.S. in comparison with other industrialized countries are believed
to be driven by higher than projected per capita spending on health care, the wider
distribution of compensation for health services, the highly fragmented health financing
system, the higher capacity of health systems (i.e., technologies and professionals),
administrative complexity and costs, and unwillingness to ration health care (Reinhardt,
et al. 2004). High health expenditures generally and for hospital care, however, do not
assure high standards of quality of care, which are defined as the degree to which health
services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health
outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge (Schuster et al. 1998).
The World Health Organization Report (2000) evaluated the performance of the health
care systems of the world, and the U.S. was ranked only 37thoverall in 2000. The
Institute of Medicine report (2000) has also revealed that between 44,000 and 98,000
inpatient deaths appeared due to preventable errors, occurring every year in the U.S.
hospitals.
Efforts to address problems in health care must take into account the changing
provider landscape in the U.S.A. In the mid-1990's, which is a timeframe relevant to
this study, one of the suggested ways to improve quality of care, while containing health
care costs, was to create integrated delivery systems (IDS) that consist of hospitals,
physicians, other providers and auxiliary services, and possibly insurance products
(Shortell, 1996). Clinical integration of IDS'S processes was believed to help achieve
the better quality at the lower costs due to more effective coordination of services in
effective manner, shared incentives, standardization of care, improved continuity of care,

and other factors (Shortell, 1996). Shortell et al. (2000) also mentioned that centralized
health systems (CHS) may achieve clinical integration and better quality of care because
CHS have common ownership and shared incentives, which allow them to communicate
policies across and coordinate activities of sub-units in a unified manner.
During the mid-1990s (i.e., the timeframe for this study), a transformation of
freestanding health providers into health systems was primarily stimulated by external
forces, such as managed care, competition, reimbursement regulations (Lesser and
Ginsburg, 2000, Kohn, 2000, Lake et al. 2003, Bazzoli et al., 1999). For example, the
absolute number of health systems rose from 295 (2,836 affiliated hospitals) in 1994 to
365 systems (3,221 affiliated hospitals) in 1998 (Bazzoli et al., 2001).
Bazzoli et al. (1999), using cluster analyses, classified 90 percent of health
system into five well-defined categories: centralized health system (CHS), centralized
physicianlinsurance health systems (CPIHS), moderately centralized health systems
(MCHS), decentralized health systems (DHS), and independent hospital systems (IHS).
Prior research has found differences in costs across these system types (Bazzoli et al.,
2000). Centralization of health systems may facilitate clinical integration of processes
among system members due to diffusion of management and clinical information
systems, quality and care management processes, which may results in differences in
outcomes (Shortell et al., 2000). It is believed that this taxonomy could assist in
advancing research on integration and outcomes in health care (Alexander et al., 1996).
However, there is only limited research on how structural integration of hospitals
in systems may affect quality outcomes. Empirical studies demonstrate mixed results on

how different organizational arrangements of health providers affect quality of care.
Effects of clinical integration on hospital quality performance have also mixed results.
Since no studies were performed on quality of care provided by different types of health
systems, the current research is intended to compare quality outcomes in hospitals
affiliated with various system types.
Purpose of the Study
Structural and process elements necessary for delivering high quality care will be
assessed. Structural differences among hospital-led health systems may yield
differences in care provision, resulting in differences in quality outcomes. Types of
ownership, centralization of authority, and differentiation of services in health systems
may result in different approaches to care delivery in various types of health systems.
Internal processes of service delivery, in turn, may be associated with quality outcomes
varying by system types. Therefore, structural and process characteristics of hospitals in
different types of health systems may be associated with certain quality outcomes for
these organizational arrangements, and differences in quality o~ltcomesmay occur
between these types of health systems.
Research Questions
This research questions are as follows:

1.

What types of health systems and their member hospitals are associated with the
best quality outcomes, produced by hospitals in those systems?

2.

What types of health systems and their member hospitals are associated with the
worst quality outcomes, produced by hospitals in those systems?

3.

Are there differences in care delivery processes associated with positive or
negative quality outcomes in hospitals in various types of health systems?
Theoretical Framework
Contingency theory will be used in developing a conceptual framework for this

study. Contingency theory states that there is no best way to organize that is highly
effective for all organizations (Galbreith, 1973). Different environments present
different challenges and opportunities for organizations (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) proposed a conceptual perspective where organizations
may restructure through differentiation and integration strategies in response to their
environments. Thompson (1967) introduced a notion of task interdependence that can
be used to predict the structural features of organizations. Environments (i.e., external
conditions), organizational size, task interdependence, technology (i.e., internal
conditions) were called contingency factors (Donaldson, 1995 and 200 1; Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Galbreith, 1973). External and internal contingency
factors moderate organizational change of its structure in adapting to the environment
and for improving organizational effectiveness and performance (Child, 1972;
Donaldson, 1995). Contingency factors determine which organizational structural
characteristics produce the highest levels of organizational performance, as there must
be a good "fit" between environment conditions and the organizational structure
designed to deal with that environment (Donaldson, 200 1). Changes in contingency
factors may possibly lead to changes in the organizational structures and processes
through appropriate decision-making by capable organizational management (Figure 1).

Contingency
Factors

,
t

Structure

-

Process

-

Performance

t

Figure 1: Schematic Depiction of Theoretical Constructs
Contingency theory provides plausible "scenarios" for evaluating hospital
strategic responses to the dynamics of the health care environment in the 1995 - 2000
period. This conceptual model will theoretically identify strategies that may affect
hospital structures and processes. This conceptual model will set up a structureprocess-performance link for empirical evaluation. A set of testable hypotheses will be
developed.
Conceptual Model and Propositions
The U.S. health care environment may be characterized as complex and dynamic
(Kohn, 2000; Gaynor and Haas-Wilsion, 1999; Lake et al., 2003). Environmental
forces, such as managed care, competition, reimbursement reforms (e.g., the BBA), and
others, stimulated massive consolidation in the health care industry in the mid-1990s
(Bazzoli et al., 1999, Gaynor and Haas-Wilsion, 1999, Lesser and Ginsburg, 2000,
Dranove et al., 2002). Environmental and task uncertainty make organization
performance unpredictable (Thompson, 1967). As the environmental dynamism and
task uncertainty increase, health care organizations may change their structures to regain
the fit with the changed environment in order to improve their quality. Contingency
theory proposes two or possibly three scenarios of hospital systems responses to their
external environment and internal contingency conditions.

According to the first scenario, external forces stimulate consolidation of health
providers, which, in turn, increases interdependence (i.e., connectedness) among these
providers (Donaldson, 2001). In this situation, leadership of integrated health care
providers may view task interdependence as a leading or dominant contingency factor.
Health systems may start using integration strategy to better align their structures in
accordance with requirements of task interdependence.
A greater centralization of structures may allow managing effectively increasing
connectedness of organizations in the systems. Contingency theory implies that as task
interdependence and centralization increase, differentiation and divisionalization
decrease, because organizational services, products, and tasks become related and
require more integration and coordination at the systems' level and less delegation of
authority to the hospital's level (Donaldson, 200 1). Centralization of authority at the
health system's level would allow the system leadership to better process information for
making effective decisions and coordinating activities among sub-units in response to
changing environments (Savage et al., 1997). Effective coordination of reciprocal
interdependences may improve provision of care along the continuum and stimulate
clinical integration of the system's sub-units. Centralization of health systems may also
stimulate diffusion of administrative and care management practices within their systems
(Shortell et al., 2000).
As a result, a hypothesis that better quality outcomes would be observed in more
centralized health systems in comparison with more decentralized health systems will be
proposed.

8
According to the second (contrasting) scenario, as consolidation among health
providers has picked up in response to the dynamic environment in the mid-1990s,
organizational size of health systems increased (Bazzoli 1999/2000). Child (1975)
stated that organizational size defines the structure, and therefore, leadership may view a
large size as a main contingency factor and need to manage it by restructuring.
Health system's leadership may use differentiation and divisionalization strategy
to fit organizational size with their structures when organizational services, products,
tasks are maintained at the hospital level and unrelated with each other at the system
level (Thompson, 1967, Donaldson, 2001). As a result, a large health system to
decentralize and rely more on indirect means of control over organizational processes,
such as specialization (i.e., division of labor), formalization (i.e., pre-specified roles and
relationships), and worker autonomy (i.e. technical competency of personnel) (Child,
1972; Scott, 2003).
Specialization, due to routinization of tasks, and formalization of care delivery
may improve clinical processes and accountability of personnel at the hospital level,
thus, reducing system errors and mistakes. Increased physician decision-making
authority and clinical autonomy in decentralized health systems improve physicianhospital relationships when hospitals rely more on professionals to improve their
performance (Alexander et al., 2001), which may result in better quality outcomes.
Thus, decentralization of health systems may improve adjustments of hospitals
with contingency factors at the local submarkets by increasing service availability and
accessibility through differentiation strategy, stimulating specialization in hospital

services and physician clinical autonomy in the local submarkets as indirect means of
control. In contrast to the first scenario, a hypothesis that better quality outcomes would
be observed in more decentralized health systems in comparison with more centralized
will be suggested.
The interplay of both scenarios provides that moderately centralized health
systems can potentially become quality champions in comparison with other system
types, because they may have found the "right" organizational structure and strategic
balance between centralization and differentiation of their structures and services. On
the other hand, independent health systems are hypothesized to have the worst quality
outcomes in comparison with other system types, because their structures may be
characterized as neither centralized nor differentiated.
Scope and Approach
Data are assembled for 6 years (1995 - 2000) from multiple sources: 1) Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project
State Inpatient Database (HCUP SID) provides patient clinical and non-clinical
information, including main quality indicators; 2) Joint Commission for Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) performance area scores, assessing organizational
dimensions of the quality of inpatient care (these data are available for 2 at most years
for each study hospital), provide data on internal clinical processes and integration; 3)
American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Surveys provide data on hospital
characteristics; 4) Area Resource File (ARF) provides market and socioeconomic
variables at the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) and county levels; 5) HMO

Interstudy provides information on the number of HMOs and HMO penetration; 6) the
1995-2000 Medicare Case Mix Index Files provide data on hospital case-mix; and 7) the
1993-2000 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare cost report
data, which provide detailed hospital financial information.
A combination of panel and cross-sectional designs is proposed. The unit of

analysis for this study is a hospital. Dependent variables are patient quality outcomes.
Risk adjusted Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) and Patient Safety Indicators (PSIS) are
used. The exogenous constructs are presented by four sets of variables: (I) clinical
integration; (2) hospital organizational characteristics, including the main explanatory
variable - hospital affiliation with different types of health systems; (3) market
characteristics; and (4) patient characteristics.
Through descriptive analysis, comparing hospitals in the empirical sample with
hospitals in the nationwide sample, external validity and generalizability of findings will
be assessed. In order to evaluate effects of structural designs of hospital systems on
quality outcomes, performances of several models will be analyzed and compared: (I)
panel models, estimated by fixed effects or random effects, assuming strict exogeneity;
(2) cross-sectional three stage estimation models for separate years of 1997 and 2000;
and (3) simplified models may be used if measures of clinical integration are weak.
Using a combination of panel and cross-sectional models may help in accounting for
possible feedback effects, avoiding data limitation, and reassuring internal validity of
findings. The panel, cross-sectional three stage estimation, and simplified models for
this study are defined and presented below.

Description of the Models
1) General Fixed Effects or Random Effects Model - Panel Study:

q, = d l +S,CI,, +S,S,, + d 4 X , ,+ d , M , , +d,<,

+S,Time, + p ,+ E , ,

2) Three Stage Estimation Models - Cross-sectional Study:
a) Multinomial Logit Model (first-stage) for Estimating Predicted Probabilities
for Health Systems:
Y sys = a, + a,X , + a,M ,

+ a,P, + t9,IVHS + E

b) Negative Binoniial Model (second-stage) for Estimating Predicted Sums of
Scores for Internal Clinical Processes and Integration by System Types:
YCL= PO + PIXI + P2M2 + P3P3 + P4i)SY.$ + t92IVCI + &
c) OLS (third-stage) Regression with Predicted Values of Internal Clinical
Processes and Integration by System Type:

Y = S o + S , j , , + d , X , + S 3 M 3+S4P4+ E
3) Simplified Model:

Y =8, + d 2 j s y 5+ & X , + 4 M 4 +&P, + E
Significance of the Study
This study differs from the previous empirical work on hospital systems and
quality of care in several ways: the conceptual model presents two or possibly three
scenarios on how structural variation in levels of centralization and differentiation
between different types of health systems and their processes of care delivery may
influence quality performances; HCUP SID quality and patient safety indicators are used

as quality signals; JCAHO variables are proposed as measures of clinical integration;
and extensive data sources and rigorous methodology may provide generalizable and
reliable findings for this study.
Contingency theory is used in developing a contrasting andlor complementary set
of hypotheses. The taxonomy of health systems is applied in assessing how different
hospital structures may affect quality outcomes (Bazzoli et al., 1999). It has already
been found that financial performance varies among hospitals in these types of health
systems (Bazzoli et al., 2000). Therefore, it is expected that hospital structural
characteristics may influence patient quality outcomes.
A combination of risk-adjusted Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) and Patient
Safety Indicators (PSIs) is proposed as dependent variables that has not been previously
used in the panel data analyses in studying hospital structural characteristics and quality
of care. Romano et al. (2003) in a descriptive study found that quality outcomes
measured by 7 IQIs and PSIs got worse, outcomes for 10 IQIs and PSIs improved, and
outcomes for 2 PSI and IQI remained unchanged from 1995 to 2000. Thus, there is
variation in PSIs and IQIs over time; however, how much of this variation can be
explained by hospitals' affiliation with different types of health systems still remains
unanswered. This research will attempt to provide answers on which health system type
may be the best or the worst quality performer. It is proposed to assess whether the
JCAHO performance area scores can be used as measures of internal clinical processes
and integration in hospitals in different types of health systems. Identification of clinical
process measures may be beneficial for the future research, which will use a structure-

process-outcome framework. This study will be useful to health policymakers, hospital
managers, and health services research community. Public (e.g., governments) and
private (e.g., employers, health plans) would like to know if some types of systems
produce better quality, so they can: a) get better hospital value when making purchasing
decisions, weighing quality differences against cots; b) give hospital systems direct or
indirect incentives to adopt such a structures. Similarly, hospital managers would find
such information very useful for structural and process improvements. This study may
contribute to a general knowledge on how hospital integration affects quality of care,
which may facilitate further research efforts in this direction. Additional research may
be needed to further pin point structural and procedural technical elements necessary for
delivering high quality care.
Summary of Remaining Chapters
This chapter briefly overviews structural and clinical integration and quality of
care, introduces theoretical and conceptual models, the purpose and significance of the
proposed study. It also describes the forthcoming chapters: Chapter 2 reviews literature
on quality of care and different types of structural integration that occurred the 1990s
and the 2000s. Horizontal, physician-hospital, and vertical integration in the health care
industry and their conceptual and empirical causes and effects will be described. A
proposition of that Integrated Deliver Systems (IDS) are more likely achieve clinical
integration, and therefore, reduce costs and improve quality outcomes will be reviewed.
A discussion how external and internal forces and hospital structural characteristics may

affect inpatient quality will be provided. This review will also reveal gaps in the
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existing empirical literature on quality of care and hospitals in IDS. Chapter 3 provides
an overview of the mechanistic-organic approach to organization theory (Burns and
Stalker, 1961), which became a conceptual basis for contingency theory. Contingency
theory helps in developing several conceptual scenarios on health system structure
effects on quality outcomes. A set of contrasting and/or complementary hypotheses is
developed.
Chapter 4 describes the methodology used in this study. Panel and crosssectional approaches to study designs are suggested. Multiple data sources, variables
and measures, analytical models are discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 5 presents the empirical results of the current study. Descriptive
statistics and results of fixed effects and three stage estimation models are presented.
Performances of the models are compared.
Chapter 6 summarizes the empirical results, providing findings and conclusions.
Limitations of the current study are discussed, and recommendations are suggested for
the future research.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
This literature review describes the status of quality of care and structural
integration that occurred among hospitals and health care organizations during the 1990s
and 2000s, which is a timeframe relevant to the current study. Horizontal, physicianhospital, and vertical integration in the hospital industry is reviewed in greater detail. A
proposition that integrated delivery systems (IDS) are more likely than free standing
hospitals to improve quality is discussed. Existing empirical research on how different
types of integration affect hospital quality of care is also provided.
Secondly, the studies on external (i.e., managed care, competition, regulation) and
internal (i.e., decision-making, organizational culture and others) forces that may have
direct influence on integration and quality of care are reviewed. A description how
hospital structural characteristics may affect inpatient quality is available in this literature
review.
Thirdly, different taxonomies of health systems are presented in order to select
one classification that can make this research more effective in terms of studying quality
of care provided in hospitals that belong to different types of health systems. This review
also reveals gaps in the existing empirical literature on hospitals and IDS structures and
quality of care.

Quality in General Terms
According to the Institute of Medicine definition (2001), quality is "the degree to
which health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired
health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge."
Good quality of care maximizes patient welfare, reflects excellence in the
provision of medical care in a timely and continuous manner, with good communication,
shared decision making, and cultural sensitivity (Donabedian, 1980, Laffel and
Blumenthal, 1989 and Schuster et al. 1998). Poor quality is characterized by providing
too much care (e.g., unnecessary medical services, tests, medications that can harm
patients due to side effects or associated risks); too little care (a failure to provide
necessary and needed medical care); or the wrong care (e.g., clinician-induced
complications) (Schuster et al. 1998).
Donabedian (1980) proposed a structure-process-outcome approach for studying
quality of care. "Structural quality evaluates health system characteristics, process
quality assesses interactions between clinicians and patients, and outcomes offer evidence
about changes in patients' health status" (p. 5 18, Schuster et al. 1998).
Stiles and Mick (1994) proposed a typology of quality dimensions presented
below that was influenced by the Donabedian's work (Tablel). Even though all
dimensions of quality are important for measuring quality outcomes, literature reviews
indicated that there are more studies available on technical process quality (Schuster et al.
1998). Technical process quality is characterized by whether provided clinical care is
appropriate and necessary. The care is appropriate when the expected health benefits

Table 1: The Typology of Quality Dimensions

Technical

Interpersonal

Structure
Equipment available
Staffing (numbers,
qualifications,
expertise)
Training programs
Teaching affiliation
Size, volume,
ownership
Governing board

Process
Accuracy of
diagnosis
Appropriateness of
treatment
Treatment skillfully
applied
Treatment plans,
sequencing
Practice guidelines

New technology's
impact on roles and
role relationships
Building design,
signage
Presence of chaplains,
patient advocates,
social workers,
translators, ethics
committee

Collegiality
Nature of
communication
Honest,
forthcoming
treatment of
patients and
families
Sensitivity and
compassion in

Amenities

Cleanliness
Presence of
conveniences
Ease of access, parking
I Appearance of staff
(p. 3 13, Stiles and Mick, 1994)

patient flow
Short waiting
periods

Increments and
decrements in health or
functional status
Palliation
Frequency, distribution
of adverse incidents
Malpractice
Donations (time,
bequests)
Patient satisfaction
Enlotional, spiritual
peace
Family satisfaction
Referrals
Compliance
Returns for future care
Malpractice
onz zit ions (time,
bequests)
Patient satisfaction
Family satisfaction
Referrals
Donations (time,
bequests)

exceed health risks. The care is necessary if there is a reasonable chance that a patient
would benefit from this care or it is improper not to provide the care.
Quality indictors are developed to measure technical process quality. Quality
indicators are based on professional standards of care and allow a comparison of
performance of health providers between each other and over time (Schuster et al. 1998).
Quality indicators are constantly used to identify those structural and process
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characteristics of health providers that have the most influential effects on quality of care.
Structural integration among health providers may affect quality of care. Thus, in the
following sections, a review of literature on various aspects and effects of integration in
the health care industry, including its effects on quality of care, is provided.
Integration in General Terms
Webster's dictionary (1990) defines integration as: "the act or process or an
instance of forming, coordinating, or blending activities into a functioning or unified
whole." "Integration is the extent to which functions and activities are appropriately
coordinated across operating units that are parts of a system's delivery of care so as to
maximize the value of services to patients (Giles et al., 1997, p. 230)." Functional .
integration, physician system integration, and eventually clinical integration are believed
to be the key elements in creating the integrated organization (Shortell et al., 1996).
Shortell et al. (1996) defined functional integration as "the extent to which key
support functions such as financial management, human resources, information systems,
strategic planning, and total quality management are coordinated across the operating
units.. ..Physician-system integration is defined as the extent to which physicians are
economically linked to the system, use its facilities and services, and are active
participants in planning, management, and governance.. ...Clinical integration is defined
as the extent to which patients care services are coordinated across people, functions,
activities, processes, and operating units so as to maximize the value of services
delivered" (p. 30). Clinical integration is achieved when a health care organization is
able to horizontally and vertically integrate their structures and processes. Clinically

integrated organized delivery systems may improve quality of care and reduce costs
(Shortell et al., 1996).
Horizontal Integration
Horizontal integration is defined as the "combination of several organizations
whose outputs are substitutes from the perspective of consumer demand" (p. 419, Snail
and Robinsion, 1998). Horizontally integrated firms offer "similar (substitute) or
compatible (complement) products" and "horizontal markets are comprised of
conventional competitors (firms that offer similar goods and services to the same set of
potential customers)" (p. 179, Robinson, 2001). Horizontal integration is also defined as
"coordination of activities at the same stage of delivery of care" (Shortell et al., 1996).
Horizontal integration takes place when two or more hospitals combine their structures
(Dowling, 1995). There are two types of horizontal integrations in the hospital sector: (I)
merger (one of the organizations retains its name and legal status) or consolidation (a new
organization is formed from melding together a few separate organizations) and (2)
multihospital systems (Mick et al., 1993).
Horizontal integration through merger started in the mid 1960s (Dowling, 1995).
There were only 74 hospital mergers in the 1983-1988 period; 190 mergers occurred
between 1989 and 1996 (Bazzoli et al., 2002). According to Sinay and Campbell (2002),
278 single hospitals merged or were consolidated from 1986 and 1992. Hospital mergers
continued through the mid-1990s and slowed in the late 1990s. There were 3 1 mergers in
1998 and 22 hospital mergers in 1999. A seventeen percent increase in the merger
activity was noted in 2000, which was the first increase in two years.
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Once two or more hospitals merge, but maintain their separate identity, they
become a part of local or regional multihospital system. Multihospital systems are
defined as a system of "two or more acute care hospitals that are owned, leased,
sponsored, or managed by a single corporate entity" (p. 100, Mick et al, 1993,
Zuckerman, 1979). According to the American Hospital Association (AHA) definition,
health systems are entities that owned andfor managed by health care provider facilities
or health-related subsidiaries. Some demographic information on multihospital systems
is presented below.
Bazzoli et al. (2004) reported that 56.2 percent of U.S. hospitals belonged to a
health network or system; by 2000, this increased to 72.1 percent. Ermann and Gabel
(1985) described the growth in multihospital systems and the number of hospitals
affiliated with systems in their review of literature: there were 202 systems (1,405
affiliated hospitals) in 1975,267 systems (1,796 affiliated hospitals) in 1980,256 systems
(1,924 affiliated hospitals) in 1982 identified in the AHA data sets. The number of health
systems has increased from 295 (2,836 affiliated hospitals) in 1994 to 365 systems (3,221
affiliated hospitals) in 1998 (Bazzoli et al., 200 1 and 2002).
Luke et al. (1995) studied local hospital systems (LHS) formation. They noted
that the percentage of urban acute care general hospitals that were members of urban
clusters (i.e., hospitals having one or more system partners in the same metropolitan area)
grew from 19 to 28 percent from 1982 to 1989. The geographic dispersion of health
systems was mainly limited to one geographic area, i.e. Metropolitan Statistical Area: "in
1990, 56.5 percent of systems owned hospitals [located] in just one MSA and this
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increased to 63.9 percent of systems in 2001 (Bazzoli, 2005)"

Mergers and formation of

multihospital systems have been extensively studied in the recent years. Conceptually
and empirically grounded reasoning of horizontal integration was proposed by the
number of researchers, which is going to be discussed in the following sections.

Causes of Horizontal Integration
Organization and economic theory perspectives were mainly used to describe pros
and cons of horizontal integration in the health care industry. Organization theory
suggests that organizations may get involved in horizontal integration in order to.increase
or improve: (1) organizational size, (2) chances of organizational survival, (3) access to
resources, (4) market and political powers, (5) performance and outcomes, (6) reduce
competition in local markets (Shortell et al., 1996, Mick et al., 1993, Morrisey and
Alexander 1987).
Economic theory suggests that organizations may get involved in horizontal
integration in order to experience: (1) economies of scale and/ or scope, (2) economies of
management, purchasing, and marketing, (3) easier access to capital and manpower, (4)
reduction in competitive pressures, (5) increased purchasing and bargaining powers
(Bogue et al., 1995, Robinson 2001, Bazzoli et al., 2002).
It is obvious that many conceptual causes proposed by either theory are
compatible and suggesting the same consequence: horizontal integration in health care
should improve the end results, i.e. organizational performance and quality of care.
Whether it is true or not can be learned from the empirical research findings.
Horizontally integrated hospitals are believed to be systematically different from

independent hospitals and, therefore, a comparison of these two forms is difficult (Snail
and Robinson 1998). A discussion of empirical studies on determinants of horizontal
integration that involved multivariate techniques and/or longitudinal data to reduce
potential limitation of cross-sectional designs is provided below. However, there are only
a few articles that used rigorous statistical techniques and panel data.
Bogue et al. (1995) studied 74 hospitals that merged between 1983 and 1988.
They found that the acquiring hospitals were more likely to be large, general community,
non-profit hospitals, with higher occupancy rates and lower Medicaid revenues than
hospitals with which they merged. The Bogue's et al. (1995) longitudinal study
compared hospital characteristics before and after a merger and whether merged hospitals
retained or dropped acute care services. They identified three main reasons for merger:
consolidation of services, improving market positioning, and gaining financial and
operating stability.
Bazzoli et al. (2002) replicated the Bouge's study using newer data in order to
compare their findings. Bazzoli's et al. study supported the earlier findings, i.e. merged
hospitals tended to consolidate duplicating departments and programs, to reduce clinical
(mainly nursing), non-clinical, and administrative FTEs, and to strengthen their financial
position. However, urban hospitals in the later period (1989-1996) were less frequent in
reducing excess capacity and closing duplicating facilities and services than hospitals in
the earlier period (1983-1988).
Alexander and Morrisey (1988a) researched hospitals that joined with
multihospital systems in the 1980s and found that weak hospitals merged with stronger
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hospitals to improve their market positioning. Alexander and Morrisey (1988b) also
identified that hospitals' non-teaching status, low bed size, low occupancy rate and profit
margin may increase their chances of being acquired in the 1980s. Brooks and Jones
(1997) found that hospitals merged to gain opportunities in their unique local
environments in the 1983-1 992 period. Brooks and Jones (1997) also found that greater
financial differences and closer geographic proximity between merging hospitals may
result in greater benefits of their merger. However, Bazzoli et al. (2003) studied 1,016
urban hospitals in the later period of 1994 and 1998 and found that financially strong
hospitals were more likely to join hospital systems as a defense strategy to managed care
in the 1990s.
Luke et al. (1995) found that local health system formation was positively
associated with the number of hospitals in the markets, the number of doctors per capita,
and the percentage of the population enrolled in HMOs. Chernew et al. (1995) also
found that a ten percent increase in HMO market shares lead to a four percent reduction
in the number of hospitals and a five percent reduction in beds in 1982-1 987, suggesting
that consolidation and integration of providers possibly happen for efficiency reasons and
for gaining market power. Thus, motivations for hospital horizontal integration were
different for hospitals in the 1980s and the 1990s. Horizontal integration in the hospital
sector may have been motivated by multiple factors:
(1) To increase market and political power, reducing competition in their markets;
(2) To carry out organizational change: consolidation of duplicating services and
departments, reducing excess capacity and personnel;

(3) To improve hospitals' financial and operating positioning;
(4) Mergers between unequal hospitals were prevalent in the 1980s and managed

care may have stimulated integration of strong providers in the 1990s.
Effects of Horizontal Integration

The following literatures look at horizontal integration's effects on quality of care
and hospital financial performances. Only one study was identified that examined the
effects of hospital mergers on quality of care. Ho and Hamilton (2000) looked at hospital
mergers and acquisitions in California between 1992 and 1995 in terms of quality
measures from 1 to 3 years before or after mergers. Measures of quality were inpatient
mortality from heart attacks and strokes, 90-day readmission rates for heart attack
patients, and early discharge of newborns (Ho and Hamilton, 2000). A self-selection
problem of hospitals that chose to merge was controlled by the Heckman's selection
technique. Controlling for patient, organizational, and market characteristics, Ho and
Hamilton (2000) did not find differences in inpatient mortality before and after mergers
and acquisitions, although the associated standard errors were large. Readmission rates
and early discharge of newborns increased in some cases during the 1-3 year period after
mergers.
Newhouse et al. (2003) recreated variables for integration within Maryland (MD)
hospitals and differentiation across MD hospital systems and networks using a
methodology developed by Bazzoli et al. (1999). They used these variables as the key
explanatory variables in a retrospective cross-sectional study of integration and
differentiation effects on readmission, in-hospital mortality, length of stay and costs.

They found no integration effects on outcomes; a higher likelihood of readmission was
found as the level of community service differentiation increased. However, several
limitations may be noted: 1) this study was limited to only one state; 2) the Bazzoli's et
al. methodology was only partially applied leaving out physician and insurance products;
3) Newhouse's et al. (2003) measures of integration as the number of services at the
hospital level and of differentiation as the number of services available within the
hospital, system, network, community may be correlated.
The effects of horizontal integration on hospitals financial and operational
performance were contradictory. On one hand, Connor et al. (1997) longitudinally
compared costs and prices for 3,500 hospitals (122 mergers) in merging and non-merging
categories between the 1986 to 1994 period in selected markets. They found that mergers
were financially beneficial for consumers, providing average price reduction of 7.1
percent; and cost growth was 7.2 percent lower for hospitals in merging category. Spang
et al. (2001) also studied the impact of mergers on hospital costs and prices for the 1989
to 1997 period. Spang et al. (2001) found that cost growth for merging hospitals was
10.1 percent lower than that of non-merging hospitals; price growth for merging hospitals
was 7.9 percentage points less than it was for non-merging hospitals.
Menke (1997) found that system hospitals had two hundred - two hundred fifty
dollars lower average and marginal costs per stay than independent hospitals. Hospital
systems also reached economies of scope between inpatient and outpatient services,
reducing mean costs by eleven percent for system and three percent for independent
hospital (Menke, 1997).

On the other hand, Dranove and Shanley (1995) examined two reasons for the
formation of horizontally merged local multihospital systems: cost reduction and
reputation. Integrated hospitals may eliminate duplicating services and reduce
administrative costs. Searching costs for consumers who look for higher quality of care
may also decrease in integrated provider markets. Dranove and Shanley (1995) found
that cost reduction was not a factor, but system hospitals enjoyed reputation benefits over
non-system hospitals. Horizontal integration of hospitals may affect their pricing policy.
Dranove et al. (2004) found that consolidation enabled hospitals to increase prices in
three of the four markets studied. Earlier Dranove et al. (1996) concluded that
horizontally merged hospitals did not generate production efficiency and did not limit
duplication of expensive technologies, but system hospitals were able to raise price
margins in comparison with non-system hospitals.
Clement et al. (1997) found that 2,500 urban hospitals that were members of
strategic hospital alliances (SHAs) had higher net revenues per adjusted discharge than
non-SHA hospitals in 1995, but their cash flow and operating expenses were not
different. In another study, price increases were larger for region and national hospital
systems (Young et al., 2000). Finally, Bazzoli et al. (2004), in reviewing literature on
organizational change over two decades, concluded that horizontal integration among
hospitals yields higher revenue or profit levels for consolidating hospitals versus
independent hospitals.
However, possible price and cost effects of hospital mergers may decrease over
time (Nauenberg et al., 1999, Spang et al. 2001). It is also unclear whether multihospital

systems can gain substantial economies of scale. Hospitals with the 200400 bed range
were the most likely ones to achieve economies of scale; but many consolidated hospitals
exceeded this range (Snail and Robinson, 1998).
Dranove and Shanley (1995) found that system hospitals were not better than nonsystem hospitals in exploiting economies of scale in managing service offerings and
administrative costs. Dranove (1998) also stated that economies of scale were exhausted
in hospitals with over 10,000 discharges annually; therefore, larger, merged hospitals and
multihospital systems would have no or small efficiency gains. In summary:
(1) There is limited research on quality effects of horizontal integration. Only
one study identified that there were very limited effects of mergers on quality
outcomes;
(2) Empirical studies demonstrate mixed results of horizontal integration on
hospital operational performance, i.e. hospital costs;
(3) Many empirical studies suggest that consolidating hospitals (merged and
joined into multihospital systems) had higher price or profit levels than nonconsolidating, but these effects may decrease over time;

(4) There are mixed findings on whether horizontally integrated hospitals would
gain economies of scope andlor scale;
(5) More empirical work is necessary for assessing quality outcomes in different
types of health systems and hospitals.
Horizontal integration has been a prevalent phenomenon in the hospital industry
during the last decades. Effects of horizontal integration are mixed and the most
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literatures are dated. However, Bazzoli et al. (2004) suggested that studies on outcomes
of horizontal integration are only measuring short-term effects (at most 3 years after a
merger) of hospital consolidation, but not long-term effects. Thus, empirical studies that
look at long-term effects of hospital integration are necessary to consider.
According to Shortell et al. (1996), health providers need to achieve physiciansystem integration before reaching clinical integration and resulting in cost reduction and
improvement in quality of care. Therefore, a discussion of empirical literature on
physician-hospital integration and vertical integration in the health care industry that took
place in the recent time is important.
Physician-Hospital Integration
Robinson (200 1) stated that physician-hospital integration differs from vertical
integration of hospitals with other organizations, because some relationships between
physicians and hospitals may be complementary, not vertical, in nature. These two
parties "rarely sell or buy from each other.. ..they combine their services in a
complementary fashion to create a single product that is sold to the patient and insurer"
(p. 181, Robinson, 2001).
Physician-hospital integration increased through the mid 1990s, but has since
experienced a steady decline. "In 1994,58.5 percent of health systems had contractual
arrangements with physicians and this declined to 3 1.8 percent by 200 1. The percentage
of systems that owned physician practices declined from 29.1 percent to 18.2 percent....
around 20 percent of hospitals systems owned HMOs in the 1994 to 1998 period and this
declined to 16 percent by 2001" (Bazzoli, 2005). In this sub-section, studies that looked

at structures of physician+n-ganizationarrangements (POA), causes and effects of
physician-hospital integration are reviewed.

Structural Organization of Physician-Hospital Arrangements
A variety of organizational models have been developed to link physicians and
hospitals. American Hospital Association's Annual Survey of Hospitals describes them
as follows: Group Practice Without Walls (GPWW) is a loosely coupled formation aimed
at decreasing administrative expenses; and physicians remain independent. Independent
Practice Association (IPA) is a legal entity that assists solo physicians and those in
smaller practices to obtain managed care contracts. Physician-Hospital Organization
(PHO) is a joint venture that assists physicians to obtaining managed care contracts; it
may also own or operate a primary care clinic. Management Service Organization
(MSO) is owned by a hospital or a physician organization and contracts with physicians
to provide administrative services and management. Medical Foundation (MF) is a
hospital subsidiary that acquires all physical assets of medical group practices; physicians
sign a professional services agreement with the subsidiary corporation. Integrated Salary
Model (ISM) is a hospital that employs physicians. Integrated Health Organization
(IHO) owns one or more medical group practices and owns or joint ventures with an
HMO.
Several researchers identified prevalence of Physician-Organization
Arrangements (POAs) in different years. Morrisey et al. (1996) used 1993 Prospective
Payment Assessment (ProPAC) data on 1,495 hospitals and reported that 23.3 percent of
hospitals participated in at least in one form of physician-organization arrangements; 64

percent had a physician-hospital organization (PHO), 32.6 percent - a management
service organization (MSO), 15.5 percent - a medical foundation (MF), and 11.2 percent an integrated healthcare organization (IHO).
Dynan et al. (1998) studied 573 hospitals in a later period and found that the
prevalence of POAs was as follows: 60.5 percent of PHOs, 38.3 percent MSOs, 3 1.7
percent ISMS, 22.1 percent MFs, 20.3 percent of IPAs, 10.4 percent IHOs, 9.5 percent of
GPWW. According to the AHA, which may followed a greater number of hospitals, 27.6
percent of hospitals had PHOs in 1994, which increased to 33.2 percent in 1996, and then
declined to 26.4 percent by 2000 (Bazzoli et al., 2004 ). The similar patterns of
fluctuation in prevalence were discovered for other types of POAs (Bazzoli et al., 2001).
Burns and Thorpe (1993) suggested that physician-hospital arrangements develop
from one model to the next. Cave (1995) lined up different POA models on dimensions
of cost-efficient delivery of services and sustainability over the long run. GPWW model
was on one extreme, i.e. low cost-efficient delivery of care and not sustainable in the long
run. Efficiency and sustainability were increasing as: PHO- MSO-

MF--+Staff

models; and Equity model was on another extreme, i.e. high cost efficiency and
sustainability. Cave (1995) suggested that IDS would benefit from having staff- and
equity-based systems because these systems would provide operational stability, a strong
primary care physician base, efficient delivery of medical care, and geographic
accessibility under capitation payment. One governance structure in staff- and equitybased systems and strong physician bonds with these systems would also stimulate
efficiency and sustainability. However, Burns and Thorpe (1993) and Cave (1995)
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suggestions were driven by theory and observations, not based on empirical findings, and
were considered as rough typologies. Later studies by Alexander et al., (1996) and
Dynan et al., (1998) did not find support for gradual staging from less to more integrated
physician-hospital arrangements in response to managed care. Casalino and Robinson
(2003) in their case study of four hospital systems noticed that systems chose to develop
or maintain their affiliations with physicians even while the U.S. health industry is
moving from tight to loose managed care.

Causes and Effects of Physician-Hospital Integration
The determinants of physician-hospital integration have rarely been studied.
Empirical studies that demonstrate how hospital structure, environment, and strategy may
stimulate physician-hospital integration are discussed below.
Certain physician characteristics may affect physician-organization integration.
Burns et al. (2001) identified that older physicians were more likely to align with a
system, possibly due to fewer available alternatives at the later stage of their careers.
Tenure duration was associated with physician intent to continue working with a system
and to admit patients to that system; and tenure was inversely related to physician's
affective commitment to the hospital system. Bums et al. (2001) suggested that over time
physicians "may come to resent their ties to a system even though they report being more
likely to stay with the system and admit patients to its facilities" (p. 1-5). Physician
leadership in POAs' governance and decision-making was a positive factor in integrating
physicians and hospital systems (Burns et al., 2001; Coddington et al. 2000; Gillies et al.
200 1). Financial stimuli may also result in better physician-organization alignment.
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Burns et al. (2001) at a physician and Alexander et al. (2001) at a physician organization
level of analyses found that physician financial incentives, i.e. salary and stipend, and
practice management support services resulted in greater alignment between physicians
and hospital systems. The Alexander's et al. (2001) study also found that the individual
physician risk assumption related to managed care contracts was negatively related to
physician-system integration; but the group risk assumption exerted positive relationships
with alignment. Joint risk-sharing arrangements had positive effects on physicianhospital integration (Burns, Morrisey, et al. 1998; Dynan, Bazzoli, et al. 1998). Mixed
results were also found on physician competition effects on their integration with
hospitals (Alexander et al., 1986; Gillies et al., 2001).
Hospitals structural characteristics, such as size (200-300+ beds), location in
urban areas, affiliation with regionally based health systems, non-for-profit and teaching
status were associated with physician-hospital integration (Morrisey et al. 1996,
Alexander et al. 1996). Hospitals located in environments with higher managed care
penetration (>15%) were more likely to integrate with physicians (Morrisey et al. 1996).
A greater hospital competition was also associated with physician-hospital integration,
i.e. hospitals were twice as likely to form POAs if a competing hospital also formed
POAs (Alexander et al. 1996). However, there were mixed findings on whether hospitals
received any financial benefits from forming POAs. On one hand, Mark et al. (1998)
found that hospitals with POAs had higher costs and lower total margins when compared
with hospitals without POAs. On the other hand, Goes and Zhan (1995) found hospital
costs were lower for integrated physician-hospital organizations. Bazzoli et al. (2004)
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concluded that hospitals were shedding there POAs since 1996, suggesting that "these
organizations may not have returned the value for which hospitals had hoped (p. 3 18)."
Managed care effects on physician-hospital integration were described as complex and
different from its effects on integrative processes in the hospital industry (Morrisey et al.
1996, Burns et al. 2000).
On one hand, Morrisey et al. (1996) found that more extensive processes of
physician-hospital integration, such as employing physicians and buying practices and
entering into joint ventures and network, were not associated with HMO penetration.
Burns et al. (2000) studied the effects of HMO market structure, measured as HMO
penetration and the number of HMO in a market, on formation of physician-organization
arrangements (POAs). The researchers found that a formation of hospital-physician
alliances was induced by the number of HMOs in the market rather than by HMO
penetration.
Threshold effects were identified: the number of HMOs exceeding four in the
local market lead to a substantial increase in POAs formation; however, when the market
consisted of one or two dominant HMOs, POAs' formation may be the lowest, i.e.
discouraged by concentrated HMO markets. These f?ndings raised doubts that HMO
penetration triggered physician-hospital integration (Burns and Thorpe, 1995, Shortell et
al., 1996).
Bazzoli, Dynan, et al. (2000) also found that global capitation of physicianhospital arrangements had more significant effects on their integration than managed care
penetration. Global capitation motivated physicians and hospitais to integrate their
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administrative, management services and computer linkages, promote physician financial
risk sharing, and create joint ventures to provide new services (Bazzoli, Dynan, et al.,
2000).
On the other hand, Dranove et al. (2002) investigated whether managed care may
lead to consolidation among hospitals and physicians. Managed care was associated with
increase in the Herhindahl Index of hospital concentration from .096 in 1981 to .I54 in
the average market in 1994, which was comparable with a decrease from 10.4 equal-sized
hospitals to 6.5 equal-sized hosp.itals. Researchers also found a 14-point decrease in the
percentage of physicians in solo practice in the 1986-1995 period. Researchers
concluded that higher levels of managed care penetration were positively associated with
increases in concentration of hospital and physician markets.
Cuellar and Gertler (working paper, 2002) studied whether physician-hospital
integration is motivated by (1) efficiency gains (e.g., reducing transaction costs and
gaining economies of scope); or is achieved for (2) exerting power in negotiating higher
prices with managed care plans (Gal-Or, 1999). They discovered that adoption of POAs
(excluding fully integrated models) was more likely to occur in markets with high
managed care presence, managed care growth, and managed care dependency. The
authors also found that hospitals integrated with POAs were not different from
unintegrated hospitals in terms of operating costs, i.e. did not have efficiency gains.
However, the results supported the negotiation contracts' power conceptualization, i.e.
hospitals integrated with open and closed POAs had positive and significant effects on
managed care prices and payer volumes than unintegrated hospitals. Cuellar and Gertler

(2002) compared quality of care, measured by HCUP quality indicators, for different
forms of POAs, which was important for both theoretical perspectives. They found that
fully integrated organizations (medical foundations and salary POA) were associated with
better quality outcomes in the HCUP's measures of surgical complication and ambulatory
sensitive conditions and charge about the same in comparison with other less integrated
physician-hospital models.
Strategic positioning of health care providers may also be effective in achieving
physician-hospital integration. Alexander et al. (1996) studied whether the three strategic
dimensions of POA formation-protecting hospital markets, expanding hospital markets,

integratinglcoordinating delivery-were likely causes of POA formation. Alexander et al.
(1996) found that expansion of current markets and integration of clinical services were
more likely to cause of POA formation. Also, health systems that placed high strategic
importance on market expansion or clinical integration had a significantly greater number
of physicians in POAs. However, use of purposeful sample and a cross-sectional study
design were limitations'of the study.
Dynan et al. (1998) studied strategies used by hospitals to form POAs. They
classified hospitals as having: (1) a tight-only strategy if they had any combination of
MSO, MF, ISM, and IHO; (2) a loose-only strategy if they had GPWW, IPA, or PHO
combinations; (3) a hybrid strategy with a combination of both tight and loose
organizational forms. The researchers found that a tight-only strategy exerted a
significant, positive effect on three factors of functional integration (i.e., integration of
administrative, practice management services, and organization of joint ventures to create

new services) and a significant, negative effect on physician financial risk-sharing
between hospitals and physicians. However, a hybrid strategy has a significant, positive
effect on five factors (three mentioned above and also including computer linkages and
salaried physician arrangements), indicating that the hybrid strategy achieves greater
level of hnctional integration than the tight-only and loose-only strategies. Researchers
concluded that hospitals and physicians integrate not only through involvement in
governance, capital planning, and provision of practice management services, but also
through clinical integration and economic involvement. Dynan et al. (1998) also
mentioned the importance of studying both the structure and process elements, rather
than relying on ownership and contractual elements, since their research showed that
ownership may not be crucial for achieving tight integration between hospitals and
physicians. In summary, several factors may influence physician-hospital integration:
(1) Physician characteristics, such as older age, tenure, and physician involvement
in governance and decision-making process of health systems;
(2) Financial incentives for physicians, such as physician salary and stipend, and
creative payment arrangements that balance individual and group risks;

(3) Hospital structural characteristics, such as hospital size, Medicare patient mix,
location in urban areas, affiliation with health systems, non-for-profit and
teaching status; and hospital competition;

(4) There are mixed findings on a managed care influence on integration of
physicians and hospitals; however, global capitation payment system may be a
more decisive factor in POAs' formation;

(5) POAs are more likely to form for gaining contract negotiation power, rather
than for efficiency reasons;
(6) Hybrid POAs' strategy (combing loosely and tightly integrated models) may
achieve a greater functional integration; however, fully integrated models (e.g.
medical foundation and salary model) may have better quality outcomes than
less integrated models.
Vertical Integration
"Vertical integration is the production by a single organizational entity of
successive stages in the processing and distributing of goods and services" (p. 100, Mick,
1993). In health services research literature, commonly used terminology for vertical
integration is defined as follows:

(1) Vertical "forward" integration is directed toward an organization's consumers
such as patients, physicians, enrollees, and purchasers. Forward integration in the
hospital industry includes linkages with physician group practices, outpatient clinics,
skilled nursing facilities, home care agencies, because these are "sources of the hospital's
patients and/or where patients go following hospitalization" (p. 141, Dowling, 1995;
Grasso, 2000). Thompson (1967) also suggested stages of vertical integration "before"
and "after" the core technology. If applied to health care, then inpatient care is the core
technology, pre-hospital and post-hospital care are before and after stages, respectively.
(2) Vertical "backward" integration is aimed at the inputs of production, such as
supplies, equipment, drugs, trained labor, etc. Backward integration may be
characterized by hospital ownership of a medical equipment company, laboratory, or
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group purchasing organization, affiliation with a nursing school or medical school, i.e.
sources of inputs used for production of patient care (Dowling, 1995; Grasso, 2000).
Vertical forward integration among health providers increased through the mid1990s, but then experienced a steady decline due to changes in the payment methods
introduced by the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) for long-term and nursing care facilities

". ..the percent of community hospitals offering home health care increased between 1990
and 1998 (from 35.3 percent to 53.6 percent) but then declined in 2001 (to 44.2 percent).
The percentage offering skilled nursing facility care followed a similar trajectory,
increasing from 19.6 percent in 1990 to 33.3 percent in 1998, but declining, albeit
slightly, in 2001 to 30.9 percent (Bazzoli, 2005)."

Causes and Effects of Vertical Integration
The concept of vertical integration is not new for the health care industry, and
several reasons for vertical integration have been proposed and believed to improve
performance of integrated health care providers (Ackerman, 1992, Robinson and
Casalino, 1996, Robinson, 2001).
(1)

Vertical integration may "occur when the gains to specialization (by keeping
the productive states in separate firms) are offset by the costs of using
market exchange - that is, when it is cheaper to "make" the input than to
"buy" it" (p. 59, Conrad et al., 1990);

(2)

Vertical integration may lower transaction costs through efficient
negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement of restructuring in organizational
units of the vertical systems (Conrad et al., 1990);

(3)

Vertical integration may also result in modest economies of scope by
sharing facilities, joint purchasing, and coordinating administrative services,
i.e. if similar production processes are used along the value chain
(Robinson and Casalino, 1996, Conrad et al., 1990);

(4)

Physician-hospital and hospital - long-term care links may allow integrated
providers to better control flows of patients (Cody, 1996);

( 5 ) Financial risks may be better managed by vertically integrated providers

(Robinson and Casalino, 1996).
Robinson (1996) researched vertical integration of Californian hospitals with
skilled-nursing facilities (SNFs) over two periods: 1982-1986 and 1986-1990. He found
that high Medicare patient mix and non-profit status were significant predictors of
developing hospital-based subacute care in both periods. Economies of scope had a
strong association with integration, and capacity utilization had less strong influence on
integration in the later period. Market conditions did not influence the decision to
integrate into subacute care. Other theoretically driven causes of vertical integration, i.e.
decrease in transaction costs, did not explain hospital integration into subacute care.
Banks et al. (2001) also suggested that the post-1984 system of prospective payment for
hospital care and the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) financial incentives have possibly
encouraged vertical integration. Hospitals have incentives to transfer patients along the
continuum of care sooner; however, traditional providers of long-term care (i.e. skilled
nursing facilities ) have less incentives to accept complicated patients under the BBA
prospective payment for SNFs,. Hospitals vertically integrated SNFs may have easier
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placement for these patients (Banks et al., 2001). Young (1998) suggested that Integrated
Delivery Systems (IDS) would be more suited to sustain financial strains, due to the
BBA, than non-IDS. IDS could use strategic planning, design clinical and non-clinical
task forces and teams for integrated care delivery, select appropriate patient transfer
pricing and methodology between system members in order to minimize the negative
BBA effect on their systems.
However, many hospitals are now choosing to disintegrate with their nursing
facilities (Bazzoli, 2005), because the costs associated with keeping SNF may exceed
their benefits. Cody (1996) hypothesized that vertical integration of hospitals with
outpatient and subacute/chronic care facilities were expected to substitute for inpatient
volume and enhance revenues. Effects of seven vertical integration strategies on the
change in total revenue from 1983 and 1990 were investigated. Cody (1996) found that
adding more community-based physicians to the medical staff, providing more clinic care
and outpatient surgery services had a positive and significant influence on the change in
revenue from 1983 to 1990. On the other hand, Wan et al., (2001) found that profit
margin was lower for health networks (IHNs) integrated into subacute and long-term care
than for those with no integration. Researchers pointed out a possible selection problem
because data had information on 100 top-ranked IHNs; a cross-sectional design may also
be a draw back. In summary, it is concluded that:
(1) The empirical findings are mixed - one study identified that vertical
integration had positive and significant influence on the change in revenue of
integrated providers; however, another study showed opposite results;
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(2) Economies of scope may be associated with hospital integration with
subacute care facilities; however, the concept of decreasing transaction costs
is not substantially researched;
(3) Organizational characteristics, such as high Medicare patient mix and nonprofit status, are associated with vertical forward integration;
(4) Changes in the payer environment may confound organizations' incentives to
pursue vertical integration.
Horizontal, physician-hospital, and vertical "forward" integration may facilitate a
greater clinical integration among providers (Shortell, 1996). Therefore, in the next
section, studies that may explain how structural integration of health providers is linked
to clinical integration, and how clinical integration may affect hospital performance and
quality of care are presented.
Integrated Delivery Systems and Clinical Integration
Vertically and horizontally integrated health providers may operate as Integrated
Delivery Systems (IDS). "An organized [or integrated] delivery system is a network of
organizations (e.g., ambulatory care clinics, physician groups, diagnostic centers,
hospitals, nursing homes, home health care agencies) usually under common ownership
which provides, or arranges to provide, a coordinated continuum of services to a defined
population and is willing to be held clinically and fiscally responsible for the health status
of that population (p. 8, Devers et al. 1994)." Gillies et al. (1993) defined clinical
integration as "the extent to which patient care services are coordinated across the various
functions, activities, and operating units of a system (p. 468)." Integrated Delivery
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Systems (IDS) are more likely to be clinically integrated than freestanding health care
providers. According to Shortell (1996), organized or integrated delivery systems may
achieve clinical integration and, therefore, provide high quality care at lower costs.
In theory, clinical integration of providers in IDS may facilitate: (1) coordination
of clinical and non-clinical services in effective manner; (2) standardization of care; (3)
population-based health statuslneeds assessment; (4) provision of better management of
chronic diseases; (5) specialization among different health providers within the system;
(6) improved continuity of care, provision of easier access to care, and less paperwork

(Gillies et al., 1993, Shortell et al., 1994, Charns 1997, Casalino et al., 2003).
Shortell et al. (1996) noted that "the key to successfully creating a clinically
integrated continuum of care is the ability to achieve mass customization ... that involves
developing services to meet the unique needs of each patient but doing so in an efficient
fashion, using relatively standardized support functions that can be applied to all patients
and that can coordinate care for all patients across the continuum (p. 167)." Burns (1999)
pointed out that standardization of clinical services through various care management
processes (CMP) is the glue that could hold together the polarities in IDS. Burns (1999)
defined CMP as use of clinical evidence-based practice guidelines and protocols,
performance feed back to individual physicians, continuous quality improvement/ total
quality management (CQIITQM), clinical information systems, case management, use of
medical registries, and team approach to provision of care. Care management processes
may move IDS toward mass customization and clinical integration, allowing meeting
needs of individual patients in an efficient manner.
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In practice, IDS may achieve clinical integration when (1) there are clear mission
and values, aimed at clinical integration, that all IDS sub-units should follow, (2)
strategic planning activities involving all sub-units are in place, (3) availability of
information systems, providing data across IDS, (4) coordination of activities is promoted
through common budgeting policies and practices (Shortell, Gillies, and Anderson,
1994).

Causes and Effects of Clinical Integration
Organizational characteristics and financial incentives may influence clinical
integration between providers. Shortell and colleagues (1996 and 2001) identified
hospital characteristics that were related to clinical integration. Larger hospital size,
close physician-system integration with large physician groups (25>), close geographic
proximity between hospitals, physician administrative involvement, hospital strategic
orientation to improve quality of care, and a greater degree of HMO market penetration
were positively associated with clinical integration (Gillies et al., 1993, Devers et al.,
1994, Shortell et al., 1996). Cohen et al. (2000) suggested that integration (mostly for
educational activities) of clinical departments in merged hospitals depends on successful
leadership and management models. They identified several factors necessary for
integration of clinical departments: single chairpersons, constant communication, flexible
leadership and management structures, centralization of and patience in decision making
which was trusted and accepted by physicians.
Mark (1998) studied effects of change in hospital characteristics over two years
on total margin and average Medicare costs as of 1993 in hospitals that either adopted or
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did not adopt physician - hospital organizations. They found that operating margins were
higher when clinical departments heads were held accountable for profits and losses and
when medical staff developed clinical guidelines. Whereas growth in average Medicare
costs was lower when hospital boards had greater physician membership and when
hospitals offered practice management services to physicians. Although direction of
causality was a concern in this study, it suggested that greater levels of clinical
integration and physician accountability may increase operating margins and lower
hospital costs.
Shortell et al., (2001) and Waters et al., (2001) found that compensation
incentives that reimbursed physicians based on cost containment, productivity, and
quality were positively associated with development and comprehensiveness of clinical
integration practices. Casalino et al., (2003) also found that external incentives
(physician bonuses, public recognition and other financial and non-financial incentives to
provide better quality of care) were strongly associated with use of care management
practices (CMP) in providing care to chronically ill patients. In particular, public
recognition and better managed care contract opportunities were the most strongly
associated. These findings suggest that health care purchasers and insurers should
provide external financial and non-financial incentives to health providers in order to
improve quality of care.
Greater clinical integration and physician participation in health systems were
associated with increased greater debt coverage (r=.54 to r=.58), availability of capital
(r=.54 to r=.59), greater total net revenues (r=.47), operating margins (r=.5 l), and
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system's cash flow (r=.48) (Devers et al. 1994, Shortell et al. 1994). However, the
researchers mentioned that these findings should be interpreted cautiously because of
cross-sectional study design and the lack of statistical control for other factors that might
have influenced the systems' performance (Shortell et al. 1994). Lee and Wan (2002)
examined relationships among structural clinical integration, average total charge, and
patient outcomes. Clinical integration was conceptualized and structured as a latent
variable in the LISREL model, using several hospital structural components: integration
across sites of care (forward and backward integration), integration across divisions of
care (use of high tech services and case management), integration of physicians (use of
different types of POAs), integration of the information technology (use of
administrative, management, and clinical information systems). They found positive
associations between structural clinical integration and average total charge, as well as
between average total charge per admission and surgical complications and in-hospital
death.
Lin and Wan (2002) concluded that clinical integration did not immediately
improve financial performance of hospitals, and that structural clinical integration had
only an indirect effect on patient outcomes. However, several limitations were noted by
Lin and Wan (2002): the lack of random sampling of hospitals, a limitation in measuring
clinical integration that reflected only hospital structural aspects, a questionable use of
average total charge as a measure of efficiency, and limitations of risk adjustment
models. Various studies demonstrate that different clinical management processes
(CMP) may be more or less effective in improving quality of care. A number of

randomized control trials found that efforts to implement evidence-based clinical
guidelines were not very successful; only small-to-moderate improvements (not more
than 5-10 percent) in the process of care have been found. Mixed and moderate effects of
physician performance assessment and feedback on quality of care were also found in 8
systematic literature reviews (Grol, 2001). The most effective forms of feedback were
those provided by a respected peer or opinion leader using credible guidelines and
embedded in a comprehensive program of continuous monitoring and improvement
(Grol, 2001).

.

Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) may be described as a constant
improvement of processes of providing goods and services that meets or exceeds
customer expectations (Shortell et al. 1998). A national survey of U.S. hospitals in 1993
found that 69 percent of hospitals had adopted of some form of CQI (Shortell et al. 1998).
A literature review by Shortell et al. (1998), assessing the impact of CQI on clinical

practice, provides some interesting information. The majority of reviewed studies
reported positive CQI effects on clinical practice. For example, CQI reduced length of
stay and patient charges with no change in patient mortality, CQI lead to fewer adverse
drug events, a lower mortality rate, and reduced costs. However, there were no studies
that addressed quality issues across the continuum of acute, primary, and follow-up care.
The weak study designs may have undermined the positive findings on CQI effects on
quality of care (Shortell et al., 1998).
Effective internal processes of care provision, physicianlunit specialization and
team approach may positively affect quality of inpatient care. Aiken et al. (1994)

examined whether hospitals known to be good places for nursing ("magnet" hospitals,
which are known for their team approach and integrative care delivery) have lower
mortality than hospitals that are otherwise similar. They found that the magnet hospitals
have a 4.6 percent lower mortality rate than matched control hospitals (Aiken et al.,
1994). Decreased mortality was also associated with pediatric ICUs with intensivists, comanagement among internists and surgeons, facility-led services, and a specialized stroke
unit (Mitchell and Shortell, 1997). However, limited and inconsistent research was
performed on other organizational processes of care, such as collaboration and
coordination of care, and organizational culture effects on quality (Mitchell and Shortell,
1997).
Shortell et al., (1994) identified the lack of developed clinical information system
one of the major barriers for clinical integration. Waters et al., (2001) found evidence
indicating importance of management information systems in formation of clinical
integration between physician and organization. Casalino et al., (2003) detected that IT
was positively associated with physicians' use of CMP. Hospital information technology

(IT) adoption was positively associated, among other factors, with hospital system
membership (Burke et al., 2002). In 1996, the health care industry spent $1 1.6 billion on
computerized information systems, supporting clinical areas such as outcome
measurement, clinical decision support, disease and case management, telemedicine; it is
also expected that IT costs will be rising in the future (Snyder-Halpern et al., 2000).
Even though the findings suggesting effectiveness of CMP were mixed, Grol
(2001) identified 16 systematic reviews that showed effectiveness of multifaceted

strategies for quality improvement, i.e. strategies that combined different approaches and
targeted different barriers to improve care. These strategies were more effective than
individual approaches in terms of quality of care.
Grol(2001) concluded that there is a need to integrated different CMP in a wider
quality system. Bazzoli et al. (2004), in reviewing literatures on processes of hospital
integration, suggested that administrative consolidation and integration of low-volume
clinical services may have come quickly, but a wide-scale clinical service integration was
limited and took longer time to achieve.
In summary, clinical integration may be a lengthy, resource and time intensive
process:

(1) Clinical integration is not fully achieved by many providers and requires a
clear IDS mission, centralized leadership, strategic planning, information
systems, coordination of activities, capital investments, and time;
(2) Clinical integration is more likely to be achieved in large hospitals that were
aligned with larger physician groups, strategically oriented to improve quality
of care, located in competitive environments and in close geographic
proximity with each other or reimbursed by global capitation;

(3) Clinical integration is strongly and consistently associated with physicians'
financial and non-financial incentives and physicians' participation in
leadership of IDS;
(4) Findings on whether increased financial performance associated with clinical
integration are inconclusive;
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(5) Effects of clinical integration practices on quality have also inconclusive
results;

(6) Clinical integration may result in cost-effective and high quality care, when
standardization of care through multifaceted strategies for quality
improvement are achieved;

(7) There are no clear measures of clinical integration and those few are hard to
find in existing data bases.
Effects of External and Internal Factors on Quality of Care
External forces may have stimulated transformation of freestanding health
providers into integrated delivery systems (IDS) in the 1990s (Lesser and Ginsburg,
2000, Kohn, 2000, Lake et al. 2003, Bazzoli et al., 1999). Managed care, competition,
reimbursement regulations and hospital financial status may also affect quality of care.
Since this literature review was not so far focusing on external factors' direct effects on
quality of care, it may be beneficial to describe studies that actually examined these direct
effects.

Effects of Managed Care on Quality of Care
Only a few empirical longitudinal studies were found that research managed care
effect on hospital quality of care. Shen (2003) examined the effect of financial pressure
on hospital care between 1985 and 1994. One of the variables representing financial
pressure was a change in health maintenance organization (HMO) penetration at the
county level. Quality was measured by mortality and complication rates for acute
myocardial infarction (AMI). HMO penetration doubled between 1985 and 1994. Shen

(2003) found that a 1 percent increase in HMO penetration was responsible for 0.20
percent and 0.70 percent increase in hospital 30-day mortality rates in 1985-1990 and
1990-1994, respectively. Adverse HMO effect was reduced in magnitude and
significance for mortality rates beyond 1 year, suggesting that HMO penetration affected
the short-term mortality.
However, Sari (2002) applied fixed, random effects, and instrumental variable
fixed effects models, using hospital panel data for the 1992-1997 period from 16 states,
and found that higher managed care penetration improved quality, when inappropriate
utilization, wound infections and adverseliatrogenic complications were used as quality
indicators. Thus, findings on managed care effects on quality were mixed, which may be
attributed to differences in quality measures that were used in the studies, i.e. AM1
mortality versus patient safety indicators. Multiple empirical studies compared quality of
care provided in managed care plans versus fee-for-services plans (FFS). Managed care
cost-containment strategies, service access and use reduction strategies raised concerns
about quality of care. Miller and Luft (1994, 1997,2002), in their series of literature
reviews, provided comprehensive analyses of several important empirical studies that
compared managed care and FFS quality performances. They identified and assessed
thirty-seven articles on quality of care provided by HMOs and non-HMOs plans for their
1997 and 2002 reviews. There were equal numbers of positive and negative results
comparing quality of HMO and non-HMO plans. The main conclusion was that quality
of care for HMO enrollees was roughly comparable to those for non-HMO enrollees
(Miller and Luft, 1997,2002).
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Effects of Competition on Quality of Care

Competition in health markets differs fiom competition in the other industries. In
this section, a description how the nature of competition has changed fiom "medical arms
race" to price competition in the health care industry from the early 1980s until 2000 is
provided (Devers et al., 2003). Also articles on price competition's influence on quality
of care are discussed.
Health care competitive environment is affected by asymmetry of information
between buyers and sellers, uncertain outcomes of care, the third party payment system,
integration among health providers, cost reduction strategies, and other factors (Gaynor
and Haas-Wilson, 1999; Miller, 1996). Thus, competition in health care may not
function as predicted by the economic theory. In health care, providers compete not only
based on price, but also based on quality of care, including access and style of care,
reputation, and technical quality (Miller, 1996; Morrisey, 2001).
The presence of health insurance made patients and their agents-physicians to be
less concerned about prices (Gaynor and Haas-Wilson, 1999). Hospitals added services
and technologies when their competitors did the same, which led to duplication and
excess capacity (Robinson and Luft, 1987; Salkever, 1978; Melnick and Zwanziger,
1988). Therefore, hospitals in more competitive markets had higher costs than hospitals
in less competitive markets. This type of competition that increased hospital prices and
costs was named "medical arms race".
During the 1990s, managed care attempted to introduce price competition through
selective contracting. Melnick and Zwanziger (1988) and Zwanziger et al. (1994) found

that rates of increase in costs were lower in more competitive markets after the
introduction of selected contracting. Melnick et al. (1992), Gaskin and Hadley (1997),
Bamezai et al. (1999) also showed that a traditional model of competition (i.e., more
competition-lower prices and costs) worked in the hospital markets with higher levels of
managed care penetration and selective contracting.
There was a concern that price competition among hospitals may negatively affect
inpatient quality (Gaynor and Haas-Wilson, 1999). Only a handful of empirical studies
looked at the. impact of hospital price competition on quality of care and the results were
mixed.
Mukamel et al. (2002) studied the effects of price competition on resource
allocation and quality of care, suggesting that higher price competition may lead hospitals
to allocate more resource into "hotel" rather than clinical services, which may result in
worsening of quality outcomes. The researchers compared data for hospitals before and
after selective contracting in California form 1982 to 1989. Mukamel and colleagues
(2002) found evidence that clinical quality, measured by excess mortality, was associated
with the amount of resources used in producing clinical services and that the increase in
mortality (i.e., lowering of quality) was associated with a decrease of 1 standard deviation
in clinical expenditures per adjusted discharge. Therefore, cost reduction through
increased price competition and selective contracting in California may result in lower
quality of care in hospitals. Volpp et al. (2003) also found similar results in New Jersey:
after the introduction of hospital price competition, quality of care for Acute Myocardial
Infarction (AMI) patients has deteriorated for the uninsured group.
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Contrary, Kessler and McClellen (2000) examined the effects of hospital
competition and HMO penetration on payments to hospital, mortality rates, and
readmission rates for Medicare heart attack patients over the 1985-1994 period. They
found that payments were lower, heart attack mortality was lower, and the complication
rates were lower in high hospital competition and HMO penetration areas rather than in
less competitive markets with lower HMO penetration levels. In other words, higher
competition was associated with better quality outcomes. Sari (2002) also studied
hospital panel data from 16 states in the 1992-1997 period and confirmed that higher
hospital market share and market concentration, i.e. lower hospital competition, were
associated with lower quality outcomes measured by in-hospital complications.

Effects of Reimbursement Regulations and Hospital
Financial Status on Quality of Care
Several shifts have occurred in the federal government reimbursement policy over
the last two decades. These shifts are described in this section. Before 1983, Medicare
reimbursed hospitals on a reasonable costs basis for inpatient care patients. This time
was referred as the "Golden Era" of health care, because the government covered
virtually all health care costs. However, the escalation of costs resulted in adoption of the
Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 1983 that paid hospitals a fixed amount
per discharged case, determined by the Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs). The
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 lowered the rates of growth in payments and levels of
supplemental payments for Medicare patient. It was suggested that the PPS and the BBA
may negatively affect quality of care (Banks et al., 2001).
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The PPS reduced the reimbursement for the average Medicare patients for a
majority of hospitals (Hadley et al., 1989). Hospitals responded by implementing
operational changes, which resulted in low increases in the Medicare inpatient hospital
costs. Hospital admissions fall 11.3 percent and occupancy rates decreased by
approximately 10 percent between 1983 and 1987 (Feinglass et al., 1991). Other effects
included reductions in the Medicare patient length of stay, increases in outpatient service
provision, and reduction of hospital staffing (Feder et al., 1987).
Hospitals had an incentive to shift provision of care from inpatient to skilled
nursing settings, because these types of services were still reimbursed on retrospective,
cost basis and were not affected by the PPS. Lee et al. (1996) found that post-acute care
substituted for acute care; post-acute care costs grew rapidly from 7 percent in 1986 to 22
percent in 1993. Admissions to SNFs also grew from 9.6 to 11.8 in the 1981-1985
(Feinglass et al. 1991). Health expenditures continue to grow, but at a lower rate since
1983. Sager et al. (1989) also indicated a major shift in the location of death from
hospitals to SNFs after the PPS of 1983.
There were no indications that quality of care suffered as a result of the PPS
regulation (Feinglass et al. 1991). Kahn et al. (1990) evaluated effects of the PPS before
and after its implementation and found no association between the introduction of the
PPS and 30- or 180-day mortality. However, Cutler (1995) found the PPS was associated
with increased short-term mortality in hospitals. Shen (2003) also studied the effects of
the PPS on hospital quality using long-differences models for the period before and after
the PPS. There was a short-term negative effect of the PPS on 30-day mortality rates

from AMI. Thus, effects of the PPS on hospital quality are mixed. Hospital financial
characteristics, as a possible reflection of cost-containment strategies, may also influence
quality of care; but the empirical findings are also mixed (Fleming, 1990). Burstin et al.,
(1993) found that low inpatient operating costs per discharge increased the likelihood of
negligent medical injuries. Bradbury et al., (1994) found positive and significant
relationships between hospital resource expenditures and certain patient mortality and
morbidity measures. They concluded that more care, i.e. a greater amount of services
provided, does not mean better care.
The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 addressed issues of the further rising
costs by introducing a prospective payment system for outpatient care and skill nursing
facility care, decreasing payments for home health care, and cutting DRG payments for
selected DRGs when care load shift to SNFs.
Other cost cutting policies included elimination of the inflation update to hospital
DRG payments in 1998, limiting inflation adjustments in subsequent years, cutting
capital payments, reducing adjustments for indirect medical education (IME) and
disproportional share hospital (DSH) payments. One hundred nineteen ($1 19) billion
dollars of hospital payment savings due to the BBA were estimated (Bazzoli et al. 2002).
However, the BBA revisions restored about $2 1 billion of hospital payment savings for
the period 1998-2004. Bazzoli et al. (2002) found that hospitals experienced decreasing
hospital margins. Hospital also reduced length-of-stay and limited staff increases.
Under the BBA provision, financial incentives to shift care to outpatient and
skilled nursing facility settings were lost. Due to the BBA financial pressure and
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decreased hospital margins, health providers may cut back on quality of care. However,
there are very limited empirical studies that evaluated the BBA effects on quality of care.
Clement et al. (working paper, 2004), in a descriptive study over the 1995-2000 period,
observed worsening of quality after 1997, measured by a few inpatient quality and patient
safety indicators. Summarizing the effects of external factors on health provider
integration and quality, it may be concluded that:

(1) Empirical studies convey mixed findings on managed care penetration effects
on hospital quality of care. There were no substantial differences in quality of
care provided by HMOs versus FFS plans.

(2) Price competition among hospitals was introduced as a result of managed care
cost-cutting strategies, i.e. selective contracting and capitation payment. The
quality effects of price competition were mixed.

(3) The PPS regulation's and hospital financial characteristics' influences on
quality of care demonstrated mixed findings. Effects of the PPS and the BBA
pressures on quality of care were not extensively researched. However, there
is a concern that increasing financial pressure due to both the PPS and the

BBA may worsen quality of care.
Effects of Hospitals' Structures and Processes on Quality of Care
Hospital internal factors may also affect quality of care. This section of the
literature review discusses whether hospital system membership and hospital
characteristics, such as professionalization of personnel and use of technology, hospital
ownership and teaching status, and volume of services, influence quality of care.
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Madison (2004) studied relationship between hospital system membership and the
patient outcomes. She found that, even though the effect of hospital system membership
on quality outcome was limited, patients, who were admitted to small rural system
hospitals that were affiliated with big hospital partners within 100 miles, experienced
lower mortality rates than patients initially admitted to independent hospitals.
Physician qualification, expertise, and higher level of training may be related to
quality care. The greater percentage of board certified physicians was associated with
lower mortality rates in hospitals (Haqtz et al., 1989, Kelly and Hellinger, 1986).
The higher percentage of registered nurses (RNs) versus less qualified nurses and
the greater number of RN hours were associated with statistically significant decreases in
the likelihood of patient dying within 20 days of admission, the rates of failure to rescue
and pneumonia, and the rates of urinary tract infection, gastrointestinal bleeding, and
cardiac arrest (Aiken et al., 2003, Cho et al., 2003, Needleman et al., 2002).
However, Mark et al. (2004) found only "limited support for the prevailing notion
that improving RN staffing unconditionally improves quality of care" (p.279).
For-profit ownership status was associated with increased inpatient mortality,
preventable adverse events of any type and operative adverse events, and events due to
delayed diagnosis and therapy (Devereaux et al., 2002, Thomas et al., 2000). However,
teaching status effects on quality had mixed findings, but the most rigorous studies with
large sample sizes and adequate risk adjustments found that for common conditions,
particularly in elderly patients, major teaching hospitals offered better care than nonteaching hospitals (Ayanian and Weissman, 2002). Hospitals with greater number of
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high-tech services provided better quality care (Hartz et al., 1989, Silber et al., 1995).
Systematic review of literature by Gandjour et al. (2003) showed evidence for a volumemortality relationship, i.e. the greater the volume of services performed, the less
mortality. In summary, it may be concluded that there are certain structural and process
variables of hospitals, such as physician and nursing staff qualification, non-profit
hospital ownership, provision of high-tech services technology, teaching status, high
volume of services, may have positive effects on inpatient quality of care. In the next
section, a review of existing taxonomies and how a use of taxonomy can benefit this
research are provided.
Taxonomy
It is believed that taxonomy of health providers may assist in advancing research
on integration in health care (Alexander et al., 1996). Taxonomy may be useful for
identification of hospitals that belong to different types of systems and studying how
hospital affiliation with systems may affect quality outcomes. Several taxonomies of
integrated delivery systems were proposed by researchers.
Webster's (2004) dictionary defines taxonomy as "the study of the general
principles of scientific classification." Alexander et al. (1996) suggested that taxonomy
of health care organizations may clarify strategies and structures that organizations use to
adapt to turbulent environments, and may identify dimensions that produce distinct
internal structures among health care organizations. The organizational taxonomy may
also be necessary for tracking changes in the health industry and studying performance of
health providers.
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Different researchers attempted to classify integrated delivery systems (Burns and
Thorpe, 1993; Alexander, 1996; Succi et al., 2001; Bazzoli et al., 1999; Madison, 2004).
Unlike plants and animals that can be classified by inherent genotypes, organizations do
not have unique "genetic" codes. Therefore, it is essential to find classification principles
that allow allocation of health care organizations in different categories. Several factors
were used to classify organizations: structure, strategy, ownership, types of affiliation,
and others. Pros and cons of these classifications are discussed.
Succi et al., (2001) looked at health system consolidation and formation of new
health systems. Succi and colleagues (2001) classified systems by categories: (1)
investor owned, (2) church affiliated not-for-profit (NFP), and (3) other private not-forprofit; and by size: (1) small: 2-5 member hospitals, (2) medium: 6-20 member
hospitals, and (3) large: 2 1 or more member hospitals.
However, several limitations may be noticed. Succi et al., (2001) used a crosssectional design in their study that did not capture temporal trends in the health industry
that affected integration processes. This classification did not incorporate other
providers, which could also belong to IDS, i.e. the payers, non-physician providers, and
community health centers. This classification was also not validated or used in other
empirical studies, suggesting either instability of their groupings or technical complexity.
These limitations were addressed in several ways by Bazzoli et al. (1999) in their
taxonomy of hospital system and networks. Bazzoli and colleagues (1999) used existing
industrial organization economic and organization theories in creating this taxonomy.
Measures of differentiation, integration, and centralization were developed at the

hospital, POA, and provider-owned insurance company level and used as the
classification factors.
Bazzoli et al., (1999) found that differentiation and centralization were
particularly important for the classification. They classified 90 percent of health systems
as described below:
(1) Centralized Health Systems - systems with high degree of centralization in
hospital services, physician arrangements, and insurance products; ownershipbased and contractual-based physician and insurance arrangements were
employed at the system level; moderate differentiation in hospital services and
physician arrangements and low differentiation in insurance products; urban
locations and hospitals in close proximity of one another were common;
teaching hospitals were more common in this category.

(2) Centralized PhysicianJInsuranceHealth Systems - high levels of
centralization for physician arrangements and insurance products at the health
system level; hospital services were only moderately centralized;
differentiation in all service/product dimensions was moderate; relatively
small numbers of hospitals with low investor-owned representation; hospitals
in close geographic proximity.

(3) Moderately Centralized Health Systems - moderate levels of centralization for
all service/product dimensions; high differentiation in hospital services and
moderate differentiation in physician arrangements and insurance products;
higher prevalence of church-sponsored institutions.
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(4) Decentralized Health Systems - high levels of decentralization in hospital
services, physician arrangements, and insurance products, these were more
predominant at the hospital level than at system level; high levels of
differentiation on the hospital, physician, and insurance dimensions; large
number of hospitals that are disproportionately church-affiliated and are
spread over a broad geographic area.
(5) Independent Hospital Systems - little differentiation of hospital services, few
physician arrangements, and little insurance product development;
centralization on all of these dimensions is low to moderate; smaller, rural
area systems; and investor-owned hospitals were predominant (Bazzoli et al.,
1999).
The taxonomy captures structural dimensions of the health systems and their
strategic activities. The taxonomy also incorporates vertical and horizontal integration
among various types of health organizations. Large samples and use of panel data
increased reliability and validity of taxonomic classification. Thus, this taxonomy is
more comprehensive and is likely to be stable over time than other classifications. It has
also been used to track changes in the health care industry (Bazzoli et al. 2001).
Bazzoli et al. (2001) found that the number of health systems rose from 295
(2,836 affiliated hospitals) in 1994 to 365 (2,512 affiliated hospitals) in 1998 in the U.S.
The results of taxonomic analyses demonstrated no evidence "that providers' efforts to
develop organized delivery systems nationwide are on a pathway to disintegration" (p.
195, Bazzoli et al. 2001).

Shortell et al. (2000) suggested that higher levels of centralization of health
systems may facilitate more clinical integration due to diffusion of management and
clinical information systems, quality management and care management practices. It
may be expected that hospitals in more centralized health systems are more likely to
achieve greater levels of clinical integration and, in turn,improve quality of care.
Therefore, it is beneficial to use this taxonomy in studying how structural and process
elements of different types of systems may affect quality of care over time (1995-2000).
Summary
This literature review demonstrates that structural integration in the health care
industry was influenced by the variety of external and internal factors. The literature also
suggests that structural integration through horizontal, vertical and hospital-physician
integration may lead to clinical integration among health providers. However, a limited
number of empirical studies researched integrated delivery systems' (IDS) and clinical
integration's effects on hospital performance and quality of care. Those studies that did
yielded mixed findings. The taxonomy that classifies hospitals in five different health
systems, ranging from centralized to independent, is identified for use in this research on
quality of care provided in hospitals that belong to different types of health systems.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction
In this chapter, a mechanistic and organic approach to organization theory is
reviewed. Contingency theory attempts to bridge the mechanistic-organic dichotomy,
however, adding a level of complexity to this dichotomy. Contingency theory helps us
develop at least two plausible scenarios evaluating hospital strategic responses to the
dynamics of the health care environment in the 1995-2000 period. Relevant tenets of
contingency theory are used to develop a conceptual model that predicts hospital system
leadership's choice of strategies that assist in either centralization or decentralization of
their structures.
General organizational behavior literature is discussed to set up a link between
organizational structure fit with contingency factors and its effect on organizational
performance. The conceptual model theoretically identifies strategies that may affect
hospital structures. Hospitals affiliated with five types of health systems (i-e., having
different structures) may develop and use different processes of care delivery, which, in
turn, may result in varying quality performance across system types. The conceptual
model is used in setting up a structure-process-performance link for empirical
evaluation. As a result, a set of testable hypotheses is developed and is discussed the
following sections of this chapter.

Mechanistic Versus Organic Approach to Organization Theory
Bums and Stalker (1961) distinguished between organic and mechanistic
structures of organizations as representing two poles or extremes on a continuum of
various organizational structures. The mechanistic structure is top-down, characterized
by higher levels of centralization of decision making, specialization through job
descriptions, and formalization by rules and regulations (Burns and Stalker, 1961). The
organic structure is decentralized and low on functional specialization and formalization,
where employees have a creative approach to decision-making. Mechanistic
organizations administratively control their employees, while organic organizations rely
on initiative and expertise of their employees. The mechanistic+x-ganicapproach may
also be attributed to large, multidivisional (M-form) corporations. For example, organic
structures were used in decentralized, semi-autonomous operating centers of M-form
organizations and creative processes were employed through long-term research,
investment, and innovation sub-units (Thompson et al., 1983).
The mechanistic-rganic

dichotomy can be used to examine how organizational

structures may adapt to different environmental conditions. In stable and simple
environments, where tasks and technology are relatively routine and require less
flexibility, organizations employ relatively high percentage of nonprofessional workers,
the mechanistic structure may provide better outcomes (Thompson, 1967).
In turbulent and complex environments, where tasks and technologies are nonroutine, organizations innovate and employ a relatively high percentage of professionals,
the organic structure may be suitable to maintain or improve organizational performance.

The organic organizations rely more on lateral communication and coordination,
because these organizations are effective when they can process more information, and
have greater expertise and flexibility in complex environment. An organization also can
be situated in between these two extremes, having varying levels of centralization,
specialization, and formalization (Donaldson, 2001).
Contingency theory uses the mechanistic-organic framework; however, adding
increasing levels of sophistication and complexity to this approach. According to one
scenario, contingency theory suggests that under unstable environmental conditions (e.g.,
turbulent and dynamic) with increasing task interdependence (i.e., connectedness of
organizations with each other), large organizations do not necessarily use the organic
approach, requiring decentralization.
Instead, centralization of decision-making is beneficial for organizations that
chose to integrate and consolidate their structures. However, according to another
scenario, large organizations may use differentiation and divisionalization strategy to
manage large organizational size, which requires a greater decentralization of their
structures. Therefore, organizations' leadership may choose one or another strategy to be
used in order to respond to environmental conditions by either centralization or
decentralization of structures.
In the following sections, a review of contingency theory is available; a
discussion how one theory may lead to two different scenarios on how hospital systems
under certain conditions may either chose greater centralization/decentralizationand/or
differentiation of their structures and services is provided. Testable hypotheses that may

identify which system structures have a positive effect on hospitals performance
measured by quality outcomes are proposed.
Contingency Theory - Overview
Contingency theory states that there is no single organizational structure that is
highly effective for all organizations and that organizations can and must adapt to their
environments (Galbreith, 1973; Donaldson, 1997). Contingency theory explains how
changes in the environment affect organizational structures and organizational
effectiveness and performance (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Each element of
organizational structure is dependent upon one or more conditions or contingency factors
(Donaldson, 2001). These main conditions are organizational environment, task
uncertainty, task interdependence, and size (Burns and Stalker, 1991; Child, 1975;
Galbreith, 1973; Thompson, 1967; Scott, 2003; Chandler, 1962; Lawrence and Lorsch,
1967; Donaldson, 1995 and 200 1).
The contingency factors are moderators (Donaldson, 2001). Effects of one
variable, organizational structure, on the second variable, organizational performance,
depends on the third variable, a contingency factor and variations in its levels, or a fit
among contingency conditions and organizational structures (see Figure 2).
Contingency factors determine what organizational structural characteristics
produce the highest levels of organizational performance. Changes in contingencies may
lead to changes in organizational processes and structures through appropriate decisionmaking initiatives by organizational leadership, or the organization would perform poorly
and possibly fail. There are two categories of contingency factors namely those that are

Contingency Factors

Structure

b Performance

- Good performance,

- Poor performance at first,

Figure 2: Tenants of Contingency Theory
external to the organization and those that are internal (Donaldson, 2001). Organizational
environment is an external condition. Task uncertainty, task interdependence, and
organizational size are internal conditions.
Environment reflects all elements and components outside the boundary of an
organization, which may be defined by the organization and its actors (Scott, 2003).
Donaldson (2001) proposed to reduce the environmental condition to three dimensions:
"dynamism (which subsumes a notion of stability-instabilityand turbulence), complexity
(which subsumes a notion of homogeneity-heterogeneity and concentration-dispersion),
and munificence (which subsumes capacity) (p.20)." Dynamism is one of the major
components of the environmental contingency (Thompson, 1967, Child, 1975,
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Donaldson, 2001). Dynamism may be characterized not only as a rate of change, but also
as the degree of unpredictability or instability, i.e. shifting environment makes
organization's successful performance unpredictable (Dess and Beard, 1984, Thompson,

Thompson (1967) characterized environments as homogeneous, i.e. simple, or
heterogeneous, i.e. complex. As heterogeneity increases, the number of functional
divisions within an organization would increase to cope with the increasing
environmental uncertainty. Munificence is the quantity of slack resources (Dess and
Beard, 1984), such as availability of inputs and markets for outputs, fewer competitors
and a known regulatory filed (Scott, 2003). Economic stringency or lowering
munificence fosters organizational change. Organizational performance becomes less
certain, as the environment becomes more dynamic and complex, and the availability of
resources decreases.
The internal contingency factors include task uncertainty, task interdependence
and organizational size. Task uncertainty is closely related to the organic - mechanistic
dichotomy. According to Donaldson's conceptualization (1997), low uncertainty tasks
are most effectively performed by a centralized hierarchy, since this is a simple structure,
which allows quick decision-making, close coordination, and it is inexpensive to
implement. As task uncertainty increases, then the hierarchy needs to loosen control and
to be overlaid by decentralized structures. However, when other contingency factors,
e.g., task interdependence and organizational size, start playing a more significant role,
the direction of organizational restructuring becomes less clear.
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Task interdependence describes how organizational parts are connected with each
other (Donaldson, 2001). Thompson (1967) defines organization's internal connections
as pooled, sequential, and reciprocal interdependences. Pooled interdependence refers to
overall coordination among organizational departments. If one branch of an organization
does not perform well, the whole organizational performance is jeopardized.
Standardization is used for coordination of pooled interdependence. Sequential is a serial
interdependence, where the outputs of one branch become the inputs of another branch.
It is coordinated by planning. Reciprocal interdependence refers to the cycle in which the
outputs of one branch become inputs for the other branch, and the outputs of the last
branch become the inputs for the first branch. Reciprocal interdependence is coordinated
by mutual adjustment, i.e. feedback.
Size is another major contingency and an organizational characteristic, reflecting
the number of people working in an organization. Organizational size affects structure of
an organization. Mintzberg (1979) found that a small organization is more effective if it
uses a simple organizational structure. As the organizational size increases, the
organizational structure becomes more complex. For example, as size increases, the
number of employees andlor hierarchical levels or branch offices may also increase
(Scott, 2003). Size is positively associated with the number of organizational activities
and functions (Scott, 2003). Environment affects internal contingencies of organizations,
which, in turn, shapes organizational structure. Thus, internal contingency factors may
become more immediate and direct causes of structure under conditions of achieving
structural congruency with multiple contingency factors (Donaldson, 200 1).
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Interplay among the environment, internal contingencies, and managerial actions
influences the organizational design and affects its performance (Donaldson, 2001). An
organization has to gain a "fit" of its structure with contingency factors (see Figure 2 on
p. 64). This fit results in a desirable organizational performance. A "misalignment or
misfit" between the contingencies and the structure results in a poor performance, which
drives structural changes in the organization in order to regain the fit with new levels of
contingencies (Donaldson, 200 1). As a result, structural adjustments in the right
direction should improve organizational performance and lead to a new desirable fit
between contingency factors and a new organizational structure. The fit-misfit parameter
of contingency theory implies that an organization can adapt its structure to changing
environments and contingencies, so that their effectiveness and performance are
maintained at a desirable level (Donaldson 2001) or conversely, organizations can
misjudge their environment and a type of structure .that is needed to function effectively
in this environment, and performance declines. Organizations must continuously monitor
alignment of their structures and performance.
A number of researchers proposed a multicontingency approach to
conceptualization of organizational fit and performance. Mintzberg (1979) suggested
that size, technology, environment, and management would influence the choice of
o n a fit) of environment, leadership,
organizational structure. A viable c ~ ~ g u r a t i (i.e.,
strategy, and structure is necessary for good performance (Miller, 1987). Richard (1994)
found that manufacturing firm leadership's judgment aimed at strategy-structureenvironment alignment produced higher performance than did other judgments.
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Therefore, organizational leadership may be able to strategically decide which structure is
more appropriate in dealing with a particular external or internal contingency or a group
of contingency factors.
Gresov (1989) simultaneously examined effects of task uncertainty and
interdependence on unit structure and performance efficiency. There may be a conflict
between contingency factors - the likelihood that structure would deviate from the
demands of either task uncertainty, horizontal dependence (i.e., task interdependence), or
both (Gresov, 1989). Organizations may adopt a mechanistic design to handle routine
tasks and ignore the need to manage interdependence; or they may adopt an organic
design to mange interdependence, thus, ignoring task requirements. Organizations may
also adopt a hybrid structure to manage both contingencies. Gresov (1989) found that an
organic design had fit with an uncertain environment, but mixed support for a
performance decrease from misfit. He implied that different structures and not
necessarily optimal ones may result in a performance level sufficient for organizational
survival. Gresov (1989) concluded that "a multi-contingencies approach provided
additional information about patterns of design.. ..this approach isolated instances in
which equifinality could be observe.. .the model provided insight into both the
phenomenon of misfit and the difficulties of observing it." Therefore, an organizational
management may respond to one or another contingency factor based on a perceived
importance of these factors.
On the other hand, Burton, Lauridsen, and Obel(2002) tested the
multicontingency fit model for strategic organizational structures, operationalizing misfit
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by organizational performance. They found that firms with situational, or contingency
misfits, or both, result in performance losses compared with firms with no misfits. They
also found that one misfit of any kind may significantly compromise performance.
However, a definition and measurement of a fit or a misfit is a difficult task and requires
solid theoretical conceptualization (Gresov, 1989; Burton et al., 2002)

A poor organizational performance may be used as a proxy for measuring a
misfit, and a good organizational performance - as a fit proxy. Organizational
performance may be measured in many ways. Total outputs, quality, productivity,
efficiency, survival, adoption of innovations, employee satisfaction are often used as
measures of organizational performance and effectiveness (Scott, 2003; Child, 1975,
Dewar and Werbel, 1979, Hage and Dewar, 1973). Time is also an important component
in measuring organizational performance (for example, how quick is a return on
investment); and also researchers need to be aware of a passage of time in studying
organizational performance. Some performance effects need to be studied in a short-run,
others - in a long-run; or an organizational stage of development (i.e., newly formed
versus developed organizations) may also influence performance (Scott, 2003).
Different performance measures may also yield different results for different
structures. For example, Kim and Burton (2002) studied the effect of task uncertainty
and decentralization on project team performance, measured in three dimensions: cost,
time, and quality. They found that, "under high task uncertainty, a decentralized team
performs better in terms of cost and time, but a centralized team performs better in terms
of quality. Under low task uncertainty, there is no performance difference between a
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centralized team and a decentralized team in terms of cost and time, but a centralized
team performs better in terms of quality (p. 365)." Their findings suggest a task
uncertainty-structure fit's effect on performance is multidimensional and that
organizations may chose their structure depending on their strategic goals, i.e. whether to
improve quality or to reduce cost in this particular example.
Juran (1989) also used quality as a measure of organizational performance. He
referred to quality not only as a quality of the end product, but also quality that is built
into organizational design, production processes, and employees' job descriptions.
Quality of care may measure performance of health care organizations. Alexander and
Randolph (1985), for example, researched separate effects of technology, structure, and
the fit between them on quality of care. They collected primary data on performance of
nursing units which was measured by patient evaluations of quality of care, reviews of
patient records, interviews with nurses and patients, and observations of processes of
nursing care. Alexander and Randolph (1985) found that the fit between technology and
structure was an important predictor of nursing subunit quality.
In this study, patient outcomes are used to measure how hospitals structural
characteristics, such as affiliation with different types of systems, may affect hospital
performance in terms of quality of care in responding to contingencies of task
interdependence and size. Data over a six-year period are used, and measures of external
shifts in the environment that may had an effect on system restructuring over time are
constructed. However, due to data (i.e., availability of only secondary data) and
methodological constraints, it is unattainable to observe and to measure a fit between the
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external environment and organizational structures and their direct and combined
influence on quality outcomes.
The following sections review how contingency theory may explain two different
scenarios for hospital system restructuring. Specifically, (1) hospital system leadership
might assess task interdependence as the main contingency factor affecting performance,
requiring centralization of structures; or (2) hospital system leadership might react to
increasing organizational size as systems are formed, requiring decentralization of
structures.
Scenario 1 for Centralization of Organizational Structures
According to Donaldson (2001), task interdependence incorporates integration as
a strategy that is used by an organization to set itself apart form competitors. Integration
across specialized tasks and services is necessary in order to achieve unity of effort.
Integration is related and achieved through various types of coordination. The overall
managerial challenge is to strategically integrate various tasks, services, and production
lines, using effective types of coordination in order to meet demands of the external and
internal pressures (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Therefore, organization leadership may
pursue centralization of structures in order to effectively integrate their task, services, and
production lines. In other words, centralization may improve effectiveness of
coordination in integrated organizations where there is a high degree of task
interdependence. A schematic depiction for Scenario 1 is presented in Figure 3.
Structural integration between organizations increases their task interdependence,
and therefore, requires more coordination in order to improve an overall organizational

Scenario 1

r
Theoretical Precursor

Structure:
Outcomes:

Centralized
Health
Systems

IQIs and PSIS

4
4

I

A

;
I

I
I

I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - ---..---

Figure 3: Conceptual Model for Scenario 1
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effectiveness and performance. Sequential and pooled interdependences among
integrated organizations require complex coordination of activities. For example, vertical
integration between organizations results in increased sequential interdependence
between organizational branches (Thompson, 1967). Sequential interdependence is
managed by planning. Implementation of innovation is an example where reciprocal
interdependence between organizational sub-units is needed; thus, coordination by
feedback is used. Coordination in integrated organizations is improved, when
centralization fits and enhances the requirements (e.g., planning or feedback) of
increasing levels of task interdependence. Therefore, organizational leadership may
effectively deal with task interdependence by using the strategy of integration, which also
requires a centralized means of coordination (Rumelt, 1974, Lawrence and Lorsch,
1967).
The U.S. health care environment may be characterized as complex and dynamic
due to various financial, structural, regulatory, and other forces affecting the industry in
the last several decades (e.g., Kohn, 2000, Gaynor and Haas-Wilsion, 1999, Lake et al.,
2003). Environmental and task uncertainty make organization performance unpredictable
(Thompson, 1967). As the environmental dynamism and task uncertainty increase, health
care organizations may change their structures to regain the fit with the changed
environment.
According to contingency theory, turbulent environment and task uncertainty
should force hospital structures to decentralize and decrease levels of specialization and
formalization. However, the environmental forces, e.g. managed care, competition,
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reimbursement reforms (e.g., the BBA), and others, stimulated massive consolidation in
the health care industry in 1990s (Bazzoli et al., 1999, Gaynor and Haas-Wilsion, 1999,
Lesser and Ginsburg, 2000, Dranove et al., 2002). This consolidation increases
interdependence among health care providers (Donaldson, 200 1). For example, task
interdependence that was achieved through physician-hospital alignments has increased
under the global capitation payment system in the mid- 1990s (Bazzoli et al., (1999/2000),
which occurred in a timeframe relevant to this study. Task interdependence may increase
when integrated delivery systems (IDS) are held accountable for the health status of the
enrolled population and is reimbursed on a capitated basis.
Hospitals consolidated into multihospital systems, formed physician-hospital
organizations, and participate in other forms of IDS (Shortell et al., 1998; Bazzoli et al.
1999). Different types of consolidation - horizontal and vertical - and different types of
vertical integration - physician-hospital versus insurance-hospital - results in different
types of task interdependence. Consolidation became a hospital strategy to respond to the
turbulent health care environment (Gaynor and Haas-Wilsion, 1999). Consolidation
increases reciprocal interdependence between organizations in the integrated delivery
system systems, where performance of one organization is interconnected with the
performance of the overall IDS (Thompson, 1967, Donaldson, 2001); therefore, IDS'S
leadership may view task interdependence as a leading or dominant contingency factor in
this situation. Task interdependence may stimulate IDS readjusting their structures
towards greater centralization in order to manage effectively increasing connectedness of
organizations in the systems.

Effective management of consolidation and integration processes may allow IDS
to achieve desired performance outcomes. Contingency theory implies that as task
interdependence and centralization increase, differentiation and divisionalization
decrease, because organizational services, products, and tasks become related and require
more coordination at the systems' level and less delegation of authority to the hospital's
level (Donaldson, 2001). Centralization of authority at the IDS level would allow the
system leadership to use better processing of information for making effective decisions
for and coordinating activities among sub-units in response to changing environments
(Savage et al., 1997). The leadership may project that centralization of IDS would
improve coordination and communication process among organizational sub-unites (i.e.,
various health providers) in the system. IDS'S centralization and coordination of
processes would help achieve a tighter integration. Effective coordination of reciprocal
interdependences may improve provision of care along the continuum of IDS and
stimulate clinical integration within the system. These strategic decisions, structural
tune-ups, and intraorganizational processes may improve organizational performance
and result in better quality outcomes for health providers in centralized IDS.

Hypotheses for Scenario 1
Using the first scenario, hospitals in more centralized health systems have
complex structures and resemble the IDS that was proposed by Shortell et al. (1996). In
the highest stage, affiliates of the IDS are reciprocally interdependent, coordinating
activities by feedback and achieving clinical integration; thus effectively responding to
task interdependence (Charns, 1997).
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Governance of Centralized Health Systems (CHS) is characterized as having high
levels of administrative intensity (i.e., administrative staffing at the system level) and
decision-making authority over policies related to ,the system. CHSs also have slightly
higher representation of affiliates' members on the system board (Alexander et al., 2003).
Centralized governance in health systems allows boards to make decisions quickly, which
is important for IDS in operating in the turbulent environments (Savage et al., 1997). The
leadership of Centralized Health Systems (CHS), due to high level of centralization of
hospital services, physician arrangements, and insurance products, are more likely to
develop and diffuse management and clinical information systems, quality management,
and care management practices (Shortell et al., 2000). Hospitals in CHS are also more
likely to be located in close geographical proximity (Bazzoli et al., 1999), which is also
important for achieving clinical integration.
Centralized Physician/Insurance Health Systems (CPIHS) are characterized as
those that have high centralization for physician arrangements and insurance products
and moderate centralization for hospital services (Bazzoli et al., 1999). In all other
aspects, CPIHS are similar to CHS, and therefore, it is proposed to collapse both in one
category, i.e. hospitals in more centralized systems.
Hospitals in more centralized systems may have a better fit with the contingency
of task interdependence than hospitals in decentralized systems (DHS). This effective
alignment may result in the overall improvement of hospital performance manifested in
improved quality outcomes in CHS and CPIHS. Young et al. (1998) found that surgical
units which used a combination of coordination by feedback and by programming, had
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best perceived quality, lowest mortality and morbidity. Coordination, continuity of care
and clinical integration may positively affect clinical performance and improve quality
outcomes for hospitals in centralized health systems and centralized physicianlinsurance
health systems. Also, the leadership of centralized health systems may have more power
and authority to consolidate certain administrative and clinical departments in their
member hospitals. A volume of services provided in consolidated clinical departments
should increase and positively affect the processes of care delivery (i.e., "the practice
makes perfect"), and, as a result, improve quality performance of hospitals in more
centralized health systems. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:

HI: Hospitals in more centralized health systems (CHS and CPIHS) would
produce better quality outcomes than hospitals in Decentralized Health Systems, all
other things being equal.
Clinical integration is highly correlated with physician-hospital integration
(Shortell et al., 1996). Centralized Physician/Insurance Health Systems may have a
greater arsenal of tools and means than other system types in providing financial and
other incentives to their physicians in order to increase physician-organization alignment
and to improve physicians' quality performance (for example, through following
evidence-based clinical protocols and guidelines, monitoring physicians' clinical
practices and activities, etc.). Therefore, hospitals in CPIHS may achieve greater
integration of clinical processes, due to tighter physician-hospital alignment and
potentially better incentives, and therefore, improve their quality performance in
comparison with hospitals in CHS. The hypothesis is as follows:
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H2: Hospitals in Centralized Physician/Insurance Health Systems would
produce better quality outcomes than hospitals in Centralized Health Systems, all
other things being equal.

Scenario 2 for Decentralization of Organizational Structures
On one hand, task interdependence may require centralization of structures. On
the other hand, a decision on whether to centralize or to decentralize organizational
structures may be made by leadership depending on other factors. The main factor for
decentralization is o~ganizationalsize (Donaldson, 2001). Child (1975) stated that
organizational size defines the structure. Smaller organizations can control their
employees directly through centralized authority.
As organizational size increases, an organization needs to decentralize and rely
more on indirect means of control over organizational processes, such as specialization
(i.e., division of labor), formalization (i.e., pre-specified roles and relationships), and
worker autonomy (i.e. technical competency of personnel) (Child, 1972; Scott, 2003).
With an increase in size, the span of control of managers increases, because the number
of managers and administrators stays unchanged or increases at a lower rate in
comparison with greater increases in the number of workers (Blau, 1970). Thus, large
organizations avoid being top heavy with high overhead costs, which may also improve
their effectiveness and efficiency, resulting in better performance. Therefore,
organization leadership may decide to manage the increasing organizational size by
decentralization of organizational structures. A schematic depiction for Scenario 2 is
presented in Figure 4.
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Organizational leadership may use differentiation and divisionalization strategy to
fit organizational size with the structure when organizational services, products, tasks are
unrelated and require decentralization of decision-making authority (Thompson, 1967,
Donaldson, 2001). Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) described differentiation as differences
between organizational sub-units in goal orientations, time orientations, formality of
structure, and interpersonal orientations. Structural differentiation is also defined as how
an organization is split horizontally - the number of sub-units, job titles, span of control
of top management - and vertically - the number of levels of hierarchy (Donaldson,
2001).
Divisionalization is also related to decentralization (Donaldson, 2001, Chenhall,
1979). Divisionalization of organizations requires decentralization of authority because
various divisions of large organizations become only loosely interdependent. Therefore,
large organizations coordinate their activities by rules, procedures, and planning, which
further emphasize decentralization of the structures. Therefore, decentralization is
achieved through differentiation and divisionalization strategy.
Specialization, formalization, and worker autonomy are positively correlated with
decentralization of structures (Child, 1972; Scott, 2003). Decentralized organization may
use specialization, formalization, and autonomy to improve effectiveness of
organizational processes and, as a result, organizational performance. Specialization is
the division of labor in the organization; it is measured by a scale of functional
specialization that assesses the degree to which administrative (and possibly clinical)
work has been specialized by functions (Donaldson, 2001). Specialization of tasks is

necessitated by and occurs as a result of structural complexity of large organizations.
Specialization makes processes of production more effective in these organizations.
Formalization is the extent to which pre-specified procedures and processes for doing
work are articulated and written down as well as used and enforced for defining
procedures and jobs, recording performance, and passing information (Scott, 2003;
Donaldson, 2001).
The need for autonomy may result from increasing decentralization. The middle
management and technical experts need less direct control within defined and formalized
organizational frames, because they have sufficient technical knowledge of how to
manage increasing volume of information, specific tasks and how to deal with their
immediate contingencies, as the size grows. Technical personnel also develop
professional autonomy, due to specialization (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Therefore,
decentralization improves predictability of organizational performance by making middle
management and technical experts comply with formalized procedures and tasks as
indirect means of control while giving them some freedom to utilize their skills and
creativity (Child, 1975).
The organizational structure becomes complex as organizational size increases,
therefore, differentiation and divisionalization strategy is used by large organizations to
fit their size with their structures. This strategy requires more delegation of decisionmaking authority from the top to the middle management, greater specialization of
personnel, formalization of procedures, and worker autonomy, which may improve
organizational processes and further stimulate decentralization of structures. As a result,

decentralization may increase effectiveness and predictability of organizational
performance.
In the health care industry, the large size of many integrated delivery systems
(IDS) may reduce effective coordination and information exchanges between the top IDS
management and the local hospital sub-units. Consolidation of health providers into
systems vertically and horizontally increases the hierarchy of IDS (Arndt and Bigelow,
1996, Meighan, 1994). Therefore, IDS need to decentralize their structures by delegating
authority to the middle management, i.e. to the hospital level and local submarkets.
Hospitals affiliated with decentralized systems maintain or further increase
differentiation and divisionalization of IDS'S structures, provide more clinical autonomy
to professionals (i.e., clinicians), and increase specialization of other hospital personnel.
Differentiation and divisionalization strategy makes hospitals less dependent on the
systems' center. Thus, differentiation and divisionalization may decrease hospitals' need
for sequential and reciprocal coordination with other system members, and therefore,
reduce hospitals' burden to improve the overall IDS performance, which makes a hospital
wholly responsible for its own submarket and reduces some of hospital's task
uncertainty.
High differentiation and divisionalization of hospitals in the decentralized IDS
may result in hospitals maintaining the full range of services, improving availability and
accessibility and competitiveness of care in local submarkets. Indirect means of control,
(i.e., managerial, financial, and clinical procedures and rules) may be used to formalize
provision of care and maintain the overall control of the IDS over its local units or
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branches. Specialization, due to routinization of tasks, may improve performance of
clinical personnel (e.g., nursing staff) at the lower levels of hospital hierarchy, thus,
reducing system errors and mistakes. Therefore, decentralization of authority in IDS may
improve adjustments of hospitals to their local submarkets, enhance clinical performance
and autonomy of personnel, reduce system errors, due to specialization of hospital
personnel and formalization of processes, and increase service availability and
accessibility in the local submarkets; thus, improving quality outcomes for hospitals in
decentralized IDS.
Hypothesesfor Scenario 2
According to the second scenario, as hospitals and health systems consolidate,
their size increases and decisions have to be communicated vertically and horizontally
across tall hierarchical structures. Top management of Centralized Health Systems
(CHS) and Centralized PhysicianlInsurance Health Systems (CPIHS) may lose their
ability to influence processes at the lower levels of their organizations, because
centralized decision-making and means of control become less effective in managing
increasing volumes of information, as size grows (Donaldson, 2001). Thus, centralized
structures of CHS and CPIHS may be more dysfunctional under the contingency of size,
and therefore, suffer from poor organizational performance, resulting in decreasing
quality outcomes. However, Decentralized Health Systems may respond differently to
the contingency of size because of their differentiation and divisionalization strategy, and
organizational characteristics and processes. Decentralized Health Systems are large
organizations and characterized by having high levels of differentiation of hospital
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services, physician arrangements, and insurance products that are more predominant at
the hospital level. The governance of DHS is characterized by low administrative
intensity and low levels of centralization for both system and affiliate policies; and
boards are dominated by nonaffiliated representatives (Alexander et al., 2003). Hospitals
in DHS also tend to be spread over a broad geographic area (Bazzoli et al., 1999). The
leadership of DHS decentralizes decision-making authority to implement strategies that
are targeted to their local submarkets and to adjust structures to their immediate
contingencies.(Pointer et al., 1995).
Due to differentiation and divisionalization, DHS maintain substantial
infrastructure, physician arrangements, and resource base in each submarket (Shortell et
al., 2000). "Management and clinical information systems and quality and care
management practices may be well organized within these submarkets (p. 15, Shortell et
al., 2000)." Divisionalizaiton of hospitals in submarkets may increase hospital system's
competitive advantages in the local markets (Luke et al., 1995). Therefore, hospitals in
DHS may achieve desirable levels of performance and positive quality outcomes.
Consequently, Decentralized Health Systems, because their decision making
processes are decentralized at the hospital level, rely on specialization of hospital
personnel, formalization and some degree of physician clinical autonomy as possible
means of indirect control over hospital internal processes. This indirect control strategy
may be more effective in managing large organizational size. Gupta et al. (1994) studied
how professionals in institutionalized environment are coordinated and controlled and
what forces shape organizational structures. Their results show that the more

institutionalized the environment, the more organizations rely on professionals to
improve performance. Decentralized decision-making and more clinical autonomy
improve physician-IDS relationships (Alexander et al., 2001), which may be important
for improving quality outcomes. Differentiation and divisionalization may promote
increasing professionalizaiton and specialization of hospital personnel in DHS.
Professionalization and specialization, in turn, may improve quality outcomes and reduce
patient safety errors in hospitals that belong to DHS.
As a result, hospitals in DHS may use differentiation strategy to manage their
increasing size and set up indirect means of control over organizational processes through
specialization of hospital personnel, their greater clinical autonomy, and formalization of
procedures, which, in turn, may lead to improved quality of care. Therefore, the
following hypothesis is proposed:
H3: Hospitals in Decentralized Health Systems would produce better quality
outcomes than hospitals in more centralized health systems (CHS and CPIHS), all
other things being equal.

Interplay of Both Scenarios
Moderately Centralized Health Systems (MCHS) and Independent Hospital
Systems (IHS) have varying levels of centralization and differentiation. Thus, MCHS
and IHS may be differently situated than the other types of systems. MCHS may use a
combination of both centralization and differentiation to propel their performance.
However, the structure of IHS, being low on centralization and differentiation, may not
be well-fitted to respond effectively to the environmental challenges.

Moderately Centralized Health Systems (MCHS) are described as having
moderate levels of centralization for hospital services, physician arrangements, and
insurance product dimensions and exhibiting relatively high differentiation in hospital
services and moderate differentiation in physician arrangements and insurance products
(Bazzoli et al., 1999). The MCHS's governance also has moderate administrative
intensity and moderate levels of centralization for system-level policy decisions;
however, MCHS have the highest level of centralization for affiliate-level policy-making
and one of the highest percentage of affiliate representatives on system board (Alexander
et al., 2003).
The leadership of MCHS may decide that both task interdependence and large
size contingencies are equally important. Moderate centralization for all categories may
be used by the system's leadership to integrate the overarching system's activities with
hospital's contingencies at the local submarkets. High differentiation of hospital services
and moderate differentiation of physician arrangements and insurance products may also
demonstrate that the MCHS' leadership tries to introduce some decentralization of
structures. The leadership of MCHS may attempt to balance both contingencies, i.e. task
interdependence by moderate centralization and increasing size by high-to-moderate
differentiation and divisionalization. A combination of both strategies may improve the
system's quality performance. The system center and local hospital sub-units may be
smoothly integrated, achieving effective coordination and continuity of care, while the
size is managed by some degree of differentiation and divisionalization. Bazzoli et al.
(2001) found that more hospitals have joined into the moderately centralized systems and
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the number of hospitals in this category has increased over time. These factors provide
some evidence that moderately centralized system may become "a system of choice and
preference" for hospitals because of its effectiveness. Empirical research also showed
that hospitals in MCHS have highest profitability and low average age of plant, while
having comparable costs with hospitals in more centralized systems (Bazzoli et al.,
2000). Effective hospitals may provide better quality of care (Donabedian, 1980 and
1982). Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H4: Hospitals in Moderately Centralized Health Systems would produce
better quality outcomes than hospitals in all other types of health systems (CHS,
DHS, and CIPHS), all other things being equal.
Hospitals in Independent Hospital Systems have low levels of centralization of
hospital services, fewer physician arrangements, and little insurance development; they
are also low on differentiation for the same categories (Bazzoli et al., 1999). Independent
Hospital Systems (IHS) have "the smallest average board size, the highest average
percentage of affiliate representatives on the board, and the lowest level of centralization
for both system- and affiliate-level policy decisions" (Alexander et al., 2003, p. 238).
Bazzoli et al. (2000) also found that hospitals affiliated with independent systems
had the highest costs and lowest profits in comparison with hospitals affiliated with other
types of systems. Hospitals in IHS are smaller organizations that are predominantly
located in rural areas (Bazzoli et al., 1999). Having low levels of centralization does not
allow hospitals in IHS to be effective in managing task interdependence. Also, hospitals
in IHS lack the size to implement to differentiation and divisionalization strategy in order
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to improve their performance. Having low levels of differentiation may preclude these
hospitals from maintaining substantial infrastructure, physician arrangements, and
resource base in their submarkets. This type of hospital system is only loosely integrated
(Bazzoli et al., 2001). Thus, hospitals in Independent Hospital Systems may be
disadvantaged in dealing with the turbulent health care environment. The following
hypothesis is proposed:
H5: Hospitals in Independent Hospital System would produce worse quality
outcomes than hospitals in all other types of health systems (CHS, DHS, and
CIPHS), all other things being equal.
Summary
Contingency theory provides at least two and possibly three general scenarios that
may explain how hospitals affiliated with various types of health systems may differ in
terms of their internal processes and quality performance. As a result, a set of competing
and/or complementary testable hypotheses is proposed. The following Chapter 4
discusses the methods that allow answering the research question and testing the
proposed hypotheses.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODS

Introduction
Two research designs are proposed - a panel design, using fixed effects or
random effects models, and a cross-sectional design for two separate years of 1997 and
2000, using three stage estimation models - in order to account for possible feedback
effects and to increase internal validity of results. Seven well-established data bases are
used for the analyses. It is planned to assemble data from short-term, general, nonfederal
hospitals from 11 states for 6 years from 1995 to 2000. Two years of data from Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization (JCAHO) are available for
hospitals in this study. Dependent variables are measures of patient quality outcomes, i.e.
Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) and Patient Safety Indicators (PSIS). Several sets of
variables are suggested to measure: (I) hospital organizational characteristics, including
the main explanatory variable - hospital affiliation with different types of health systems;

(2) market characteristics; (3) patient characteristics; (4) clinical integration, using
JCAHO data; (5) variables for cross-sectional studies, reflecting a choice of a health
system and a choice of integration of internal clinical processes. In order to evaluate
effects of structural designs of hospital systems and internal clinical processes and
integration on quality outcomes, rigorous analytical methods are used. The research
design and methods are discussed in the following sections.

Study Design

A research design should meet two criteria: (1) answer research questions and (2)
adequately test hypotheses (Kerlinger, 1986). Experimental design with randomization
of subjects to experimental and control groups and with a follow up over time - "the gold
standard'- is the strongest design in identifying causation in studied relationships. Cook
and Campbell (1979) noted three conditions for inferring cause: "(a) contiguity between
the presumed cause and effect; (b) temporal precedence, in that the cause had to precede
the effect in time; and (c) constant conjunction, in that the cause had to be present
whenever the effect was obtained" (p. 10). Wooldridge (1999) stated that economic
theory uses a notion of ceteris paribus in estimating a causal effect of one variable on
another variable, holding other factors fixed in evaluating public policy. Econometric
methods are often applied to simulate a ceteris paribus experiment. Experimental design
is not feasible in studying hospitals in various types of health system and their effects on
quality of care. Thus, econometric models are used instead. One of which is a panel
model. Strengths and weaknesses of a panel design are discussed below.
Strengths of Panel Design

(1) A panel design controls for heterogeneity in a cross-sectional unit. Hospitals
in various health systems are heterogeneous. Variation in quality of care may
be attributed to time invariant variables related to some unobserved
characteristics of hospitals, systems, and states. Panel data allow controlling
for these time-invariant, unobserved variables, otherwise omitted from an
econometric model, which results in biased parameter estimates.

(2) Panel data provide "more informative data, more variability, less collinearity
among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency" (p. 4,
Baltagi, 1995). Panel data for multiple years add more variability and
information on patient, hospital, market, and other characteristics.

(3) "Panel data are better able to study the dynamics of adjustment" (p.4, Baltagi,
1995). Panel data allow studying trends over time, duration of effects of
interest, intertemporal relations, and life-cycles. Hospitals that join health
systems may improve their quality performance, however, over a longer time
period. Only panel data allow capturing this improvement over time; crosssectional design can miss this temporal trend.
(4) Panel data are better able to identify and measure effects that are not
detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series data. Also, many
variables can be more accurately measured at the micro level, and biases
resulting from aggregation over firms and individuals are eliminated (Baltagi,
1995). Panel data are usually gathered on micro units, like patients and
hospitals. Panel data allow making stronger causal inferences than crosssectional data

Limitations of Panel Design
(1) Design and data collection problem, including nonresponse, recall, and
reference period (Baltagi, 1995). This study relies on well-established sources
of data, e.g. AHA survey, these data are collected on annual basis and the
format of questionnaires rarely changes. It is believed that hospitals'

familiarity with the AHA survey may reduce some of the aforementioned
biases. Missing records or outliers on key variables may be a problem;
however, appropriate cleaning methods are used to reduce the effects of
missing data and outliers. It is also believed that missing records are random
and, thus, not a source of bias.

(2) Even though there is an assumption that the proposed panel model is strictly
exogenous, a feedback effect may become a serious concern. In this study, for
example, a feedback effect may occur if quality of care in an earlier study
period may motivate a hospital to join with a certain system type, which is
perceived as the system to improve quality outcomes, in a later study period.
Due to data limitation (i.e., JCAHO data are only available for two years), it is
impossible to use lagged hospital quality performance variables to address for the
feedback issue. It is a major limitation of the study. Thus, results form panel models are
compared with results from cross-sectional models, i.e. three stage estimation models that
may address the feedback problem. Three stage estimation model for studying quality
outcomes by hospital system types is discussed below.

Three Stage Estimation Model
According to the conceptual model, a structure (e.g., a system type) would
influence a process (e.g., a level of clinical integration) and a process would influence
organizational performance (e.g., quality outcomes). However, a feedback or selection
effect may be present. There is a notion that hospitals may select a specific health system
type in order to improve their financial performance (Menke, 1997, Bazzoli et al., 2000).

Quality performance may also influence hospitals to join with a certain system type and
to alter their process of care delivery in order to achieve better quality outcomes. For
example, it is expected that centralized health systems are more likely to achieve clinical
integration, which may improve quality outcomes (Shortell et al., 2000).
Three stage estimation model may address the feedback effect. Lagged financial
and quality performance variables measure a previous hospital performance effect on a
hospital's choice of a system type. Alexander and Morrisey (1988) and Bazzoli et al.
(2000) also conceptualized that hospitals' affiliation with health systems, among others,
depend upon favorable market conditions. These market factors may also be used to
account for a hospital choice of a system type. Different health systems may put in place
different processes of care delivery. Some types of health systems may be more effective
in achieving greater clinical integration, due to higher levels of centralization (Shortell et
al., 2000). Therefore, some hospitals may choose to select more centralized health
systems in order to improve their process of care delivery through clinical integration. It
is proposed to use two variables that reflect alignments and relationships between
physicians and hospitals as variables for addressing a selection issue of a hospital choice
of a level of integration of internal clinical processes in different types of health systems.
Data Bases and Sources
The data are assembled from multiple sources. Seven data bases are put together
to provide sufficient measures of quality outcomes, hospital, patient, market and other
characteristics for the current study. The data sources include and are described as
follows:
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(I) the 1995-2000 hospital discharge data for 11 states that participate in Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Healthcare Cost and Utilization
Project State Inpatient Database (HCUP SID) provide patient clinical and
nonclincal information, which are used to construct quality and patient safety
indicators;
(2) the 1995-2000 Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO) performance area scores assess organizational
dimensions of the quality of hospital care and serve as measures of internal
clinical processes and integration;
(3) the 1995-2000 American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Surveys

provide data on hospital characteristics and structure;
(4) the Area Resource Files (ARF) provide market and socioeconomic variables at

the county and Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) levels;
(5) HMO Interstudy provides information on the number of HMOs and HMO
penetration;
(6) the 1995-2000 Medicare Case Mix Index Files;
(7) the 1993-2000 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare

cost report data, which provide detailed hospital financial information.
AHRQ's HCUP SID data base is used in the study. There were 13 states that
participated in HCUP SID in 1995; 16 states joined in 2000, so there was a total of 29
states in 2000. HCUP SID is the largest collection of all-payer, uniform, state-based,
inpatient administrative data. HCUP SID contains information on patient demographics
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(age, gender, and race for some states), patient clinical data (principal and secondary
diagnoses and procedures, and length of stay), location of admission and discharge,
expected payment source (Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance, self-pay, managed care
for some states), and total charges. The HCUP SID data are on 11 states - Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Washington, and Wisconsin. These states were chosen based on several characteristics:
(1) participation in HCUP SID throughout the entire 1995-2000 period; (2) mandatory
(rather than voluntary) hospital participation in data collection; (3) inclusion of hospitals
specific identifiers for merging with other data bases, e.g. AHA, CMS, and others. Being
a convenience sample, it still represents wide geographic areas in the U.S., covering 7 of
the 9 census divisions. Thirty six percent (36%) of all community hospitals nationwide
are located in these 11 states.
The Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
performance area scores for hospitals that have undergone accreditation between 1995
and 2000 are used. Around 80 percent of hospitals nationwide participate in the JCAHO
accreditation program, where system hospitals are more likely to be accredited. JCAHO
reviews the member hospitals every three years. Since the study period covers years
from 1995 to 2000, JCAHO data are available for two triennial periods, in which the
majority of hospitals have two sets of JCAHO performance scores within a 3-year
interval period. The year of 1997 instead of 1995 is chosen for the cross-sectional
analysis, because the JCAHO data base for 1995 includes only 550 hospitals, which is
substantially less than 1,300 hospitals available for 1997. Some hospitals may have
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missing data because they closed, merged, or had some other change, which makes this
sample of hospitals unbalanced.
The AHA Annual Survey is a recognized source of hospital data. AHA data have
been extensively used in health services research. Hospital-specific, nationwide data are
annually collected, which usually achieves an overall response rate of 85 percent or
higher each year; however, single item's response rates may vary. AHA data include
information on various hospital organizational characteristics and their geographic
location.
Other data sets are described below. Area Resource File (ARF) contains
extensive, county-level data on market and economic conditions, socio-demographic
characteristics, health resources, and other variables that may affect quality of care. ARF
collects data from multiple sources, including census files, Physician Master File from
the American Medical Association, and mortality and natality data from the National
Center for Health Statistics.
HMO Interstudy file contains data on approximately 650 HMOs in the country,
including information on HMO enrollment and county service data and can be used for
calculation of HMO market share and the number of HMOs in a particular market area.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) data are also used to obtain the
Medicare case-mix indexes. Medicare cost reports provide substantial financial data on
hospitals that receiving Medicare payments. Medicare cost report data can help to
identify underlying financial performance of hospitals. Approximately 87 percent of
general acute care hospitals nationwide file Medicare cost reports.
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Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis for this study is short-term, general, nonfederal hospitals that
belong to different types of health systems: Centralized Health Systems (CHS),
Centralized PhysiciadInsurance Health Systems (CPIHS), Moderately Centralized
Health Systems (MCHS), Decentralized Health Systems (DHS), and Independent
Hospital Systems (IHS).
Sampling
Complete data on approximately 3,050 hospitals for each year are merged from
HCUP SID, AHA, ARF, and other data sources. The average number of hospitals in
various types of health systems over the 1995 - 2000 period is as follows: (1) 170
hospitals in CHS; (2) 297 hospitals in CPIHS; (3) 870 hospitals in MCHS; (4) 1,350
hospitals in DHS; and (5) 360 hospitals in IHS.
JCAHO data are available for about 1,298 hospitals in eleven states over the study
period, 1995 - 2000. It is identified that around 714 hospitals belong to various types of
health systems in 11 states: (1) 38 hospitals in CHS; (2) 52 hospitals in CPIHS; (3) 254
hospitals in MCHS; (4) 337 hospitals in DHS; and (5) 33 hospitals in IHS. As a result,
this sample includes about 740 hospitals in eleven states with complete records from all
seven data sources. Since the sample is reduced from 2,647 hospitals to approximately
1,298 hospitals in eleven states and 714 hospitals in different types of health systems, it
may potentially introduce a threat to external validity.
In order to increase reliability and generalizability of findings, descriptive
statistics for hospitals in this sample for eleven states and those ones in the national
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sample are compared. The statistics for hospitals that belong to health systems in the
empirical sample with those in the national sample are also compared.
Analytical Model
In order to evaluate effects of hospital affiliation with systems on quality
outcomes, rigorous research methods are necessary. A strict exogeneity assumption
allows using fixed effects or random effects models with panel data. However, a
feedback or selection effect may still be a problem. Since these data are limited to only
two time periods (due to a JCAHO data limitation), it is impossible to use lagged quality
outcomes and hospital financial performance to address the feedback issue in the panel
model.
Thus, the cross-sectional design, using three stage estimation models, which is
evaluated separately for two years of 1997 (this year is chosen, because the 1997
JCAHO's data set has substantially more hospitals than the 1995 data set) and 2000, is
proposed to reassure validity of empirical findings and to address the feedback issue.
Variables that reflect three-year shifts in the external environment are constructed
and measured by the market-level variables, such as HMO penetration, competition
among systems, and the number of HMOs. Changes over time (three years before the
study years of 1997 and 2000) in levels of these variables may assess a fit-misfit
relationship between external environmental shifts and hospital system structures. An
analytical plan below provides a step-by-step procedure for empirical analyses.
Empirical models are also described in greater detail and expressed mathematically in the
following section.

Plan for Empirical Analyses
(1) Panel study:
a) A strict exogeneity assumption allows us to set up fixed effects (FE) or random
effects (RE) models (if assumptions for RE are met and supported by the
Hausman specification test), where quality outcomes are directly associated
with process (i.e., clinical integration) and structure (i.e., health system types)
measures. A sensitivity analysis estimates the most appropriate way of
combining internal clinical processes and integration variables (which is
discussed later in this section).
(2) Cross-sectional study:
a) Conduct the Hausman test for endogeneity for a hospital's choice of a system
type. If this test demonstrates endogenity problem, then cross-sectional three
stage estimation models for separate years of 1997 and 2000 are used. Lagged
quality outcomes and hospital financial performance and other variables
reflective of preferable market conditions are used at this stage to account for
the feedback or selection effect of a system type choice.
b) A multinomial logit model for estimating predicted probabilities of a strategic
choice of a system type is calculated for each hospital observation, using
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method. A dependent variable in this
model is a system type or a grouping of health systems (e.g., hospitals grouped
into more centralized health systems (CHS + CPIHS)); and it is a categorical
variable. The multinomial logit model can be presented schematically:
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System* = f (Hospital, Market, and Patient Characteristics of Quality of
Care, Lagged Quality and Financial Performance and Other Market-Type
Variables for a Choice of a System Type)
c) At this stage, the Hausman test for endogeneity is conducted for a hospital's
choice of a level of integration of internal clinical processes. If endogeneity is
present, variables reflective of a selection of a level of integration of internal
clinical processes are used.
d) A negative binomial model for estimating predicted sums of scores of internal
clinical processes and integration levels by different types of health systems is
calculated for all hospital observations. A construction of internal clinical
processes and integration scores is discussed later in the variable measurement
section. The model can be presented schematically:

CI* = f (Hospital, Market, and Patient Characteristics of Quality of Care,
System*(predicted probability), Variables for a Choice of Internal Clinical
Processes and Integration Level)
e) Predicted scores of internal clinical processes and integration (CI*) are
compared for different types of health systems or groupings of health systems
by comparing estimated coefficients for different system types. The robust
variance estimator for two-stage models is used to calculate correct error terms
(Hardin, 2002). Conclusions are made on which types of health systems are
more likely to have higher or lower levels of clinical integration based on the
values of predicted probabilities.
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(f) Predicted sums of scores of internal clinical processes and integration by

different types of systems (from point D) are used in OLS linear models,
estimating quality outcomes for hospitals in various types of health systems. It
can be presented schematically:
Quality Outcomes = f (CI* (predicted score), Hospital, Market, and
Patient Characteristics of Quality of Care)
g) Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is conducted on predicted values of quality
outcomes, comparing outcomes across different types of health systems or
groupings of health systems, depending on the hypotheses. Conclusions are
made on which types of health systems are more likely to have better quality
outcomes.
(3) Simplified Model:

a) It is possible that a measure of clinical integration, which is constructed using
JCAHO variables, is a weak measure of clinical integration. In this case, a
simplified model is proposed, where predicted probabilities for health systems
are directly put into the final OLS model for estimating quality outcomes, and
the internal clinical processes and integration stage is not analyzed.
Description of Models
Fixed effects (FE) model controls for unobserved hospital and market
characteristics that, otherwise, may affect parameter estimates due to omitted variable
bias. FE model introduces a separate intercept for each hospital and, as a result, takes
time-invariant, unmeasured components out of the equation. FE model provides
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consistent estimates of

a, regardless of whether or not unobserved time-invariant factors

are correlated with explanatory variables.
Information from those hospitals that switched their affiliation from one type of
system to another over a course of this study period is used; only these hospitals are
selected out in the FE analysis. FE model identifies types of hospital systems and
internal clinical processes and integration that have significant effects on patient
outcomes.
Random effects (RE) model provides additional strengths. RE model reduces a
loss of degrees of freedom, controls for unobserved unmeasured characteristics, making
parameters consistent, and also provides estimates for individual, time-invariant variables
(such as gender), which get differenced out in FE model. However, it is quite difficult to
meet all assumptions, specifically assuring that explanatory variables are not correlated
with hospital specific component of the error term, for proposing RE model that provides
consistent and efficient parameter estimates.
Thus, the Hausman specification test is used to evaluate whether assumptions for
random effects model are met. If this test demonstrates that RE assumptions are met, this
model would become "the best choice" model in the analyses of hospital affiliation with
various systems types and quality outcomes. The empirical models are mathematically
represented and described in the following section.
(1) General Fixed Effects or Random Effects Models - Panel Design:

Kt

= S , +S2CIIt+S3Slt+ S 4 X l t+ S 5 M I t+ S 6 c t +S,Time, + p , + E , ,

Yjt is a vector defining quality outcomes;
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CIjt is a vector representing clinical integration, measured by the sum of JCAHO
variables;
Sjtis a vector representing dummy variables for different types of health systems;
Xjt is a vector representing hospital control variables;
Mjt is a vector representing market control variables;
Pjt is a vector representing patient control variables;
pi is represents hospital specific, time-invariant, unobserved component;

Timet is a vector of dummy variables, indicating the year when the dependent variable is
observed;

8 ,S , S 3S 4 S 56 , 6 , are vectors of parameters to be estimated;
Ejt represents a

random error term;

i and t indexes hospitals and time.
(2) Three Stage Estimation Model - Cross-Sectional Design:

a) Multinomial Logit Model for Estimating Predicted Probabilities for Different
Types of Health Systems:
ysys = a. + a , X , + a 2 M 2+ a3P, + a4L, + q O , + E
b) Negative Binomial Model for Estimating Predicted Sums of Scores for Internal
Clinical Processes and Integration Levels by System Types:
Y,

=

Po + P I X , + P2M2 + AP3 + P49sys + P5MD5 + &

c) OLS Regressions with Predicted Sums of Scores of Internal Clinical Processes
and Integration by System Type:

The vectors are described as follows:

Y is a vector representing quality outcomes;

jsysis an estimated predicted probability for each hospital being selected into a health
system or a grouping of health systems;

$>
, is an estimated predicted score of an internal clinical processes and integration level
for each hospital in a health system or a grouping of health systems;

L is a vector representing lagged values of hospital quality and financial performance
and accounting for the system type feedback effect;
0 is a vector representing other variables reflective of favorable market conditions and

accounting for the system type selection effect;

MD is a vector representing alignments and relationships between physicians and
hospitals and accounting for the internal clinical processes and integration selection
effect;
a,a2a3a4a,~,P2P3P4Ps6,S2S
are3 vectors
S4
ofparameters to be estimated;
E

represents error term.

(3) Simplified Model:
Y = S , +S2jsys+ S 3 X 3+ S 4 M 4+S5P5+ E
Since measures of internal clinical processes and integration may be weak, a
simplified model differs from the three stage estimation model by excluding predicted
scores of internal clinical processes and integration and ANOVA steps from the analyses.

All other components and descriptions of elements are similar with the three stage
estimation model.
Measurement of Variables
In this section, measurements of this study's constructs and variables are
discussed. Variables for this study are selected based upon the literature review,
organizational theory, and a previous use of these variables in related empirical studies.
Patients' quality outcomes are represented by the Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) and
Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs). A measure of internal clinical processes and integration
is represented by a sum of JCAHO variables. Hospital characteristics include the main
explanatory variable - hospitals' affiliation with different types of health systems - and
other variables. Market characteristics are represented by hospital competition and
managed care constructs as well as changes in these variables over time reflective of
environmental shifts. Patient characteristics and other variables are represented by
demographic variables and used as statistical controls. Lagged hospital quality and
financial performance, variables reflective of favorable market conditions, and physicianhospital alignment and relationship variables are needed to account for the feedback or
selection effect in cross-sectional analyses. Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) and
Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) are described in greater detail in the following sections
and grouped together based on their clinical characteristics.
Quality Outcomes

Quality indicators are generated from the HCUP SID for the 1995-2000 period.
Quality of care is multifaceted category that requires multiple measures. Inpatient
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Quality Indicators (IQIs) and Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) are mortality rates and
adverse events, respectively. IQIs and PSIs may serve as flags for potential quality
problems rather than definitive measures of quality (AHRQ Pub.03-R204,2003). These
measures are aggregated at the hospital level. In this study, a combination of quality
indicators is used. Four IQIs from available 15 mortality indicators and 5 PSIs from
available 20 adverse events indicators are selected. Risk-adjusted rates of IQIs and PSIs
are applied to represent patient quality outcomes.
One of the concerns here is that the better quality hospitals may have a more
effective process of identification, coding, and reporting of inpatient deaths and adverse
events than the worse quality hospitals. This is a limitation of using secondary data bases
and a researcher has to keep this limitation in hisher mind. However, hospitals in those
states that have a mandatory hospital participation in data collection for the HCUP SID
project were chosen. It is believed that the HCUP SID project provided similar
guidelines for data collection in these hospitals, which may have assured a higher level of
data collection quality. In the following section, IQIs and PSIs are described in greater
details, as well as, the rational for selecting these particular indicators.
Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) are risk-adjusted mortality rates. Four IQIs for
the current study are selected because of their clinical significance, i.e. leading causes of
deaths in the U.S. These IQIs are also selected for common reasons: 75 percent or more
hospitals treat patients with relevant IQIs for the majority of years; and there are a large
number of patients at risk for these IQIs in the empirical sample. Precision of
measurement is high for these 4 IQIs (AHRQ Pub.02-R0204,2002).
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IQI 15: Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI). According to the American Heart
Association, approximately 1.5 million people suffer from AM1 each year; one-third of
them die from heart attacks. AM1 indicator is precise, measuring substantial amount of
provider level variation that is not attributable to random variation (AHRQ Pub.02R0204,2002). McClellan and Staiger (working paper, 1999) stated that short-term AM1
mortality is an excellent indictor of quality of care. McCarthy et al. (2000) studied the
reliability of using administrative data in quality outcome research by comparing results
from secondary sources with data gathered through primary data collection (e.g. medical
records).
IQI 16: Congestive Heart Failure (CHF) is a common disease, about 2 million
people suffer from CHF each year; elderly patients have a greater risk of death from
CHF; there is empirical evidence that hospitals at least in some states were able to
decrease CHF mortality during 1990s (AHRQ Pub.02-R0204,2002).
IQI 17: Stroke is the third leading cause of death in the U.S.; 10 - 15 percent of
stroke patients die during the hospitalization (AHRQ Pub.02-R0204,2002).
IQI 20: Pneumonia is the sixth leading cause of death in the country. McCarthy et
al. (2000) found that 50 percent of pneumonia cases had at least one objective clinical
evidence to confirm the complication (AHRQ Pub.02-R0204,2002).
"Patient safety is defined as freedom from accidental injury due to medical care,
or absence of medical errors, or absence of misuse of services" (p. 131, National
Healthcare Quality Report, AHRQ, 2003). Institute of Medicine report (2000) estimated
that 44,000 to 98,000 deaths occurs every year as a result of medical errors, making it the
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eighth leading cause of death; estimated cost of medical errors is reported as $29 billion
annually in lost income, disability, and health care costs.
Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) are risk-adjusted rates of adverse events for a
particular condition or procedure. Five PSIs are selected. These indicators perform well
in terms of reliability, bias, relatedness of indicators, and persistence over time (AHRQ
Pub.03-R203,2003). There is also one common reason for inclusion of these PSIs - a
large number of patients were at risk for developing these complications during the

.

1995-2000 period. In this study, PSIs may be subdivided into three categories: (1)
adverse iatrogenic events; (2) adverse nursing events; (3) adverse events due to errors in
post-operative process of care.
Adverse iatrogenic events.

PSI 15: Accidental puncture and laceration was proposed to capture complications
due to technical difficulties in medical care. For example, Taylor et al. (1998) found that
95 percent of patients, who had laparoscopic cholecystectomy, with an ICD-9 code of
accidental puncture and laceration had a confirmed injury of the bile duct or gallbladder.
Iezzoni et al. (1994) and Johantgen et al. (1998) proposed to use this indicator and
categorized it as an iatrogenic complication. McCarthy et al. (2000) found that 83.3
percent patients with this complication had at least one objective clinical evidence to
confirm the complication. Romano et al. (2003) reported 7 percent increase in accidental
puncture or laceration during the 1995-2000 period. PSI 15 attributes for 1.34 days in
excess LOS, $8,271 in excess charge, and 2.16 percent of excess mortality (Zhan and
Miller, 2003).

Adverse nursing events.

PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer is limited to secondary diagnosis for screening out cases of
ulcers present due to objective clinical reasons. This indicator was identified as very
favorable in indicating errors in nursing and process of care (AHRQ Pub.03-R203,2003).
Empirical studies found that nursing staffing, skill mix, and nursing hours were
associated with occurrence of decubitus ulcer in hospitals (Needleman et al., 2002).
Romano et al. (2003) reported 19 percent increase in the 1995-2000 period. PSI 3
attributes for 3.98 days in excess LOS, $10,845 in excess charge, and 7.23 percent of
excess mortality (Zhan and Miller, 2003).
PSI 7: Infection due to medical care is primary related to intravenous lines and
catheters. According to American Nurses Association, this indicator is nursing-sensitive
for acute care settings. Iezzoni et al. (1994) also included this indicator in their set of
inpatient quality indicators suggested for use with administrative data. Nursing staff is
mainly responsible for monitoring patients with central lines and catheters and making
sure that they are removed on time. Romano et al. (2003) found a 14 percent increase in
the infection rate over the 1995-2000 period. PSI 7 attributes for 9.58 days in excess
LOS, $38,656 in excess charge, and 4.3 1 percent of excess mortality (Zhan and Miller,
2003).
Adverse events due to errors in post-operative process of care.

PSI 12: Post-operative pulmonary embolism (PE) or deep vein thrombosis (DVT)
cases are limited to secondary diagnosis to eliminate complications that were present on
admission. This PSI is characterized as useful estimator of adverse events, because
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preventive techniques (e.g., anticoagulant therapy) should decrease the rate of this
complication (AHRQ Pub.03-R203,2003). There are mixed findings on whether nursing
is associated with post-operative PE or DVT.
McCarthy et al. (2000) noted that detection of 66.7 percent of surgical cases had
at least one objective clinical evidence to confirm the complication. Romano et al.
(2003) found a 42 percent increase in post-operative PE or DVT during the 1995-2000
period. PSI 12 attributes for 5.36 days in excess LOS, $21,709 in excess charge, and 6.56
percent of excess mortality (Zhan and Miller, 2003).
PSI 13: Post-operative sepsis is limited to secondary diagnosis to select out cases
of sepsis present on admission (AHRQ Pub.03-R203,2003). Iezzoni et al. (1994)
included this indicator in their list of quality measures detectible in the administrative
data bases. McCarthy et al. (2000) identified that 8 1.5 percent of post-operative infection
cases had at least one objective clinical evidence to confirm the complication. A fortyone percent (4 1%) increase in septicemia was reported in the 1995-2000 period (Romano
et al., 2003). PSI 13 attributes for 10.89 days in excess LOS, $57,727 in excess charge,
and 21.92 percent of excess mortality (Zhan and Miller, 2003).
IQI and PSI Processing Steps
The software, which was developed by the AHRQ and researchers from Stanford
University, generates observed and risk adjusted IQIs and PSIS. Observed rates are
generated in three steps.
First, identification of outcomes of interest (numerators, i.e. deaths or adverse
events) in inpatient records is achieved by setting a series of flag variables that select out
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necessary outcon~esfrom the raw inpatient data. Second, identification of population at
risk (denominator) is also done by the similar process of running the hospital discharge
records. Third, observed or raw IQIs and PSIs are calculated by simple division of
outcomes of interests by the populations at risk. At this point, the software allows
stratification of data by different categories, such as hospitals, age groups, racelethnicity,
gender, and payer categories.
Risk adjustment for IQIs and PSIs slightly varies. IQIs and PSIs adjustment for
age and gender are applied to the observed rates. The software provides the baseline file
means and regression coefficients for age and sex derived from AHRQ's SID for 29
states, i.e. the average case-mix. These means and coefficient are then applied to the
sample of interest, which allows comparability of rates across different hospitals. IQIs
are adjusted in a linear model by APR-DRGs. It is recommended to run version 15 of
3M's All Patient Refined - Diagnoses Related Groups (APR-DRG) software on raw
patient data before running the IQI's software in order to create APR-DRG categories,
and severity and mortality indicators. PSIs are adjusted by modified DRGs and comorbidities using logistic regression to account for differences among hospitals.

Internal Clinical Processes and Integration
Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
performance area scores are used to assess internal clinical processes and integration.
Devers et al. (2004) evaluated the role of JCAHO in promoting patient safety. They
found that hospitals try to meet JCAHO recommendations mainly in three areas: "(1)
developing better process for reporting, analyzing, and preventing sentinel events (e.g.,
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patients falls and use of patient restraints); (2) meeting patient safety standards ...(3)
meeting all or specific JCAHO patient goals, particularly improving communication and
the accuracy of patient identification" (p. 104, Devers et al., 2004).
JCAHO data are generated from on-site hospital surveys done by JCAHO
accreditation teams on a triennial basis. More than 500 human, organizational, and
facility standards of quality of hospital care are assessed for accreditation purposes. A
five-point scale is used to score hospital's compliance with each standard: (1) score 1 substantial compliance - the organization meets all major provisions of the standard and
intent; (2) score 2 - significant compliance - the organization meets most of the
provisions of the standard and intent; (3) score 3 - partial compliance - the organization
meets some provisions of the standard and intent ; (4) score 4 - minimal compliance - the
organization meets few provisions of the standard and intent; (5) score 5 noncompliance - the organization fails to meet the provisions of the standard and intent
(JCAHO, 200 1).
Individual scores are then aggregated into 44 performance area scores.
Performance area scores are also measured by the five-point scale noted above. For
example, if .the worst score (5) is present for any standard associated within a particular
performance area is identified, then this value (5) is assigned to the performance area.
Five performance area scores measure internal clinical processes and integration:
(1) Initial Assessment Procedures standards include procedures used to determine
patients needs, e.g. a physical examination and health history, appropriate
diagnostic tests and screening.
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(2) Anesthesia Care refers to the set of standards that address the planning and
delivery of anesthesia including assessment of patients' conditions prior to
anesthesia, informing patients of risks, options, and monitoring.

(3) Medication Use refers to the processes used to prescribe, prepare, dispense,
and administer medication, including specific issues such as preparation of
medication in accordance with all laws and regulations, safety, and
availability of emergency medication.

(4) Operative Procedures refers to the grouping of standards, which address the
processes used in the determination of appropriate operative procedures,
appropriateness of preoperative preparation and monitoring, and safety of
procedures.

(5) Availability of Patient Specific Information are aimed at ensuring that the
necessary information that supports and documents the care provided to
patients is obtained and maintained in the medical record in a timely manner.
These JCAHO standards may be reflective of areas related to clinical integration,
such as use of clinical information systems and clinical evidence-based practices,
guidelines, protocols, and medical registries (Burns, 1999). For example, medication use
standard demonstrate whether a hospital is in compliance with pharmaceutical guidelines
and protocols. Availability of patient specific information and initial patient assessment
procedures may be building blocks of a system-wide clinical information system.
Anesthesia care and operative procedures represent the sets of standards that may be used
across all system members, thus, easing quality monitoring and promoting clinical
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integration. Therefore, Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO) standards may capture aspects of clinical integration. However, only the
empirical analyses would demonstrate whether JCAHO variables can or cannot hold as
"good" measures of clinical integration. JCAHO's scores (1-5) are consolidated into a
single measure of compliance. Scores 1 and 2 are given a value of 1, i.e. compliance with
JCAHO standards, and scores 3,4, and 5 are given a value of 0, i.e. not in compliance
with JCAHO standards.
A sensitivity analysis to find out a way of summing these compliance measures
across five variables (Initial Assessment Procedures, Anesthesia Care, Medication Use,
Operative Procedures, and Availability of Patient Specific Information) is used. For
example, if there are no differences in marginal effects across all' five JCAHO variables
on quality outcomes, a summation of all five JCAHO variables into a single measure of
clinical integration is possible. Thus, zero is the minimum score, representing no clinical
integration, and five becomes the maximum score, representing a greater level of clinical
integration.
If some JCAHO variables have significant marginal effects but other variables do
not, a summation only significant ones into a single measure of internal clinical processes
and integration is attainable, and insignificant JCAHO variables are discarded. Other
combinations may also occur and can be considered. The summation of JCAHO
variables into a single construct would help to create a more comprehensive measure of
clinical integration, to increase variability, and to make the analyses more focused on the
research questions.

Hospital Organizational Characteristics
Hospitals affiliated with different types of health systems - centralized health
system (CHS), centralized physician/insurance health system (CPIHS), moderately
centralized health system (MCHS), decentralized health system (DHS), and independent
hospital system (IHS) - is a set of dummy variables and the main explanatory variables.
These variables are constructed from and available in the AHA data files.
Hospital size is measured by the total beds staffed and set up; it is a continuous
variable. Hospital ownership is measured by three dummy variables, distinguishing
between for-profit, non-profit (including other non-profit and church-affiliated), and
public hospitals (i.e., omitted category). Hospital teaching status is also represented by
dummy variables, having major-, minor-, and non-teaching status (i.e., omitted category).
Service mix and scope measures the number of tertiary hospital services,
categorized into 3 groups: (1) 0-10 (i.e., omitted category), (2) 10-20, and (3) 20-30
services.
Geographic locations - urban and rural (i.e., omitted category) locations - are
dummy variables. These variables control for organizational and environmental features
that may affect health system formation and quality of care.
Total nursing staff per staffed bed is a ratio of RNs and LPNs to staffed patient
bed. Ratio of registered nurses (RNs) to License Practical Nurses (LPNs) is a measure of
nursing skill-mix. These variables control for nursing related features that may affect
quality of care. Other control variables are described in the following sections of this
chapter.

Market Characteristics
Hirschrnan Herfindahl Index ranges between zero and one and is measured at a
hospital system level; a low HHI represents a greater competition in a particular MSA or
county. HMO penetration also ranges between zero and one. The number of HMOs is a
count of HMOs operating in a county or MSA. Previous research demonstrated mixed
results on the effects of hospital competition and managed care penetration on quality
outcomes (Sari, 2002; Shen, 2003); thus, it is necessary to control for market
characteristics in the model.
Three-year change variables are constructed for these market characteristics and
used in the cross-sectional study, accounting for possible relationships between the
environmental shifts and systems' structures and indirect effects on hospital performance.
Changes in levels of market variables from 1997 to 1994 prior the 1997 cross-sectional
analysis and changes in levels of market variables from 2000 to 1998 prior the 2000
cross-sectional analysis are used.

Patient Characteristics
Patient characteristics are measured at the hospital level. Patient age is a
categorical variable, having three groups: (1) the percentage of patients whose age is < 19
years (i.e., omitted category); (2) the percentage of patients whose age lies between 19
and 64 years; and (3) the percentage of patients whose age is over 64. Gender is
measured as the percentage of patients who are female (percent of males is an omitted
category). Race is measured as the percentage of white and non-white (percent of nonwhite is an omitted category). Volume captures the total number of patients at risk for
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this study's diseases or patient safety issues (i.e., denominators in calculating mortality
rates and patient adverse events).
Patient acuity (mortality34 and severity34) is measured by the percentage of
patients with 3 or 4 stages of risk of mortality and by the percentage of patients with 3 or
4 stages of severity of illness (3M mortality and severity scores). These variables control
for patient features that may affect quality of care. Since mortality34 and severity34 are
highly correlated, mortality34 is used for models estimating IQIs, and severity34 is used
for models estimating PSIS. Case-mix severity index is a numeric variable, representing
severity of Medicare cases. This variable comes from the CMS data files and is not
correlated with patient acuity variables. Case-mix index averages around 1;values less
than 1 represent hospitals with Medicare case-mixes that have lower severity than the
average, and vice versa. It is important to control for hospital case-mix because hospitals
that provide care to more severely ill patients may need more staffing and organizational
inputs to produce the desired quality outcomes.

Cross-Sectional Analyses
Variables addressing a choice of a health system type.
Lagged quality outcomes and lagged operating margin and days cash on hand
measure how a previous financial and quality performance may affect a current hospital's
choice of a system type, addressing the feedback issue. Lagged operating margin is a
numeric variable, measuring net income for hospital services in the year of 1995 and the
year of 1998, i.e., two years before the 1997 and the 2000 three stage estimation models.
Lagged days cash on hand indicate that the number of days that a hospital could cover its
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operating expenses (excluding depreciation and interest) with its unrestricted cash and
investments in the years of 1995 and 1998. Lagged IQIs and lagged PSIs are measured
as IQI and PSI quality signal factors that are summed over 4 IQIs and 5 PSIs in 1995 and
1998 for the 1997 and 2000 three stage estimation models.
Proportion of other hospitals that belong to more centralized health systems in a
market in the prior time period (two years prior) is calculated by dividing the number of
short-term general hospitals in a county for rural hospitals and a MSA for urban
hospitals, other then hospital in question (target hospital), that belong to more centralized
health systems (CHS and CPIHS) by the total number of short-term general hospitals in
that county and MSA, excluding the target hospital. Some markets may only have one or
two hospitals, thus, excluding target hospitals from the numerator and denominator is
important to avoid spurious correlation.
Proportion of other hospitals that belong to more decentralized health systems in a
market in the prior time period (two years prior) is derived by dividing the number of
general hospitals in a county for rural hospitals and a MSA for urban hospitals, other then
target hospital, that are affiliate with more decentralized health systems (DHS and
MCHS) by the total number of short-term general hospitals in that county and MSA,
excluding target hospitals.
A hospital's decision to conform to its environment may lead this hospital to join
into a more predominant form of a health system in a market. Since a predominant
system type is an environmental construct, which is external to an organization, it should
not have a direct influence on quality of care provided in a particular hospital. Quality of
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care is more likely to be influenced by internal organizational factors, such as its structure
andlor process.
Following Alexander and Morrisey (1988) and Bazzoli et al. (2000), measures of
favorable market conditions (i.e., hospitals affiliated with systems were more likely to be
located in favorable markets) to address the system type selection issue are presented.
Total population is the number of people living in a county or a MSA and
possibly measures a resource base for hospitals. Per capita income is average income for
a county or a MSA and may capture purchasing power of population and demand for
health services. Proportion of population over 65 years old and eligible for Medicare is a
numeric variable; and the CMS represents one of the major health care purchasers in the
health market. Higher population, higher per capita income and greater proportion of the
population that is 65+ represent a broad resource base and may motivate hospitals to join
into systems to be able to take better advantage of favorable markets when compared to
freestanding hospitals (Alexander and Morrisey, 1998, Bazzoli et al., 2000). Favorable
market conditions may be related to a greater centralization of health systems.
Centralized health systems may be more effective in providing services to large groups of
people and navigating them through a continuum of care, because centralization may
improve the system coordinating and communicating abilities (Shortell et al., 2000).
MDs per 1000 population is a ratio of practicing MDs by 1,000 population in a
county or a MSA. Physicians may try to secure their inpatient practices in more
competitive markets, i.e. areas with the greater number of MDs, by affiliating with health
systems. Centralized health systems may be better suited to hire and retain physicians on
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staff because of their strategic and organizational predispositions. For example, the
Kaiser Permanente health system is a good example of a highly centralized health system
that employs physicians in a highly competitive physician market such as California.
Therefore, physicians in highly competitive markets may prefer to work or to be affiliated
with more centralized health systems, since centralized health systems may provide
physicians with better job opportunities and job security.
Market conditions may directly affect structures, i.e. formation of various types of
health systems, and, indirectly, processes of care provision, i.e. clinical integration.
However, it is believed that preferable market conditions do not directly affect quality of
care. Hospitals provide care to individual patients on a case-by-case basis and not
discriminating by whether or not a patient comes from a market with greater number of
people, per capita income, and proportion of the population that is 65+.
The number of physicians in a market may also not be directly related to quality
of care, because other individual physicians' characteristics (i.e., physician qualification,
expertise, and higher level of training) are more likely to be related to a physician
component of quality (Hartz et al., 1989, Kelly and Hellinger, 1986) and are independent
of the number of physicians in a market. However, data on physician professional
characteristics are not available, which is a limitation of the current study.
Variables addressing a choice of a internal clinical processes and integration level.
Proportion of area physicians aged 45-54 is the number of physicians in this age group in
a country or a MSA divided by the total number of physicians in that market. Previous
research demonstrates that physician-hospital integration is one of characteristics of
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clinical integration (Devers et al. 1994, Shortell et al. 1994). Older physicians may have
a stronger alignment with hospitals in health systems, because physicians in tliis age
category are more likely to assume leadership and decision-making positions in their
health systems. It assumed that centralized health systems are more likely to grant
physicians with greater decision making authority than other types of systems.
Therefore, physicians of older age may be more likely to pursue and to implement
clinically integration policies and strategies promoted in more centralized systems. A
level of internal clinical processes and integration should not directly correlate with
physician age, since it is more likely to be correlated with other system characteristics centralization, coordination, communication (Shortell, 2000) - independent of physician
age.
Physicians and hospitals have formed various physician-organization
arrangements (POAs) (Cave, 1995, Morrisey et al., 1996, Burns and Thorpe, 1993).
POAs are associated with functional integration (Dynan et al., 1998). Dynan et al. (1998)
classified hospitals as having: (1) tight-only hospital-physician arrangements if they had
any combination of Management Service Organization (MSO), Integrated Salary Model
(ISM), Model Medical Foundation (MF), Integrated Health Organization (IHO); (2)
loose-only arrangements if they had Group Practice Without Walls (GPWW),
Independent Practice Association (IPA), Physician-Hospital Organization (PHO)
combinations; (3) hybrid arrangements with a combination of both tight and loose
organizational forms. Dynan et al. (1998) suggested that hospitals with tight-only and
hybrid POAs are more likely to facilitate process integration than loose-only

125
arrangements due to differences in their strategic, structural, and financial characteristics.
Madison (2004) and Cuellar and Gertler (working paper, 2002) identified several
pathways through which POAs may influence quality outcomes.
For example, POAs provide a greater incentive for quality monitoring, improve
cooperation and coordination in care delivery, overcome informational problems
(providing incentives to remove agency problems), and may reduce transaction costs, and
thus, improving patient treatment patterns and outcomes. Tight-only POAs strategy may
achieve a greater level of clinical integration than other types of POAs, thus, having a
direct effect on internal clinical processes and integration. However, POAs do not have a
direct affect on quality, but through certain pathways (Madison, 2004; Cuellar and
Gertler, working paper, 2002). Madison (2004) found that POAs did not have any
measurable impact on patient treatment and outcome. Cuellar and Gertler (working
paper, 2002) found that MF and ISM (i.e., tightly integrated models) provided better
quality care than the other types of POAs.
Following Madison's (2004) and Cuellar and Gertler's (working paper, 2002)
logic, it is suggested that tight-only POAs may improve process of care delivery, through
greater levels of integration of internal clinical processes and indirectly affecting quality
of care. It is proposed using types of POAs to account for a choice of an internal clinical
processes and integration level, omitting a loose-only category. The description of the
study variables, their construction and data sources are also presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Variables, Definitions, and Sources
Variable

Source of Data

Definition
I

Dependent Variables:

Clinical Outcomes:
IQI 15: AM1
IQI 16: CHF
IQI 17: Stroke
IQI 20: Pneumonia
PSI 15: Accidental
puncture and laceration
PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer
PSI 7: Infection due to
medical care
PSI 12: Post-operative PE
or DVT
PSI 13: Post-operative
sepsis

IQI risk adjusted rates
IQI risk adjusted rates
IQI risk adjusted rates
IQI risk adjusted rates
PSI risk adjusted rates

I Continuous variable
Continuous variable
Continuous variable
Continuous variable
Continuous variable

PSI risk adjusted rates
PSI risk adjusted rates

Continuous variable
Continuous variable

PSI risk adjusted rates

Continuous variable

PSI risk adjusted rates

I

Continuous variable

HCUP SID:
1995-2000
HCUP SID:
1995-2000
HCUP SID:
1995-2000
HCUP SID:
1995-2000
HCUP SID:
1995-2000
HCUP SID:
1995-2000

K e y Independent
Variable:

Hospital Afiliation with
Various Health Systems or
Groupings of Health
Systems (CHS+CPIHS)

I -hospitals in CHS;
2 -hospitals in CPIHS;
3 -hospitals in MCHS;
4 - hospitals in DHS;
5 -hospitals in IHS (omitted category)

Dummy variables

AHA: 1995-2000

Summed 5 JCAHO hospital compliance
scores for hospital clinical process
standards, ranging from 0 - no clinical
integration - to 5 - fuller clinical
integration

Categorical variable

JCAHO: 19952000

Internal Clinical
Processes and
Integration Variable:

Initial assessment
procedures:
I) Initial Assessment
Procedures
2) Anesthesia care
3) Medication use
4) Operative procedures
5) Availability of patient
specific information
Hospital Characteristics:

Hospital size

Total number of beds staffed and set up

AHA: 1995-2000

Hospital ownership

(I) Non-profit
(2) For-profit
(3) Public (omitted category)

AHA: 1995-2000

Service mix and scope

(I) 0 - 10 services (omitted category)
(2) 10 - 20 services and
(3) 20 - 30 services

Hospital teaching status

( I ) Major-teaching
(2) Minor-teaching

I

Dummy variables

AHA: 1995-2000

Dummy variables

AHA: 1995-2000
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Table 2: Variables, Definitions, and Sources (Continued)
(3) Non-teaching status (omitted category)
Geographic location

(1) Urban
(2) Rural (omitted category)

Dummy variables

AHA: 1995-2000

Total nursing staff per
staffed bed

Ratio of RNs and LPNs to staffed patient
bed.

Continuous variable

AHA: 1995-2000

RNs to LPNs ratio

Ratio of RNs to LPNs

Continuous variable

AHA: 1995-2000

Operating margin for 1995
and 1998

Operating incometnet patient revenue

Continuous variable

CMS: 1993-2000

Days cash on hand for
1995 and 1998

(Cash + ST investments + unrestricted LT
investments) / ((total expenses depreciation) I)

Continuous variable

CMS: 1993-2000

Hirschman Herfindahl
Index

Sum of squared market shares of inpatient
days - a low HHI score represents a
greater hospital competition.

Categorical variable:
ranges between 0 and
1

AHA: 1995-2000

HMO market share

Percentage of population covered by
HMOs in a county or MSA - a low score
means low HMO penetration.

Categorical variable:
ranges between 0 and
1

Interstudy: 19952000

Number of HMOs

Count of HMOs operating in a county or
MSA.

Continuous variable

Interstudy: 19952000

HHI change 1 period
HHI change 2"* period

HHI (1997) - HHI (1994)
HHI (2000) - HHI (1998)

Categorical variable

AHA: 1995-2000

HMO share IS' period
HMO share 2ndperiod

HMO share (1997) - HMO share (1994)
HMO share (2000) - HMO share (1998)

Categorical variable

Interstudy: 19952000

# of HMO 1' period
# of HMO 2ndperiod

# of HMO (1997) - # of HMO (1994)
# of HMO (2000) # of HMO (1998)

Continuous variable

Interstudy: 19952000

Patient age

(1) the %of patients whose age is < 19
years (omitted category)
(2) the %of patients whose age lies
between 19 and 64 years
(3) the %of patients whose age is over 64

Categorical variable

HCUP SID: 19952000

Gender

The % of a hospital's patients who are
female
The % of a hospital's patients who are
male (omitted category)

Categorical variable

HCUP SID: 19952000

Race

(1) the %of hospital's patients who are
white
(2) the % of non-white (omitted
category)

Categorical variable

HCUP SID: 19952000

Volume

Number patients at risk for a certain IQI

Continuous variable

HCUP SID: 1995-

Market characteristics:

-

Patient characteristics:
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Table 2: Variables, Definitions, and Sources (Continued)
and PSI
Patient acuity (mortality34
and severity34)

- the % of a hospital's patients with

Case-mix severity index

Continuous variables

HCUP SID: 19952000

Averages around 1; values lesser than 1
represent cases with lower severity

Continuous variable

CMS case-mix
files: 1995-2000

Proportion of other
hospitals that belong to
more centralized health
systems in a market

The total number of other general
hospitals in more centralized health
systems (CHS and CPIHS) by the total
number of short-term general hospitals in
that county or MSA, excluding a target
hospital

Continuous variable

AHA: 1995-2000

Proportion of other
hospitals that belong to
more decentralized health
systems in a market

The total number of other general
hospitals in more decentralized health
systems (DHS and MCHS) by the total
number of short-term general hospitals in
that county or MSA, excluding a target
hospital
Number of population in 1000s living in a
county or MSA

Continuous variable

AHA: 1995-2000

Continuous variable

ARF: 1995-2000

Per capita income

Per capita income in 1000s in a county or
MSA

Continuous variable

ARF: 1995-2000

Population over 65 years
old

Percent of population 65 and over years
old in county and MSA

Continuous variable

ARF: 1995-2000

MDs per 1000 population

Ratio of practicing MDs by 1,000
population in a county or MSA

Continuous variable

ARF: 1995-2000

Lagged operating margin
for 1995 and 1998

Operating income/net patient revenue

Continuous variable

CMS: 1993-2000

Lagged days cash on hand
for 1995 and 1998

(Cash + ST investments + unrestricted LT
investments) / ((total expenses depreciation) /)

Continuous variable

CMS: 1993-2000

Lagged IQls for 1995 and
1998
Lagged PSIs for 1995 and
1998

Summed over 4 IQIs

Continuous variables

HCUP SID:
1995-2000

Summed over 5 PSIs

Continuous variables

The number of physicians in this age
group in a country or MSA divided by the
total number of physicians in that market

Continuous variable

mortality risk of stage 3 or 4 (IQI related)
- the %of a hospital's patient mix with
severity of illnesses risk of stage 3 or 4
(PSI related)

Cross-Sectional Analyses
(a) Health System Choice

Total population

(b) Choice of a Clinical
Processes and Integration
Level
Proportion of area
physicians aged 45-54

ARF: 1995-2000
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Table 2: Variables, Definitions, and Sources (Continued)
Types of POAs

( I ) tight-only POAs, combining MSO,
ISM, MF, IHO
(2) loose-only POAs, combining GPWW,
IPA, PHO (omitted category)
(3) hybrid POAs, combing different types

Categorical variable

AHA:1995-2000

Note: AHA-American Hospital Association; HCUP SID--Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State
Commission on Accreditation of
Inpatient data bases; ARF-Area Resource Files; JCAH-Joint
Healthcare Organizations

Summary
This chapter described the research design, data sources, analytical plan,
empirical models, and variable measurements to be used in the current study. Panel and
cross-sectional models are proposed to identify relationships among hospital system
types, clinical integration, and quality outcomes; and to determine which health system
type or a grouping of health systems are more likely to achieve greater levels of
integration of internal clinical processes and better quality performance. The data are
assembled from multiple sources for the 1995-2000 period. Seven data bases are put
together to provide sufficient measures of quality, hospital, patient, market characteristics
for the current study. Patient risk-adjusted indicators (IQIs and PSIs) are generated from
the HCUP SID, using the software provided by AHRQ. Four IQIs and five PSIs flag
potential quality problems present in hospitals affiliated with various types of health
systems. Performances of three models are compared: (1) the panel model, estimated by
fixed effects or random effects; (2) the cross-sectional models for the separate years of
1997 and 2000, estimated by three stage estimation models; and (3) the cross-sectional,
simplified model, if the measure of internal clinical processes and integration is weak.

CHAPTER 5: RESULTS

Introduction
First, descriptive statistics, such as system hospitals' organizational characteristics
and compliance with JCAHO requirements, quality outcomes and trends in outcomes for
the national sample and the empirical 11 states sample of system hospitals, are presented
and discussed. Second, findings from the panel, longitudinal models evaluating the
effects of system structures and internal processes on quality outcomes are reported and
discussed. Finally, results from the cross-sectional analyses are reported and discussed.
Descriptive Analyses
The empirical sample is reduced from about 2,647 system hospitals in the national
sample to approximately 857 system hospitals in the eleven states (i.e., HCUP SID data
were only available for these states). There were 714 hospitals on average in different
types of health systems per year in the empirical sample. The sample declined even
further when the JCAHO data were merged in. There were 119 observations with
complete data in 1995,229 observations in 1996,246 observations in 1997,267
observations in 1998,203 observations in 1999, and 234 observations in 2000.
Since JCAHO accredits the same panel of hospitals on the triennial basis, a
decision was made to reorganize and reconstruct data into two panels: 1995-1997,
representing the first JCAHO review year, and 1998-2000, representing the second
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JCAHO review year. The number of observations was 600 on average in different panel,
longitudinal models. Due to significant variations in the sample size, a careful
descriptive analysis is necessary to identify differences in system hospitals'
organizational characteristics between the national and empirical samples.
Organizational characteristics for hospitals and different types of health systems
in the national and the 11 state empirical samples are presented and discussed at first.
Next, adjusted least squared means (ALSM) approach are examined to identify trends in
quality indicators for hospitals in different system types and over the study period for the
empirical sample, adjusting for residual variation in patients' age, gender, acuity of
illnesses, and case-mix index (CMI) at the hospital level.
System Hospitals' Organizational Characteristics
The descriptive results of hospital and system characteristics and trends in system
hospitals are discussed for the national and empirical samples. Results of t-tests and Chisquared tests of organizational characteristics between the national and the empirical
samples are compared. Then hospital characteristics by five system types averaged over
six years of data and Chi-squared tests of differences in organizational characteristics for
these hospitals in five system types are evaluated. Hospital compliance-noncompliance
with JCAHO requirements (i.e., clinical process and integration measures) is presented in
a series of tables and graphs and compared for the national and empirical samples.
Trends in mortality (IQI) and patient safety (PSI) rates adjusted for several hospital
characteristics for the empirical sample hospitals over the study period are also reported.
The following sections separately discuss descriptive tables and graphs.
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Tables 3 and 4 present orghizational characteristics of system hospitals in the
national and the empirical (1 1 states) samples over the study period from 1995 to 2000.
Some differences may be visually detected in these characteristics for the national and
empirical samples. For example, the percentages of hospitals in different system types
did not vary in the national sample (Table 3) in comparison with the empirical sample
that varied at a higher rate for system hospitals (Table 4). However, the trends over time
were similar in both samples, though changes were less dramatic for the national sample.
In the following paragraphs, changes in hospital affiliation with different types of health
systems over time are described in a greater detail, because these are main structural
characteristics in this study.
In the national sample, the percent of hospitals in Centralized Health Systems
(CHS) fluctuated around 5.25-5.75 percent during the 1995-1996 period (Table 3). The
percent then declined to 3.92 percent in 1998 and increased to 7.87 percent in 2000
(Table 3). In the empirical sample, the percent of CHS hospitals ranged between 5.28
percent-7.55 percent over the 1995-1996 period, then sharply dropped to 1.3 1 percent in
1998 and climbed to 9.33 in 2000 (Table 4). The representation of hospitals in
Centralized Physician Insurance Health Systems (CPIHS) decreased from 11.40 percent
in 1995 to 7.93 percent in 1997, increased to about 10 percent in 1998 and 1999, and then
declined to 7.64 percent in 2000 in the national sample (Table 3). In the eleven state
sample, the percent of hospitals in CPIHS decreased steadily from 13.88 percent in 1995
to 6.02 percent in 1998, increased to 7.23 percent in 1999, and then experienced a sharp
decline to 2.76 percent in 2000 (Table 4).

Table 3: System Hospitals' Organizational Characteristics in the National Sample Over the Study Period
Categories
Number of beds
Centralized Health Systems (%)
Centralized Physician Insurance Health Systems (%)
Moderately Centralized Health Systems (%)
Decentralized Health Systems (%)
Independent Hospital Systems (%)
Public (%)
For-profit (%)
Voluntary (%)
Major teaching (%)
Minor teaching (%)
Non-teaching (%)
Service Mix and Scope:
0 - lo(%)
10 - 20 (%)
20 - 30 (%)
Urban (%)
Rural (%)
Cash Flow to Total Revenue (94)
RN Percent of Licensed Nursing (%)
Sample Size

1995
176.56
5.25
11.40
20.36
52.40
10.60
17.22
20.96
61.83
6.32
14.11
79.57

1996
175.71
5.75
8.63
26.88
45.30
13.44
16.64
21.55
61.81
6.58
14.49
78.94

1997
176.68
5.29
7.93
27.14
47.23
12.41
15.48
23.13
61.39
6.67
14.88
78.45

1998
173.90
3.92
10.28
31.24
39.99
14.57
15.07
22.52
62.41
6.67
14.65
78.68

1999
174.70
4.1 1
10.70
32.32
39.23
13.63
14.76
21.80
63.44
6.62
14.53
78.85

2000
176.17
7.87
7.64
33.16
41.35
9.97
14.05
22.08
63.86
6.76
12.1.2
81.12

55.02
32.93
12.05
72.99
27.01
10.28
81.47
2,672

54.21
32.53
13.26
72.85
27.15
10.42
82.43
2,692

54.00
32.47
13.53
73.04
26.96
10.47
82.32
2,667

56.50
30.45
13.05
73.04
26.96
8.88
83.32
2,654

54.91
32.07
13.02
73.23
26.77
8.20
83.66
2,613

54.32
31.99
13.69
73.20
26.80
8.81
84.14
2,588

Table 4: System Hospitals' Organizational Characteristics in the Empirical Sample (1 1 states) Over the Study Period

-

Categories
Number of beds
Centralized Health Systems (%)
Centralized Physician Insurance Health Systems (%)
Moderately Centralized Health Systems (%)
Decentralized Health Systems (%)
Independent Hospital Systems (%)
Public (%)
For-profit (%)
Voluntary (%)
Major teaching (%)
Minor teaching (%)
Non-teaching (%)
Service Mix and Scope:
0 - 10 (%)
10 -20(%)
20 - 30 (%)
Urban (%)
Rural (%)
Cash Flow to Total Revenue (%)
RN Percent of Licensed Nursing (%)
Sample Size

1995
205.10
5.28
13.88
26.55
50.53
3.77
12.82
20.21
66.97
7.27
17.44
75.29

1996
204.47
7.55
7.69
33.57
47.27
3.92
12.40
20.67
66.93
7.58
17.91
74.51

1997
205.72
6.68
6.02
33.69
50.00
3.61
11.64
22.35
66.01
7.60
18.43
73.96

1998
205.01
1.31
6.96
36.27
48.49
6.96
11.37
21.23
67.40
7.66
18.79
73.55

1999
207.14
1.30
7.23
39.88
44.65
6.94
11.47
21.51
67.02
7.80
18.79
73.40

2000
208.43
9.33
2.76
42.84
41.79
3 -29
10.55
21.82
67.63
7.91
14.75
77.34

37.02
46.20
16.78
81.32
18.68
9.83
86.04
855

36.69
44.52
18.79
81.10
18.90
10.50
86.56
862

38.14
43.06
18.79
81.21
18.79
9.97
86.66
859

43.29
38.93
17.79
80.87
19.13
8.49
87.51
853

41.39
40.94
17.67
80.87
19.13
8.71
87.65
837

39.60
41.83
18.57
80.98
19.02
9.23
88.12
825
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The percent of hospitals in Moderately Centralized Health Systems (MCHS) has
been steadily growing from 20.36 percent to 33.16 percent over the study period in the
national sample (Table 3). A similar trend was also found in the empirical sample, i.e.
increasing from 26.55 percent to 42.88 percent. For hospitals in the Decentralized
Health Systems (DHS), a decreasing trend from 52.40 percent in 1995 to 39.23 percent
was observed in 1999, which increased up to 41.35 percent by 2000 in the national
sample. A decreasing trend was also observed in the 11 state sample for the same system
type, i.e. from 50.53 percent in 1995 to 41.79 percent in 2000 (Table 4). The percentage
of hospitals in Independent Hospital Systems (IHS) has been increasing up to 14.57
percent in 1998, but then declined to 9.97 percent in 2000 in the national sample. In the
empirical sample, the percentage of hospitals in IHS has increased from around 3.6
percent in the beginning for the study period to 6.95 percent in 1998 and 1999, but then
sharply declined to 3.29 percent in 2000.
Other characteristics are described as follows. Overall, hospital organizational
characteristics were fairly stable from one year to another in both samples. For example,
in the national sample, the average number of hospital beds has been steadily and slightly
decreasing from 176.56 in 1995 to 173.90 in 1998, and then increased up to 176.17 in
2000. The average number of hospital beds in the empirical sample was greater then in
the national sample by approximately 30 beds. During the 1995-1 998 period, the
average number of beds had change little, hovering around 205 beds. System hospitals in
the empirical sample had a smaller percent of public hospitals and larger percentages of
voluntary hospitals in comparison with the national sample (Table 3 and 4). A greater

percentage of hospitals in the empirical sample were in major- or minor-teaching
categories, provided a greater mix and scope of services, located in urban areas, and had
more nursing staff. The results of t-tests and Chi-squared tests comparing system
hospitals' characteristics for the empirical and the national samples are provided later in
the text.
Figure 5 provides a visual depiction of the trends in hospitals by system type over
the study period for the empirical sample. A decreasing trend for hospitals in CHS from
1995 to 1998 is consistent finding with the previous research (Bazzoli et al., 2001).
However, an increase in hospitals in the CHS category after 1998 has not yet been
studied. A steady increase in the percent of hospitals in MCHS and a decrease in the
percent of hospitals that are DHS over the study period can be observed.
In addition, t and Chi-squared tests were conducted on data pooled across six
years for both the national and the 11 state empirical samples to assess whether the
findings of this study can be generalizable to system hospitals in the entire country.
These tests reveal that hospitals in the empirical sample have a larger mean number of
beds than in the national sample (205.96 vs. 175.65, respectively) (Table 5). The
distribution of hospitals by system types in the 11 state and the national samples are also
significantly different with the exception of hospitals in Centralized Health Systems
(CHS).
The percentage of CHS hospitals is similar in both samples (5.37 percent vs. 5.28
percent). However, the national sample has larger percentage of hospitals in Centralized
Physician Insurance Health Systems (CPIHS) and in Independent Hospital Systems (IHS)
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Figure 5: Trends in Hospitals in Different Types of Health Systems for the Empirical Sample
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Table 5: Comparison of the National Sample and the Empirical Sample - System Hospitals' Characteristics Pooled Over
the Study Period
National Sample

Number of Beds
Centralized Health Systems (%)
Centralized Physician Insurance Health Systems (%)
Moderately Centralized Health Systems (%)
Decentralized Health Systems (%)
Independent Hospital Systems (%)
Public (%)
For-profit (%)
Voluntary (%)
Major Teaching (%)
Minor Teaching (%)
Non-teaching (%)
Service Mix and Scope:
0 - lo(%)
10 - 20 (%)
20 - 30 (%)
Urban (%)
Rural (%)
Cash Flow to Total Revenue (%)
RN Percent of Licensed Nursing (%)
Sample Size

11 State Sample

Mean
175.65
5.37
9.40
28.60
44.18
12.45
15.55
22.00
62.45
6.60
14.14
79.26

Std Dev
174.89
20.42
23.55
26.54
42.83
30.14
36.24
41.43
48.43
24.83
34.84
40.55

Mean
205.96
5.28
7.28
35.62
47.07
4.75
11.72
21.29
66.99
7.64
17.70
74.66

Std Dev
187.76
20.22
23.55
45.30
48.56
19.22
32.16
40.94
47.03
26.56
38.17
43.50

73.06
26.94
9.53
82.88
15,886

44.37
44.37
8.89
11.94

81.06
18.64
9.47
87.08
5,147

39.19
39.94
8.62
8.76

Chisquared
(or t-) value
10.24
0.08
19.28
74.07
9.33
209.57
45.79
1.15
34.66
6.52
38.63
48.05

Pr>lt(
<.ooo 1
0.7736
<.OOO 1
<.OOO 1
0.0022
<.OOO 1
<.0001
0.2833
<.OOO 1
0.0107
<.0001
<.0001

146.02
146.03
-0.36
20.94

<.0001
<.0001
0.7206
<.0001

W
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than the national sample (9.40 percent vs. 7.28 percent and 12.45 percent vs. 4.75
percent, respectively). The percentage of hospitals in Moderately Centralized Health
Systems (MCHS) and Decentralized Health Systems (DHS) is greater in the empirical
sample (35.62 percent vs. 28.6 percent and 47.07 percent vs. 44.18 percent, respectively).
A smaller percentage of system hospitals has public ownership in the empirical

sample than in the national sample (1 1.72 percent vs. 15.55 percent). The eleven state
sample has a similar percentage of investor-owned hospitals (21.29 percent vs. 22.00
percent) and a larger percent of voluntary hospitals (and 66.99 percent vs. 62.45 percent)
in comparison with the national sample (Table 3). Relatively more system hospitals were
in major and minor teaching categories in the empirical sample than in the national
sample (7.64 percent vs. 6.60 percent and 17.70 percent vs. 14.14 percent, respectively).
Hospitals in the empirical samples provide a greater mix and number of services
(18.06 percent vs. 13.10 percent for the 20-30 service category and 42.58 percent vs.
32.07 percent for the 10-20 service category) and less likely to be in the 0-10 service
category (39.35 percent vs. 57.82 percent) than hospitals nationally. Hospitals in the
empirical sample are more likely to be located in urban areas (81.06 percent vs. 73.06
percent) and less likely in rural areas (18.64 percent vs. 26.94 percent). The eleven state
sample hospitals have a greater percentage of total nursing staff that are RNs (87.08
percent vs. 82.88 percent). There is no difference in the ratio of cash flow to total
revenue between the two samples (Table 5).
Based on the t and Chi-squared tests, it is concluded that the empirical (1 1 state)
sample of system hospitals significantly differs from the national sample of system
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hospitals. The findings of the current study cannot be generalized to an average system
hospital. Hospitals in the empirical sample are more likely to be disproportionately
urban, larger in size, voluntary, nonpublic, and having a higher level teaching status and
greater service complexity and nurses that are RNs. Thus, the findings are limited to
system hospitals in these eleven states.
Table 6 presents organizational characteristics for hospitals in the different types
of health systems, averaged over six years of data in the eleven state empirical sample.
Chi-squared tests were conducted to compare organizational characteristics of hospitals
by system types to assess similarities and differences in different system hospitals.
Hospitals in CHS and CPIHS are on average larger in size (276 and 262 number of beds),
followed by MCHS with 212, DHS with 189, and IHS with 164 beds (Table 6).
Although most of hospitals in these five system types are voluntary, non-profit hospitals,
a greater percentage of DHS and IHS hospitals have for-profit status (39.85 percent and
25.80 percent, respectively); and 23.49 percent of CHS hospitals are publicly owned.
There is a descending progression in the percentages of system hospitals that are
major teaching hospitals - 15.86 percent (highest) of CHS hospitals are major teaching
institutions versus 3.5 percent (lowest) of IHS hospitals are major teaching. A similar
dynamic is observed in terms of the service mix and scope: hospitals in CHS offer a
greater number and scope of services than hospitals in other types of systems. Hospitals
in all system types in the empirical sample tend to be located in urban areas, though more
hospitals in MCHS and DHS are more likely to be located in rural areas (19.61 percent
and 23.75 percent, respectively). There are no differences in hospital cash flow (all

Tables 6: Hospital Characteristics by System Type and Averaged Over the Study Period in the Empirical Sample (19952000)

Number of Beds
Public (%)
For-profit (%)
Voluntary (%)
Major Teaching (%)
Minor Teaching (%)
Non-teaching (%)
Service Mix and Scope:
0 - 10 (%)
10 - 2 0 (%)
20 - 30 (%)
Urban (%)
Rural (%)
Cash Flow to Total Revenue (%)
RN Percent of Licensed Nursing (%)
S a m ~ l eSize

CHS
276.97
23.49
1.37
75.14
15.86
33.73
50.42

CPIHS
262.78
13.98
2.34
83.68
14.61
24.41
60.98

MCHS
21 1.62
7.04
8.72
84.24
10.52
20.28
69.20

DHS
189.43
13.92
39.85
46.23
2.95
15.45
81.60

IHS
164.31
9.63
25.80
64.57
3.50
17.85
78.65

96.16
3.84
9.00
90.20
38

90.33
9.67
8.16
89.61
52

80.39
19.61
9.32
87.40
254

76.25
23.75
10.81
86.32
337

91.19
8.81
10.00
85.99
33

Chi-squared
(or t-) value
4142.70
53.25
617.64
627.71
137.52
29.38
136.99

Pr>ltl
<.OOO 1
<.000 1
<.OOO 1
<.OOO 1
<.0001
<.OOO 1
<.OOO 1

84.23
84.23
11278.82
11247.04

<.OOO 1
<.OOO 1
.I98
.005
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around 8-10 percent) for different system types. Hospitals in centralized health systems
tend to have a greater percentage of RNs of licensed nursing staff when compared with
other system types. In conclusion, there are clear and statistically significant
organizational differences in hospitals in different types of health systems in almost all
system and hospital characteristics (except for the cash flow to total revenue), and it is
important to control for these differences in the multivariate settings.
System Hospitals' Compliance with JCAHO Requirements
As discussed earlier - the JCAHO data were reorganized into 2 panels: 19951997, representing the first JCAHO review year, and 1998-2000, representing the second
JCAHO review year. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics on the hospitals'
compliance/noncompliance with the five JCAHO performance area variables used as
clinical process measures for the current study, comparing hospitals' JCAHO scores in
the national and the eleven state samples.
Big differences in Joint Commission for Accreditation of Health care
Organization's compliance in three out of five performance areas from the first to the
second review period are observed in both samples and presented in Table 7. An increase
in non-compliance in initial patient assessment procedures was present (24.73 percent
versus 36.29 percent for the national sample and 23.60 percent versus 33.33 percent for
the eleven state sample), and decreases in non-compliance in medication use (35.1 1
percent versus 29.71 percent and 36.01 percent versus 28.03 percent, respectively) and
availability of patient specific information (44.37 percent versus 37.56 percent and 42.83
percent versus 38.38, respectively) were also notable.

Table 7: System Hospitals Not in Compliance with JCAHO Performance Area Requirements in the National and
Empirical Samples in Two Study Periods

Initial Assessment Procedures
Anesthesia Care
Medication Use
Operative Procedures
Availability of Patient Specific
Information

N
3,312

3,047
3,312
3,050

1st Study Period (95-97)
National Sample
11 State Sample
% not in
Chi%not in
compliance
N
compliance
squared
24.73
572
23.60
0.33
4.30
35.1 1
5.54

571
572
571

6.30
36.01
4.90

4.39
0.17
0.38

3,311

44.37
572
42.83
0.47
2nd Study Period (98-00)
National Sample
11 State Sample
% not in
% not in
ChiN
compliance
compliance
squared
3,703
36.29
693
33.33
2.23
3,493
3.75
689
3.19
0.5 1
3,702
29.71
692
28.03
0.79
3,504
5.99
690
6.38
0.15

Initial Assessment Procedures
Anesthesia Care
Medication Use
Operative Procedures
Availability of Patient Specific
3,703
37.56
693
Information
Note: * means significance at .10 level, * * at .05 level, * * * at .O1 level

38.38

0.17

Pr>lt(
0.56

0.04**
0.68
0.53
0.49

Pr>ltl
0.14
0.48
0.37
0.67

0.68

In the first study period, about a quarter of hospitals in the national and the
empirical samples (24.73 percent and 23.60 percent, respectively) were not in compliance
for initial assessment procedures; about one third (35.1 1 percent and 36.01 percent) - for
medication use, and about a half (44.37 percent and 42.83 percent) - for availability of
patient specific information in both samples. Hospitals compliance with JCAHO
performance areas for anesthesia care and operative procedures was high in both the
national and eleven state samples (95.70 percent and 93.70 percent for anesthesia care
and 94.46 percent and 95.10 percent for operative procedures) (Ta6le 7). Chi-squared
test detected that hospitals in the national and empirical samples were different from each
other on the anesthesia care compliance in the first review year, with fewer hospital in the
eleven state sample in compliance.
In the eleven state sample, Table 8 and Figure 6 demonstrate a visible decrease in
noncompliance in three (anesthesia care, medication use, availability of patient specific
information) out of five JCAHO performance areas in the balanced sample of hospitals
that have JCAHO data in both study periods. Noncompliance with JCAHO performance
areas requirements for initial assessment procedures increased from 23.28 percent in the
first study period to 35.83 percent in the second study period. Noncompliance with
JCAHO performance areas requirements for operative procedures has just slightly
increased from 4.46 percent to 6.29 percent of study hospitals (Table 8). In conclusion,
the national and empirical eleven state samples were not different from each other on
compliance with JCAHO requirements with the exception of anesthesia use in the first

Table 8: Percent of System Hospitals Not in Compliance with JCAHO Performance Area Requirements in the Empirical
Sample in Two Study Periods

N

11 State Sample
1st study period
2nd study period
(95-97)
(98-00)
% not in
% not in
compliance
N
compliance

Initial Assessment Procedures

494

23.28

494

35.83

Anesthesia Care

494

6.71

494

3.25

Medication Use

493

36.5 1

493

26.57

Operative Procedures

493

4.46

493

6.29

Availability of Patient Specific Information

492

42.3 1

492

40.89

--t Initial Assessment Procedure
--t-Anesthesia Care

- - X-

Medication Use
Operative Procedures

+Availability

1

of Patient Specific lnfor

2
Study periods

Figure 6: Trends in System Hospitals Not in Compliance with JCAHO Performance Areas in the Empirical Sample
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review year. Thus, multivariate findings in terms of hospital compliance with JCAHO
requirements may be nationally generalizable to an average hospital. A significant
variation in compliance with JCAHO requirements among the study hospitals was
observed. In general, the hospital compliance with JCAHO requirements has been
improving over the study period for three out of five JCHAO performance areas, which
may be showing the impact of the Institute of Medicine reports in 1999 and 2000 on
medical errors and quality and also increased pressure on JCAHO to be more stringent
and force hospitals to improve these performance areas.
Adjusted Least Squared Means
Adjusted Least Squared Means (ALSM) were calculated separately for each IQI
and PSI and for 1995, 1998, and 2000 years. The ALSM procedure removes residual
differences in hospital level patient characteristics, severity and complication that had
measurable and significant effects on IQI mortality and PSI adverse event rates.
y = a ,+ a , S , + a , P ,

+E

where y is a vector defining quality outcomes (i.e., IQIs and PSIS);

S is a vector representing dummy variables for different system types, i.e. Centralized
Health Systems (CHS),
Centralized Physician/Insurance Health Systems (CPIHS),
Moderately Centralized Health Systems (MCHS),
Decentralized Health Systems (DHS),
Independent Health System (IHS - a reference category);
P represents patient characteristics, i.e. age, gender, patient acuity, and CMI.
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The estimated regressions were run with the system type variables and the key
patient characteristics, holding these characteristics at their mean values. By doing that,
the ALSM procedure isolates the hospital systems' effects on mortality and adverse
events. Tables 9 and 10 demonstrate IQI mortality rates and PSI adverse event rates for
the Adjusted Least Squared Means Models in 1995, 1998, and 2000. Mortality and
adverse event rates are presented by the system type, where Independent Hospital System
(IHS) is a reference category. Regression coefficients and standard errors represent
differences (some of which were statistically significant at varying levels of significance)
in the mortality and adverse event rates by system types in comparison with the IHS.
A comparison of the adjusted least squared means for the IQI mortality rates for
AMI, CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia revealed that the "best performers" (i.e. system
hospitals with the lowest mortality rate) were hospitals in DHS, CHS, and CPIHS when
compared to IHS hospitals during the 1995-2000 period. The ALSM mortality rates
were significantly lower for these latter system types relative to IHS (Table 9). This
relationship held over time for hospitals in DHS, but it was less stable for hospitals in
CHS and CPIHS as shown in Table 9 and Figure 7 (the graph with AM1 and CHF was
chosen because this conditions were most illustrative of the differences among hospital
systems).
The descriptive ALSM findings suggest that both decentralization and
centralization of hospital structures may decrease mortality rates for AMI, CHF, Stroke,
and Pneumonia. This finding is in disagreement with the conceptual model and opposing
Scenarios 1 and 2, where only one, either centralized or decentralized, health system

Table 9: IQI Mortality Rates for the Adjusted Least Squared Means Models in 1995, 1998, and 2000
System Type
IHS
CHS
CPIHS
MCHS
DHS
Sample Size
System Type
IHS
CHS
CPIHS
MCHS
DHS
Sample Size
System Type
IHS
CHS
CPIHS
MCHS

IQI 15: AM1 - 1998
IQI 15: AM1 - 1995
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err. Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
13.37
9.96
11.88
- 1.49
0.94
6.84
-3.12*
1.84
12.94
-0.43
0.64
8.65
-1.30
1.01
12.48
-0.90
0.56
10.11
0.16
0.68
12.54
-0.83*
0.48
8.27
-1.69***
0.65
629
606
IQI 16: CHF - 1998
IQI 16: CHF - 1995
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err. Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
5.39
4.46

IQI 15: AM1 - 200
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
12.44
11.86
-0.59
1.15
9.72
-2.72
1.75
13.66
1.21
0.92
10.97
-1.48
0.93
577
IQI 16: CHF - 2000
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
5.34

4.37

4.57

-1.01***
0.23
756
IQI 17: Stroke - 1995
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
12.99
10.40
-2.59***
0.84
12.73
-0.26
0.57
0.49
12.72
-0.27

3.96

-0.50
0.30
812
IQI 17: Stroke - 1998
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
11.19
9.23
-1.96
1.73
9.66
-1.54
0.94
11.11
-0.09
0.60

-0.77***
0.29
730
IQI 17: Stroke - 2000
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
14.24
13.63
-0.61
0.92
10.27
-3.97***
1.43
14.02
-0.2 1
0.71
Continued

Table 9: IQI Mortality Rates for the Adjusted Least Squared Means Models in 1995, 1998, and 2000 (Continued)
IQI 15: AM1 - 1995
IQI 15: AM1 - 1998
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err. Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
DHS
10.69
-2.30***
0.41
9.39
-1.80*** 0.57
Sample Size
685
684
IQI 20: Pneumonia - 1995
IQI 20: Pneumonia - 1998
System Type
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err. Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
IHS
8.59
8.05
CHS
6.43
-2.17*** 0.62
6.44
-1.61
1.27
CPIHS
8.78
0.18
0.42
7.25
-0.80
0.66
MCHS
8.59
0.00
0.35
7.80
-0.25
0.41
DHS
7.17
-1.42*** 0.30
6.41
-1.64*** 0.39
Sample Size
792
787
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, * * * at .O 1 level
System Type

IQI 15: AM1 - 200
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
12.35
-1.89***
0.72
653
IQI 20: Pneumonia - 2000
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
9.48
9.71
0.23
0.63
6.66
-2.82***
0.98
9.78
0.3 1
0.48
8.41
-1.07**
0.48
76 1
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Figure 7: Trends in Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) and Congestive Heart Failure (CHF), 1995-2000
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structure was predicted to have better quality outcomes. However, the ALSM findings
for IQIs suggested a possible system effect on mortality rates in system hospitals, which
is the most valuable finding at this stage. Multivariate analyses are going to be conducted
that would provide statistical control for other factors that may affect quality outcomes.
In terms of PSI adverse event rates, no clear patterns exist across system types
(Table 10 and Figure 8). Mortality rates and patient safety adverse events increased or
leveled after 1998 (Figures 7 and 8) which may be suggestive of the BBA effect or
possible changes in the hospital reporting patterns of medical errors after the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) reports in 1999 and 2000. The longitudinal study needs to look for
potential adverse quality effects from the BBA, andlor potentially other market/policy
factors, andlor reporting of adverse events post the IOM report (1999), since historically
there was a substantial under-reporting of adverse events in hospitals.
In conclusion, the ALSM demonstrates that there are statistically significant
differences in mortality rates between various types of health systems, although patterns
are less clear for the patient safety indicators. Multivariate analyses are need to examine
how the system characteristics and internal clinical processes adopted by different system
types may affect quality performance as measured as IQI and PSI and holding other
factors constant. The following sections describe correlation analysis and the results of
the panel, multivariate models.
Correlation Analysis
Prior to performing a correlation analysis, outliers on dependent and independent
variables were identified and set to missing. These outliers could significantly skew the

Table 10: PSI Adverse Event Rates for the Adjusted Least Squared Means Models in 1995, 1998, and 2000
System Type
IHS
CHS
CPIHS
MCHS
DHS
S a m ~ l esize
System Type

IHS
CHS
CPIHS
MCHS
DHS
Sample size
System Type

IHS
CHS
CPIHS
MCHS

PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer - 1995
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
2.07
1.81 -0.26
0.28
1.88 -0.18
0.19
1.59 -0.48***
0.16
1.96 -0.1 1
0.13
8 10
PSI 7: Infection due to
medical care - 1995
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
0.13
0.14
0.01
0.02
0.12
-0.01
0.01
0.01
0.13
-0.0 1
0.12
-0.01
0.01
8 17
PSI 12: Post-operative
PE or DVT - 1995
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
0.55
0.61
0.06
0.08
0.53
-0.02
0.05
0.58
0.03
0.05

PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer - 1998
Rate
Coef. Std. Err.
1.95
2.36
0.41
0.42
1.98
0.02
0.22
1.79
-0.16
0.14
2.02
0.07
0.13
808
PSI 7: Infection due to
medical care - 1998
Rate
Coef. Std. Err.
0.17
0.23
0.06*
0.04
0.17
0.01
0.02
0.17
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.17
0.00
8 19
12:
Post-operative
PSI
PE or DVT - 1998
Rate
Coef. Std. Err.
0.74
0.92
.0.17
0.16
0.79
0.05
0.08
0.68
-0.07
0.05

PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer - 2000
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
1.72
2.41 0.68***
0.22
1.82 0.09
0.35
2.07 0.35**
0.16
1.97 0.24
0.17
774
PSI 7: Infection due to
medical care - 2000
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
0.18
0.19
0.01
0.02
0.20
0.02
0.03
0.19
0.01
0.02
0.16
-0.02
0.02
894
PSI 12: Post-operative
PE or DVT - 2000
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
0.80
1.0
0.20**
0.08
0.84
0.03
0.12
0.83
0.03
0.06
Continued
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Table 10: PSI Adverse Event Rates for the Adjusted Least Squared Means Models in 1995, 1998, and 2000 (Continued)
System Type
DHS
Sample Size
System Type

IHS
CHS
CPIHS
MCHS
DHS
Sarn~leSize
System Type

IHS
CHS
CPIHS
MCHS
DHS
Sample Size
Note:

PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer - 1995
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
0.57
0.02
0.04
789
PSI 13: Post-operative
semis - 1995
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
0.47
0.45
-0.02
0.13
0.37
-0.10
0.09
0.39
-0.09
0.08
0.49
0.02
0.06
65 1
PSI 15: Accidental
puncture and laceration 1995
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
0.26
0.26
0.00
0.04
0.26
0.00
0.03
0.32
0.06***
0.02
0.27
0.01
0.02
8 17

* means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at . O l

PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer - 1998
Rate
Coef. Std. Err.
0.76
0.02
0.05
782
PSI 13: Post-operative
semis - 1998
Rate
Coef. Std. Err.
0.98
1.03
0.05
0.30
1.01
0.03
0.17
0.91
-0.07
0.10
0.90
-0.08
0.10
662
PSI 15: Accidental
puncture and laceration 1998
Rate
Coef. Std. Err.
0.27
0.30
0.02
0.06
0.30
0.03
0.03
0.30
0.03
0.02
0.30
0.02
0.02
8 19
level

PSI 3: Decubitus ulcer - 2000
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
0.86
0.06
0.06
759
PSI 13: Post-operative
semis - 2000
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
0.99
0.94
-0.05
0.17
0.70
-0.29
0.27
0.88
-0.1 1
0.13
1.15
0.16
0.14
646
PSI 15: Accidental
puncture and laceration 2000
Rate
Coef.
Std. Err.
0.32
0.26
-0.05*
0.03
0.40
0.09**
0.04
0.34
0.03
0.02
0.33
0.01
0.02
790
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Figure 8: Trends in Post-Operative Pulmonary Embolism (PE) and Deep Vein Thrombosis (DVT) and Accidental
Puncture or Laceration, 1995 - 2000
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data and/or be due to reporting errors. A rule - being three standard deviations away from
the mean - was used to identify outliers and applied to all continuous variables.
The correlation analysis of pooled cross-sectional data was conducted to evaluate
which variables can enter into the multivariate models. It was discovered that several
variables were highly correlated. It was found that total number of beds (a measure of
hospital size) was correlated with the number of patients at risk for PSI adverse events (a
measure of patient volume) at a level greater than the standard cut off point (r=0.75)
(Appendix 1).
Once a hospital size and volume relationship was analyzed after first-differencing
these measures over two time periods, it was found that they were not correlated. These
two variables may be measuring different phenomena - the size is a common measure of
power and a resource base in organizational research; and the volume is a measure of
clinical proficiency (i.e., "practice makes perfect"). A simple statistical explanation is
also viable - the number of beds is stable over time, but the volume of patients may vary
from year to year, and therefore, these two measures are not correlated when analyzed
over time. The decision was made to keep both variables in the empirical models since
they may be capturing two different phenomena and not correlated over time.
The measures of hospital financial performance, i.e. operating margin and the
ratio of cash flow to total revenues were highly correlated ( ~ 0 . 7 7 )thus,
;
only one
measure of hospital financial performance (the ratio of cash flow to total revenue) enters
into the multivariate models. Hospital mortality and severity levels 3 and 4 had an
expected ~ 0 . 9 correlation.
4
Thus, mortality levels 3 and 4 are used in the IQI models
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and severity levels 3 and 4 are used in the PSI models. These measures were also highly
correlated after first differencing.
The ratio of the number of physicians in the 45-54 age category by the total
population in the market was constructed. This new measure of physicians per
population was highly correlated with the total number of physicians ( ~ 0 . 9 4 in
) the
cross-sectional correlation analysis and (r=0.82) after first-differencing them over two
time periods; therefore, the total number of physicians and population in the market area
were excludec! from the models, and the physicians in 45-54 age category per population
stayed in the multivariate models.
The other highly correlated, mutually exclusive variables were as follows.
Hospital investor and nonprofit ownership types were correlated at F -0.82. The services
mix and scope categories 10-20 and 20-30 were also highly correlated at r= -0.89. Two
patients age categories (<I9 and 19-64) were highly correlated with the older age (64+)
category (r= -0.86 and r= -0.81, respectively). Hospital minor teaching and nonteaching
status were correlated at r= -0.79. Hospital rural or urban location were correlated at F 1. In these mutually exclusive categories of dummy variables, one of the categories is
excluded from and becomes a reference category in the multivariate models. Appendix 1
presents the cross-sectional correlation matrix.
Panel, Longitudinal Analyses
Fixed and random effects models were estimated. The Hausman specification test
was conducted (for details see Chapter 4, pp. 104-105). Firstly, the less efficient but
consistent models - the fixed effects models - were estimated. Secondly, the efficient
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models - the random effects models - were estimated. Thirdly, the Hausman
specification tests were used to compare differences in the coefficients between fixed and
random effects models (pp. 104-105). The Hausman specification test indicated that
there was no difference between fixed and random effects models (could not reject the
null hypothesis of no systematic difference in the coefficients at the 0.05 level),
suggesting that the random effects models were preferable given that they are consistent
and efficient (Table 1I).

Random Effects Models with Inpatient Quality Indicators
Random effects models (coefficients and standard errors) with IQIs - AMI, CHF,
Stroke, and Pneumonia risk-adjusted mortality rates - as dependent variables are
presented and discussed in this section. The description of the main system's structure
and internal clinical process and integration effects on IQIs follows.
As suggested by the hypothesis 1, a greater level of systems' centralization may
lead to lower mortality rates. Hospital affiliation with the centralized health system
(CHS) had a significant, quality improving effect for all four risk-adjusted mortality
rates: AMI, CHF, Stroke and Pneumonia. Hospital affiliation with independent health
systems (IHS) was a reference category in the models. The AM1 risk-adjusted mortality
rate is 3.332 lower for CHS hospitals than for IHS hospitals. The similar trend was
observed for the CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia risk adjusted rates that were 1.519, 3.10,
and 2.108 lower in CHS rather than IHS hospitals, holding all other factors constant. The
regression coefficients and standard errors for these findings are presented in the
following Table 12.

Table 11: Chi-squared Tests and p-values for the Hausman Specification Tests of Model Selection Comparing Consistent
FE Estimators With More Efficient RE Estimators

Chi-squared

p-value

Degrees of Freedom

CHF

35.44

0.35

33

Stroke

22.45

0.92

33

Pneumonia

30.93

0.57

33

Decubitus Ulcer

32.1 1

0.5 1

33

Infection Due to Medical Care

39.56

0.20

33

Post-operative PE or DVT

34.53

0.39

33

Post-operative Sepsis
Accidental
Puncture or Laceration

41.70

0.14

33

45.58

0.07

33

Table 12: Random Effects Models of Different Health System Types and Internal Clinical Process Effects on IQI Mortality Rates
Variable
CHS
CPIHS
MCHS
DHS
Patient Specific Information
Medication Use
Initial Assessment Procedures
Operative Procedures
Anesthesia Care
Total Beds
For-profit
Nonprofit
Service Scope and Mix (20 30)
Service Scope and Mix (10 20)
Major Teaching
Minor Teaching
Urban
Total Nursing Staff Per Staffed
Bed
RNs to LPNs Ratio
Cash Flow to Total Revenue
Age 19 - 64 (%)
Age > 64 (%)

AM1
Coef.
Std. Err.
1.438
-3.332***
-1.655
1.383
-1.723
1.278
1.299
-1.712
-0.372
0.42 1
0.448
0.392
0.708
0.45 1
- 1.263
0.791
0.508
0.835
0.012***
0.002
-1.951*
1.122
0.966
0.990

CHF
Coef.
Std. Err.
-1.519**
0.764
-0.3 13
0.738
-0.01 8
0.686
-0.210
0.696
-0.439**
0.213
0.129
0.230
0.005
0.236
-0.139
0.440
-0.140
0.427
0.001
0.001
-1.357***
0.492
-0.328
0.409

Stroke
Coef.
Std. Err.
-3.100**
1.522
-1.746
1.484
- 1.244
1.364
-1.606
1.389
-0.753*
0.453
-0.104
0.496
1.077**
0.497
-0.045
0.919
-0.7 16
0.876
0.008***
0.003
-0.057
1.049
1.980**
0.882

Pneumonia
Coef.
Std. Err.
-2.108*
1.138
-1.189
1.105
-0.090
1.03 1
-0.739
1.043
-0.981***
0.313
-0.295
0.338
0.332
0.345
-0.780
0.650
0.060
0.621
0.005***
0.002
-0.983
0.738
0.440
0.614

2.451***

1.028

0.785

0.532

2.479**

1.145

0.977

0.773

2.1 12***
-1.561
0.584
1.089

0.879
1.078
0.620
0.993

0.866**
-0.337
-0.194
-0.620

0.434
0.582
0.3 15
0.426

2.024**
-0.650
0.109
0.306

0.984
1.156
0.62 1
0.908

1.168*
-0.713
-0.184
-0.012

0.623
0.867
0.474
0.636

0.304
-0.021
0.067***
-0.01 1
0.134***

0.588
0.037
0.026
0.063
0.047

-0.129
-0.008
0.02 1
0.040
0.077***

0.275
0.0 15
0.013
0.029
0.022

0.538
-0.050
0.009
0.027
0.115**

0.588
0.035
0.027
0.06 1
0.046

0.193
0.4 10
-0.008
0.023
0.012
0.020
0.025
0.043
0.061*
0.032
Continued
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Table 12: Random Effects Models of Different Health System Types and Internal Clinical Process Effects on IQI Mortality Rates (Continued)
AM1

Variable
Coef.
Female (%)
Black (%)
Mortality Score 3 & 4 (%)
Case Mix Index
Log of Volume (Total Patients
at Risk)
Hirschman Herfindah1 Index
HMO Penetration
Log of Per Capita Income
(1000s)

Population Over 65 (%)
MDs 45 - 54 Years Old Per
Population
Tight Physician-Hospital
Arrangements
Hybrid Physician-Hospital
Arrangements
Second Time Period (1998 2000)

CHF
Std. Err.

Coef.

Stroke
Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

Pneumonia
Coef.
Std. Err.

0.060
0.006
-0.201***
-1.752

0.078
0.019
0.071
2.179

0.01 1
-0.018*
-0.1 14***
-1.994**

0.037
0.010
0.034
1.016

0.001
-0.002
-0.191***
-2.190

0.082
0.018
0.071
2.142

0.006
-0.007
-0.104**
-3.410**

0.056
0.014
0.05 1
1.518

-2.727***
0.557
-1.231

0.439
1.105
1.540

0.146
0.091
-0.701

0.23 1
0.516
0.795

-2.025***
1.317
-2.143

0.545
1.093
1.617

-0.633*
0.394
0.407

0.374
0.771
1.181

0.959
-24.852***

1.277
5.897

0.615
2.937

2.072*
-28.249***

1.243
5.944

0.645
-20.498***

0.932
4.409

0.207
-14.646***

-0.587

0.784

0.582

0.397

0.156

0.819

0.541

0.598

-0.2 16

0.543

-0.171

0.2 82

-0.406

0.592

-0.509

0.418

0.42 1

0.535

-0.078

0.28 1

-0.398

0.581

-0.126

0.418

-0.143

0.422

0.250

0.227
4.345

0.276
18.521
432
292

0.486
9.197

0.284
13.194
475
321

0.333
6.578

Constant
17.628
9.422
4.871
Sample Size
492
472
Number of Groups
365
318
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .0 1 level
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Findings of t-tests derived through tests of linear restrictions demonstrated that
CHS hospitals had better quality performance than hospitals in moderately centralized
(MCHS) and decentralized health systems (DHS) in all four IQI models at varying
significance levels (Table 13).
AM1 mortality rates were lower at a rate of 1.609 and 1.62 in CHS hospitals
compared with MCHS and DHS hospitals at the 0.1 significance level'. Hospitals in
CHS had 1.501 and 1.309 lower CHF mortality rates than hospitals in MCHS and DHS,
respectively, at the 0.01 significance level. Stroke mortality rates were 1.856 and 1.494
lower in CHS hospitals than in MCHS and DHS. Also, Pneumonia mortality rates were
2.0 18 and 1.369 lower in CHS hospitals rather than in MCHS and DHS hospitals (Tables
12 and 13). These findings may suggest that a higher level of centralization of hospital
services may be an important structural factor that could also improve the process of care
delivery and quality outcomes for AMI, CHF, Stroke and Pneumonia patients in CHS
hospitals. In addition, t-tests for differences in coefficients for CHS and CPIHS showed
no difference in 2 out of 4 models: Stroke and Pneumonia risk-adjusted mortality rates
(Table 13).
In terms of AM1 and CHF mortality rate, hospitals in CHS had 1.677 (at the 0.1
significance level) and 1.206 (at the 0.05 significance level) lower rates than hospitals in
CPIHS. These findings do not support Hypothesis 2, which postulated that quality of
care may be better (i.e., lower mortality rates) in CPIHS hospitals due to their tighter

I

The differences in rates by system types were calculated as follows: 1.609 = -3.332-(-1.723), where (3.332) is a coefficient for the CHS category, (-1.723) is a coefficient for the MCHS category (Table 1 I). Pvalues for these differences are provided in Table 12.

Table 13: P-values of Tests of Linear Restriction Comparing Centralized Health Systems
to the Other System Types in IQI Random Effects Models
Health System Type

AM1

CHF

Stroke

Pneumonia

Centralized Physician Insurance

0.09 1*

0.017**

0.191

0.215

Moderately Centralized

0.05 1*

O.OOl***

0.034**

O.OOl***

Decentralized
0.057*
0.003***
0.092*
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .O1 level

0.032**

physician-hospital integration. Centralization of hospital services at the system level
(which is a main structural characteristic of centralized health systems) may have a
positive effect on how these services are provided through possibly improved process of
communication and coordination, and an effective use of clinical expertise along the
continuum of care delivery in the centralized health systems. A discussion of these
findings is provided in greater detail in Chapter 6.
Hospital affiliation with CHS and CPIHS were recoded into one variable
representing a system with more centralized structure. This aggregation of systems into
more centralized category was proposed in the conceptual model because CPIHS were
different from CHS structures by having highly centralized physician arrangements and
insurance products and moderately centralized hospital service. In all other aspects,
CPIHS were similar to CHS. Hospital affiliation with MCHS and DHS were also
recoded into a single variable representing a system with more decentralized structure as
their structural characteristics were also thought to be compatible. Hospitals in
independent hospital systems (IHS) remained a reference category. However, once
empirical analyses were performed, the significant centralization effect become weaker
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when models were run with these aggregated system types. Hospitals in more centralized
systems have 2.698 lower AM1 mortality rate than hospitals in IHS, however, significant
only at the 0.1 significance level (Table 14). The rest of the IQI models showed no
difference in mortality rates for hospitals in more centralized versus independent hospital
systems.
Table 14: Random Effects Models of Aggregated Health System Types on IQI Mortality
Rates

Variable

AM1
Std.
Coef.
Err.

CHF
Std.
Coef. Err.

Stroke
Std.
Coef. Err.

1.408 -1.553

1.089

More Decentralized -1.591 1.510 -0.103 0.682 -1.416 1.346 -0.277
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .O1 level

1.045

More Centralized

-2.698* 1.558 -0.813 0.710 -2.325

Pneumonia
Std.
Coef. Err.

Tests of linear restrictions (t-tests) demonstrated that more centralized health
system may still have lower mortality rates than more decentralized health systems,
supporting hypothesis 1. However, these findings were less representative (significant in
3 out of 4 models) than findings with single system types (significant in all 4 models)
(Tables 13 and 15). Thus, there may be structural or process characteristics that are
specific to each system type (e.g., high level of centralization of hospitals services in
CHS) and aggregation of systems may not be appropriate in this case. Only one process
of care delivery measure had a statistically significant trend shown in IQI models2.

2

Sensitivity analyses (tests of linear restrictions) were conducted to estimate whether there are differences
in marginal effects and direction across all five JCAHO variables on quality outcomes. We found that the
differences are quite large, and therefore, summation of all five JCAHO variables into a si.ngle measure of
clinical integration was not attainable. All five single JCAHO variable retained in the models as separate
measures.

Table 15: p-values of Tests of Linear Restriction Comparing More Centralized to More
Decentralized Health Systems in IQI Random Effects Models
Health System Type

AM1

CHF

Stroke

0.014**
0.1224
More Decentralized
0.08 1*
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .0 1 level

Pneumonia
0.004***

As system hospital compliance with JCAHO requirement for availability of patient
specific information improves, CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia risk-adjusted mortality rates
decrease by 0.439,0.752, and 0.98 1, respectively (Table 12). System hospitals in
compliance with JCAHO requirement for availability of patient specific performance area
may have attempted to improve their clinical information systems that may resulted in
reduction of inpatient mortality.
The rest of JCAHO variables did not demonstrate any significant trends in the IQI
models. However, in only one model, hospital compliance with JCAHO requirement for
initial assessment procedures may be associated with an increase in the Stroke mortality
rates by 1.077, which may appear due to random variation. A discussion of these
findings is provided in greater detail in Chapter 6.
The other interesting hospital characteristics that were statistically significant in
the IQI models are discussed below. Investor owned hospitals had 1.951 and 1.357 lower
AM1 and CHF risk-adjusted mortality rates than publicly owned hospitals (Table 12).
Investor owned hospitals may locate in or relocate their facilities in markets with a
healthier and wealthier population base in comparison to publicly owned hospitals that
are more likely to have an inner city location. Nonprofit hospital ownership status is
associated with significantly higher Stroke mortality rate (1.980) than in publicly owned
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hospitals (Table 12). As the total number of beds increases by one, the mortality rates for
AMI, Stroke, and Pneumonia increase by 0.012,0.008, and 0.005, respectively at the 0.01
significance level (Table 12). Hospitals in a 10-20 service mix and scope category have
higher mortality rates that are highly significant in 3 IQI models for AMI, CHF, and
Stroke and moderately significant in Pneumonia model in comparison to the reference
group (the 0-10 service scope and mix category). Hospitals in a 20-30 service category
have higher mortality rates for AM1 and Stroke than in the reference category (Table 12).
These findings may suggest a possible explanation - as the hospital size, complexity, and
the number and scope of services grow, the possibility of making a clinical mistake
andlor not being able to identify andcorrect it in time may also increase.
The models did not show any significant hospital financial performance trends on
quality outcomes. The only finding that was significant suggested that one percentage
point increase in the cash flow to total revenue ratio may lead to a 0.067 increase in the
AM1 risk-adjusted mortality rate (Table 12). This finding is somewhat counterintuitive,
is not observed in the.rest of IQI models, and may be attributed to random variation and
noise.
Some interesting patient specific effects are discussed below. Hospitals with a
higher level of patient acuity (measured by the percentage of patients with 3 or 4 stages
of risk of mortality) managed to lower their AMI, CHF, Stroke, Pneumonia mortality
rates by 0.20 1,O.114,O.191, and 0.104, respectively. In the similar manner, as the
complexity of cases measured by CMI grows, the mortality rates for CHF patients
decrease by 1.994 and for Pneumonia patients - by 3.410. Also, AMI, Stroke, and
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Pneumonia mortality rates go down by 2.727,2.025, and 0.633 as the volume of patient
for these condition increases (Table 12). On one hand, having cared for more severe and
complex patients and having a greater volume of patients, hospitals may increase their
clinical expertise in providing better care for these types of patients. On the other hand,
the location of death for sicker patients may be shifting outside the hospital, i.e. hospices,
skilled nursing facilities. It was also found that having a greater percent of elderly
patients (over 64 years old) increases mortality rate for AM1 patients by 0.134, CHF
patients by 0.077, Stroke patients by 0.1 15, and Pneumonia by 0.061 in sys!em hospitals
(Table 12).
Only one market characteristics had a statistically significant and strong effect in
IQI mortality models. A greater percent of older people (>65 years old) in a market
significantly reduces mortality rates for AMI, CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia (Table 12).
This finding is somewhat unexpected and counterintuitive. One possibility is that
hospitals in markets with greater elderly population may have improved their clinical
expertise on how to provide better inpatient services to elderly patients. Alternatively,
other providers of services for elderly (i.e., skilled nursing facilities) may be located in
these markets, and there are, thus, more opportunities to transfer sick, older patients to
these settings where they ultimately may die.
Random Eflects Models with Patient Safety Indicators
Tables 16 and 17 present random effects models with Patient Safety Indicators
(PSIS)- Decubitus ulcer, Infection due to medical care, Post-operative PE and DVT,
Post-operative sepsis, and Accidental puncture and laceration - as dependent variables.
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Health system effects on adverse event rates were not observed in the PSI models.
Test of linear restrictions showed significance in only one PSI for Accidental puncture
and laceration, which may occur due to random variation (Tables 18 and 19). Thus, on
one hand, structural characteristics of hospital-led health systems may be less important
in improving patient safety in comparison with the effects of health systems on mortality
outcomes (Tables 12 and 13). On the other hand, patient safety efforts may be newer
programs so hospitals have yet to systematically work and improve in these areas.
In terms of the measures of internal clinical process and integration, hospital
compliance with the JCAHO requirements for availability of patient specific information
was marginally significant and associated with reduction of rates of Infection due to
medical care (Table 16). This finding may be plausible because it is consistent with the
direction (i.e., negative signs) in the rest of PSI models, even though not significant.
However, there are other significant, but inconsistent findings that seem less plausible.
For example, hospital JCAHO compliance with operative procedures performance area
was significant and negative in one PSI model; however, significant and positive in
another PSI model (Table 16). Hospital compliance with initial assessment procedures
and anesthesia care may have also followed this inconsistent trend. Significant, but
inconsistent results in JCAHO measures may appear due to random variation. The
hospital characteristics that had statistically significant effects in PSI models are
described below. As in the IQI models, investor owned hospitals were better quality
performers than publicly owned hospitals in two PSIS models. The coefficients were
negative and significant. The risk adjusted adverse event rates for Post-operative PE and

Table 16: Random Effects Models of Different Health System Types and Internal Clinical Process Effects on PSI Adverse Event Rates

Variable

CHS
CPIHS
MCHS
DHS
Patient Specific Information
Medication Use
Initial Assessment
Procedures
Operative Procedures
Anesthesia Care
Total Beds
For-profit
Nonprofit
Service Scope and Mix (20 30)
Service Scope and Mix (10 20)
Major Teaching
Minor Teaching
Urban
Total Nursing Staff Per
Staffed Bed
RNs to LPNs Ratio

Decubitus Ulcer

Infection Due to
Medical Care
Std.
Coef.
Err.

Post-operative
PE or DVT
Std.
Coef.
Err.

Post-operative
Sepsis
Std.
Coef.
Err.

Accidental
Puncture
or Laceration
Std.
Coef.
Err.

Coef.

Std.
Err.

-0.272

0.306

-0.006

0.030

0.054

0.134

-0.059

0.245

0.010

0.053

-0.038
0.086

0.076
0.085

-0.015*
0.003

0.008
0.009

-0.015
-0.062

0.035
0.039

-0.002
0.060

0.068
0.076

-0.010
-0.010

0.0 14
0.015

-0.053
0.165
0.208
0.001

0.085
0.170

0.009
0.017

-0.061
-0.038

0.076
0.146

0.037**
-0.045

0.015
0.029

0.016
0.000

0.015
0.163**
-0.002

0.039
0.075

0.157
0.001

-0.009
-0.033**
0.034**
0.000

0.072
0.000

0.019
0.000

0.140
0.000

-0.036
-0.0002**

0.028
0.000

0.129
-0.107

0.215
0.180

-0.015
-0.013

0.020
0.017

0.091
0.076

-0.162
-0.165

0.182
0.154

-0.102***
-0.012

0.036
0.030

-0.121

0.208

0.008

0.021

0.020

0.094

-0.174

0.193

0.046

0.037

-0.171
0.202
-0.006

0.168
0.268
0.134

-0.005
0.048*
-0.006

0.017
0.025
0.013

-0.011
0.126
-0.013

0.076
0.112
0.057

-0.140
-0.138
-0.124

0.168
0.204
0.107

-0.012
-0.016
-0.040*

0.029
0.044
0.023

-0.123

0.193

0.029

0.018

-0.131*

0.079

0.165

0.01 1

0.032

0.04 1
0.004

0.110
0.007

0.011
0.001

0.014
0.002

0.048
0.003

0.041***
-0.001

0.000
-0.190**
-0.290***

0.358**
-0.102
-0.007

0.093
0.006

-0.019
0.019
0.001
0.001
Continued

Table 16: Random Effects Models of Different Health System Types and Internal Clinical Process Effects on PSI Adverse Event Rates
(Continued)
Accidental
Post-operative
Puncture
Sepsis
or Laceration
0.004
0.002** 0.001
-0.001
0.004
0.01 1
0.001
0.002
0.008 -0.003*
0.002
-0.010
0.003
0.020
0.014 -0.001
0.007** 0.003 -0.001
0.001
0.014
0.011 . 0.012*** 0.002
0.710
0.079
0.436 -0.088

Variable

Decubitus Ulcer

Cash Flow to Total Revenue
Age 19-64(%)
Age > 64 (%)
Female (%)
Black (%)
Severity Score 3 & 4 (%)
Case Mix Index
Log of Volume (Total
Patients at Risk)
Hirschman Herfindah1
Index
HMO Penetration
Log of Per Capita Income
(1000s)
Population Over 65 (%)
MDs 45 - 54 Years Old Per
Population
Tight Physician-Hospital
Arrangements
Hybrid Physician-Hospital
Arrangements
Second Time Period (1998 2000)
Constant

-0.007
0.013
-0.003
0.028*
0.018***
0.088***
-1.418***

0.005
0.013
0.009
0.016
0.004
0.012
0.459

Infection Due to
Medical Care
0.001
-0.001
-0.004*** 0.001
-0.003*** 0.001
-0.002
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.004*** 0.001
0.005
0.043

0.1 14

0.095

0.012

0.010

0.098**

0.040

-0.086

0.071

0.014

0.019

-0.396*
0.338

0.230
0.315

-0.045**
-0.03 1

0.022
0.032

0.108
0.038

0.095
0.138

-0.166
-0.422

0.186
0.265

0.031
-0.050

0.039
0.056

-0.020
-2.504*

0.284
1.350

-0.033
-0.107

0.026
0.125

0.073
-0.866

0.1 15
0.549

0.166
1.060

0.223
1.083

-0.065
-0.156

0.047
0.224

-0.220

0.174

0.039**

0.017

0.071

0.074

0.006

0.141

0.051*

0.030

0.016

0.108

-0.006

0.01 1

-0.085*

0.049

-0.005

0.092

0.008

0.019

0.1 10

0.109

-0.009

0.011

-0.038

0.049

-0.1 12

0.091

0.019

0.019

0.079
1.891

0.041*** 0.008
0.505
0.186

0.247***
-0.264

0.037
0.788

0.440***
-0.834

0.069
1.665

0.068*** 0.015
0.360
0.338

Sample Size
Number of Grou~s

0.303***
-1.054
474
318

474
319

Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .Ol level

Post-operative
PE or DVT
-0.003
0.002
-0.005
0.005
-0.001
0.004
0.004
0.007
0.002
0.002
0.020*** 0.005
-0.447**
0.215

468
316

42 1
286

468
319

Table 17: Random Effects Models of Aggregated Health System Types on PSI Adverse Event
Rates
Variable

More
Centralized

Infection
Due
to Med Care
Std.
Coef. Err.

Post-op PE
and DVT
Std.
Coef. Err.

Post-op
Sepsis
Std.
Coef. Err.

0.285 0.001 0.029

0.087 0.124

0.038 0.227 0.020 0.049

Dicubitus
Ulcer
Std.
Coef.
Err.
-0.222

Accident
Puncture
Std.
Coef. Err.

More
Decentralized -0.341 0.275 0.018 0.027 0.114 0.120 0.049 0.218 0.075 0.048
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .Ol level
Table 18: p-values of Tests of Linear Restriction Comparing Centralized Health Systems
to the Other System Types in PSI Random Effects Models
Infection
Health System Type

Decubitus
Ulcer

due
Care

Postoperative
PE or DVT

Postoperative
Sepsis

Accidental
Puncture
or
Laceration

Centralized Physician
Insurance

0.659

0.53 1

0.584

0.275

0.68

Moderately Centralized

0.699

0.33

0.222

0.468

0.012**

Decentralized
0.559
0.774
0.941
0.37
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .O1 level

0.057*

Table 19: p-values of Tests of Linear Restriction Comparing More Centralized to More
Centralized Health Systems in PSI Random Effects Models

Health System Type

Decubitus
Ulcer

Infection
Due to
Medical
Care

Postoperative
PE or DVT

Postoperative
Sepsis

More Decentralized
0.29
0.102
0.59
0.91
Note: * means significance at .10 level, ** at .05 level, *** at .O1 level

Accidental
Puncture or
Laceration

0.005***
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DVT and Accidental puncture and laceration were 0.190 and 0.102 lower for investor
owned hospitals. Nonprofit hospitals also had lower adverse event rate for Post-operative
PE and DVT in comparison with public hospitals (Table 16).
Other hospital-level findings are mainly scattered and do not form into any
discernable trends in the PSI models. As the number of bed increases, the rate of adverse
events for Accidental puncture and laceration declines. Hospitals in the major teaching
category may have more patients that develop Infection due to medical care than
hospitals with no teaching affiliation, i.e. reference group. Being in a minor teaching
category may be associated with lower rates of Accidental puncture and laceration.
Hospital location in urban areas was associated with a marginally significant decrease in
the rate of Post-operative PE and DVT, but an increase in Post-operative sepsis (Table
16).
A greater number of nursing staff per patient bed has a significant and positive
effect on patent safety outcomes in terms of Infection due to medical care rate. This rate
increases by 0.041. Infection due to medical care is nursing sensitive, thus, having more
nurses may increase a possibility of them making a mistake. Alternatively, having more
nurses on staff may signal a sicker and more susceptible patient population that may not
be captured by other variables. Also, hospitals that have a tightly managed physicianorganization arrangements (POA) may have 0.085 lower rates of Post-operative PE and
DVT in comparison with loosely integrated POAs (Table 16).
In terms of patient characteristics, however, several trends are worth noting.
Hospitals with a greater percentage of highly severe patients in 3 and 4 risk groups have
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greater risk-adjusted adverse event rates detected in 4 out of 5 PSI models. This finding
is strongly significant and positive (Table 16). A volume measure (number of patients at
risk for an 'adverse event) is significant and positive for Post-operative PE and DVT
adverse event rate, i.e. increasing the rates for these events. The directions for patients'
acuity and volume reversed in the PSI models in comparison with the IQI models where
patients' acuity and volume decreased risk-adjusted mortality rates. These findings may
suggest that system hospitals choose to put more efforts and inputs into reducing wellmonitored and evaluated inpatient mortality, rather than into less discernable and studied
patient safety problems.
A significant and negative effect of hospitals treating more complex patient mix

(CMI) was similar in both PSI and IQI models. As complexity of cases grows, the rates
of Decubitus ulcer and Post-operative PE and DVT decrease by 1.418 and 0.447,
respectively, which is similar with the IQI finding (Tables 16 and 12).
Another interesting finding that having a greater percent of black patients was associated
with higher rates of Decubitus ulcer and Post-operative sepsis. Also, rates of riskadjusted Infection due to medical care and Accidental puncture and laceration events
were lower in hospitals with a greater percentage of elderly patients (over 64 years old)
rather than in hospitals with a greater percent of younger patients (less than 19, i.e.
reference category).
This finding is counterintuitive; however, younger surgical patients, such as
trauma, ICU patients, may require quick clinical responselreaction, and thus, a greater
possibility of making a mistake. These types of case complexity may not be captured in
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the empirical models. Also, having more patients in the middle age group (19-64) was
also associated with a decrease in the rate of Infection due to medical care (Table 16).
Several market characteristics demonstrated statistically significant effects on
patient safety outcomes. Hospitals located in markets with lower levels of competition
are more likely to be better quality providers in terms of Decubitus ulcer and Infection
due to medical care adverse events. These risk-adjusted rates decrease by 0.396 and
0.045, respectively, as HHI increases (i.e., competition decreases).
Decubitus ulcer rates may be 2.504 lower in markets with a greater percentage of
elderly residents (over 65). Markets with greater proportion of physicians in the 45-54
age category per population are characterized by having statistically significant and
positive (i.e., increasing) rates of Infection due to medical care and Accidental puncture
and laceration. This may occur because more procedures provided in markets with the
greater number of physicians.
A strong and positive trend was also observed in the second time period. The
rates of Decubitus ulcer, Infection due to medical care, Post-operative PE and DVT, Postoperative sepsis, and Accidental puncture or laceration increased by 0.303,0.041,0.247,
0.440, and 0.068, respectively. This trend may be suggestive of a possible Balanced
Budget Act's effect or other unobservable market or policy effects on patient safety
outcomes. One of the explanations is that hospitals' proficiency and rigor in reporting of
the adverse events may have been increasing, especially after the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) reports in 1999 and 2000. The cross-sectional analyses are described in the
following section.
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Cross-Sectional Analyses
Since the panel data was limited to only two time periods (due to a JCAHO data
limitation), it was impossible to use lagged quality outcomes and hospital financial
performance to address a possible feedback issue in the panel model. The cross-sectional
design, using three stage estimation models, which is evaluated separately for two years
of 1997 (this year is chosen, because the 1997 JCAHO's data set has substantially more
hospitals than the 1995 data set) and 2000, was proposed to reassure validity of empirical
findings with panel data and to address a possible feedback issue.
Lagged quality outcomes and hospital financial performance and other variables
reflective of preferable market conditions were proposed at this stage to account for a
possible feedback or the effect of a system type choice. Three stage estimation models
have been undertaken; however, due to serious limitations, cross - sectional analyses
were viewed as problematic and unreliable. Multinomial logit models for estimating
predicted probabilities for different types of health systems were conducted at first with
the 1997 data.
The sample size for the year 1997 was 246 hospitals with complete data, i.e.
system hospitals with HCUP and JCAHO data. The cross-sectional models with a full set
of variables (Chapter 4) were run with types of systems as dependent (categorical)
variables and IHS as a reference group. The number of observations has drop even more
to about 146 observations for the multinomial models due to missing data in lagged
quality outcomes (e.g., 45 missing for AMI) and lagged cash flow to total revenue (63
missing).
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The models were also not sustainable - they did not provide an overall Chisquared p-values, LR Chi-squared, and log likelihood, and a number of variables (e.g.,
major and minor teaching, for-profit ownership status) dropped out from the models.
Sensitivity analyses demonstrated that the only one JCAHO variable - availability of
patient specific information - had a significant and negative effect on mortality
indicators. The rest of variables were not sufficient predictors of quality.
Since measures of internal clinical process and integration were weak and
merging in JCAHO data lead to significant reduction of the sample size, a simplified
model was undertaken. The simplified model differs from the three stage estimation
model by excluding predicted scores of clinical integration (JCAHO) step from the
analyses. All other components and descriptions of elements were similar with the three
stage estimation model, and predicted probabilities for health systems were directly put
into the final OLS model for estimating quality outcomes, and the clinical integration
stage was not analyzed. Exclusion of JCAHO data increased the 1997 sample size to 738
observations. However, when the multinomial models were run, the number of
observations still went down to about 330. This drop in observations happens due to a
cumulative effect of missing values in key measures, lagged values of quality indicators
(22 1 missing observation) and cash flow to total revenue (244 missing observations).
The multinomial models remained unstable. Therefore, two factors - the weak clinical
process measure and the significant decline in the sample size with and without JCAHO
data - could sufficiently and unpredictably affect the cross-sectional findings. Therefore,
the decision was made not continue further with the proposed cross-sectional analyses.
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Summary
It was found that the IQI and PSI models have different patterns. In the IQI
models, hospitals in CHS tend to perform better than hospitals in MCHS, DHS, and IHS
in all four models. There is no difference in mortality indicators between hospitals in
CHS and CPIHS in two models, but hospitals in CHS have better performance in the
other two models than hospitals in CPIHS. System hospitals that are in compliance with
the JCAHO performance area for availability of patient specific information may
improve clinical process and integration of care delivery for patients at risk for CHF,
Stroke, Pneumonia, and Infection due to medical care. The PSI models did not indicate
any hospital-led health systems' effects on the rates of adverse events. There were some
pattern effects as well as single effects of other hospital, patient, and market characteristic
on mortality and patient safety rates. Tables providing schematic depictions of
hypotheses that were supported, partially supported, and unsupported as well as
implications of these and other main findings are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

Introduction
The purpose of this study was to assess structural and process elements associated
with the delivery of high quality care. It is proposed that structural differences among
health systems may yield differences in care provision, resulting in differences in quality
outcomes. It is conceptualized that centralization of authority in centralized health
systems and differentiatiodspecialization of services in decentralized health systems
would result in different approaches to care delivery processes in various types of healtli
systems and lead to different quality outcomes in these system types. Three research
questions were posed:

1.

What types of health systems and their member hospitals are associated with the
best quality outcomes, produced by hospitals in those systems?

2.

What types of health systems and their member hospitals are associated with the
worst quality outcomes, produced by hospitals in those systems?

3.

Are there differences in care delivery processes associated with positive or
negative quality outcomes in hospitals in various types of health systems?
The conceptual model, based on Contingency Theory, suggested contrasting

scenarios and hypotheses. According to Scenario 1, greater centralization of hospital-led
health systems may allow systems' leadership to manage effectively increasing

179
interconnectedness of providers, improve coordination, internal clinical processes, and
integration of organizations, and consolidate certain administrative and possibly clinical
services in centralized health systems, which would increase volume of services provided
at a certain facility within the system. As a result, it was hypothesized that better quality
outcomes would be observed in more centralized health systems in comparison with more
decentralized health systems. It was also hypothesized that centralized physicianinsurance systems would have better quality outcomes than just centralized health
systems due to their tighter physician-hospital integration, which could improve internal
process and integration of care delivery, and due to possible financial incentives that
physicians may receive from their affiliated systems to improve quality.
According to Scenario 2, decentralization of large health systems may improve
adjustments of hospitals with internal contingency of size and increase service
availability and accessibility through differentiation of services. Specialization of tasks is
also necessitated by and occurs as a result of structural complexity of large organizations.
Specialization, formalization, and worker autonomy are positively correlated with
decentralization of structures (Child, 1972; Scott, 2003). Decentralized organization may
use specialization, formalization, and autonomy to improve effectiveness of
organizational processes and, as a result, organizational performance. Different hospitals
within Decentralized Health Systems (DHS) may get engaged into "internal competition"
with their fellow members to improve quality. Thus, it was hypothesized that better
quality outcomes could be observed in more decentralized health systems in comparison
with more centralized.
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The interplay of both scenarios provides that, on one hand, moderately centralized
health systems can potentially become quality champions in comparison with other
system types, because they may have found the "right" organizational structure and
strategic balance between centralization and differentiation of their structures and
services given the environment in which they operate. On the other hand, independent
health systems were hypothesized to have the worst quality outcomes in comparison with
other system types, because their structures may be characterized as neither centralized
nor differentiated.
The data from seven well-established data bases were assembled for short-term,
general, nonfederal hospitals from 11 states for 6 years from 1995 to 2000. Two research
designs - panel and cross-sectional - were proposed. However, due to missing
observations on key variables, the cross-sectional study was not viable. Random effects
models, though, provided consistent and efficient results. In the following sections, the
findings and conclusions are summarized, the implications and significance for the
theory, policy and future research are provided, as well as, the limitations of this study
are described.
Summary and Interpretation of the Descriptive Analysis
Descriptive analyses demonstrated that hospitals in .the empirical, 1 1 state sample
were different from the hospitals in the national sample. There were more hospitals in
Centralized Physician/Insurance Health Systems (CPIHS) and Independent Hospital
Systems (IHS); however, lesser hospitals in Moderately Centralized Health Systems
(MCHS) and Decentralized Health Systems (DHS) in the empirical sample rather than in
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the national sample. There was no difference in the percentages of hospitals in
Centralized Health Systems (CHS) in two samples. System hospitals in the empirical
sample (in comparison with system hospitals in the national sample) were more likely:
a) to be larger by 30 beds on average;
b) to have nonpublic and voluntary ownership;
c) to be in major and minor teaching categories;
d) to provide a greater mix and number of services;
e) to be located in urban areas and less likely in rural areas;
f) to have a greater percentage of total nursing staff that were RNs.

Therefore, based on the t and Chi-squared tests, it was concluded that system
hospitals in the empirical (1 1 state) sample were different than system hospitals in the
national sample. The findings of this study cannot be generalized to hospitals in the
USA.
In the descriptive study, it was also found that organizational characteristics of
system hospitals varied by system type. More sample hospitals belonged to Moderately
Centralized Health System (MCHS) and Decentralized Health System (DHS) types and
lesser hospitals belonged to Centralized Health Systems (CHS), Centralized
Physician/Insurance Health Systems (CPIHS), and Independent Hospital Systems (IHS).
Most of system hospitals in the empirical sample had a voluntary, nonprofit ownership
status. However, a greater percentage of DHS and IHS hospitals had for-profit status.
CHS and CPIHS in comparison with other system types stand out by having:
a) a greater number of beds; more hospitals in major teaching category;
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b) a greater number and scope of services provided;
c) a greater percentage of RNs of licensed nursing staff when compared with
other system types.
In conclusion, there were clear organizational differences among hospitals in
different types of health systems which were necessary to control statistically in the
multivariate regressions.
The Adjusted Least Squared Means (ALSM) methodology was used to identify
trends in,quality and patient safety outcomes by system types during the study period. It
was also examined whether there was a hospital system relationship with quality
outcomes, controlling for residual differences in hospital level patient characteristics
(age, gender, and race), acuity (3 and 4 levels of mortality and severity) and complication
(case-mix index) that had measurable and significant effects on IQI mortality and PSI
adverse event rates. The ALSM found a relationship between system types and inpatient
quality indicators (IQIs), i.e., hospitals in DHS, CHS, and CPIHS in comparison with
IHS hospitals had lower mortality rates during the 1995-2000 period.
However, in terms of PSI adverse event rates, the findings were less clear and
significant. Mortality rates and patient safety adverse events increased or leveled off
after 1998, which may be suggestive of the BBA effect, changes in the hospital reporting
practice of patient adverse events post the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report on medical
errors in 1999, and/or other marketlpolicy effects on system hospitals' quality
performance. Summarizing the ALSM findings and descriptive analysis of system
differences, it may be concluded that:
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a) both decentralization and centralization of hospital structures may be
associated with decreased mortality rates;
b) hospital system effect was less clear when patient safety indicators were used
as dependent variables;
c) even though the ALSM controlled for hospital specific patient characteristics,
statistical controls for hospital and market characteristics were essential.
Multivariate analyses were conducted with statistical controls and helped to
clarify hospital system effects on quality and patient safety outcomes in the ALSM
models.
Summary and Interpretation of the Hypotheses Testing
Even though the conceptual model suggested that Inpatient Quality Indicators
(IQI) mortally rates and Patient Safety Indicators (PSI) adverse events would flag
potential quality problems in the same way, the empirical results show otherwise.
Models with IQI mortality rates and PSI adverse events convey quite different stories of
hospital system effects on quality performance. Thus, the findings from IQI (Table 20)
and PSI models are summarized and discussed separately.

Inpatient Quality Indicator Models
In the conceptual model, the aggregation of centralized and centralized physicianinsurance health systems into one category was proposed (i.e., systems with more
centralized structures). The aggregation of decentralized and moderately decentralized
health systems into another category was also proposed (i.e., systems with more
decentralized structures). These made sense conceptually; however, empirically, these

Table 20: Summary of Hypotheses Tested in the IQI models
Hypotheses
Centralization of structures+

quality performance

Expected
Direction
Decrease
Mortality

Supported

Decrease
Mortality

No

Decrease
Mortality

No

Decrease
Mortality

No

Increase
Mortality

Partially
supported;
hospitals in
IHS were
worse than
in CHS

Yes

H 1: Hospitals in more centralized health systems would
have better quality performance than hospitals in DHS
Tighter physician-hospital integration +quality
performance
H 2: Hospitals in CPIHS would have better quality
performance than hospitals in CHS
Decentralization to outcomes +quality performance
H 3: Hospitals in DHS would have better quality
performance than hospitals in more centralized structures
Combination of centralization and differentiationquality performance

H 4: Hospital in MCHS would have better quality than
hospitals in other system types
Low centralization and differentiation -+ quality
performance
H 5: Hospital in IHS would have worse quality than
hospitals in other system types performance

aggregations were not satisfactory in singling out hospital system effects on quality
performance. Also, the cross-sectional study was not viable due to missing and
incomplete data. Thus, empirical evaluation of which system type may have a better
internal process and integration of care delivery in place that could lead to lower
mortality rates was not possible.
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Therefore, the findings for five essential system types (instead of aggregated
system categories) are discussed. The effects of systems' internal clinical processes and
integration on quality are discussed for hospitals in general, rather than specifically by
each single system type.
Hypothesis 1, centralization of hospital-led health systems would result in better
quality performance was supported. Hospitals in Centralized Health Systems (CHS) had
lower mortality rates for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI), Congestive Heart Failure
(CHF), Stroke, and Pneumonia patients compared with almost. all other types of health
systems at varying significance levels (Tables 11 and 12). Only quality performance of
hospitals in Centralized Physician/Insurance Health Systems in terms of Stroke and
Pneumonia mortality rates were similar to those in CHS hospitals.
Centralization of hospital-led health systems may result in more effective internal
clinical processes, and thus, better quality performance. Centralization of structures may
possibly improve internal process of care delivery and integration of services by:
a) enhanced coordination of activities, communication between providers, timely
adjustments of process of care delivery and structures to external pressures
(Shortell et al., 1996 and 2000);
b) development and diffusion of management and clinical information systems,
quality management, and care management practices (Alexander et al., 2003,
Savage et al., 1997);
c) possible clinical integration of providers into an Integrated Delivery System
(Shortell et al., 1996).
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Thus, it is possible to conclude that hospitals in CHS may have introduced more
effective structures that improve process of care delivery and integration of services.
Superior structure and process of care delivery may decrease mortality rates in CHS
hospitals.
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Hospitals in CPIHS were not better quality
performers in comparison with hospitals in CHS, which had lower mortality AM1 and
CHF mortality rates than CPIHS hospitals. There were no statistically significant
differences between these two types of systems in terms of Stroke and Pneumonia
mortality (Table 12). It was hypothesized that CPIHS hospitals may have a higher level
of physician-hospital integration than hospitals in CHS, resulting in more effective
clinical process and integration of services. The CPIHS may also introduce financial and
other incentive systems for their affiliated physicians, stimulating them to improve
quality. Therefore, the CPIHS hospitals may have lower mortality rates in comparison
with hospitals in other system types. However, having higher levels of centralization of
physician arrangements and insurance products as in CPIHS hospitals did not lower
inpatient mortality. In conclusion, the findings suggest that that centralization of hospital
services at the system level as in CHS may contribute to reduction of inpatient mortality.
Hypothesis 3, which proposed that hospitals in decentralized health systems
(DHS) would be better quality performers (i.e., having lower mortality rates) than more
centralized health systems under certain conditions, was not supported. DHS hospitals
had higher mortality rates than CHS hospitals in all four IQI models. These findings
suggest that decentralization of leadership, differentiation and divisionalization of
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services may add administrative layers and increase bureaucratization of structures.
Bureaucratization may create barriers in information exchanges, disable leadership to
make and communicate decisions quickly. Bureaucratization may also remove
accountability of clinical personnel. It is also possible that the volume of service
offerings is low in any given hospital in DHS, due to a lack of consolidation of clinical
departments. Thus, it is more difficult to achieve a certain level of clinical excellence in
DHS hospitals. These may explain why hospitals in DHS had higher mortality rates than
hospitals in CHS.
Hypothesis 4 was that hospitals in moderately centralized health systems (MCHS)
would be better quality providers due to their ability to take advantage of both
centralization and differentiation strategies. It was suggested that if appropriate balance
is achieved, the MCHS hospitals' quality performance would improve. However,
hypothesis 4 was not supported. Quality performance of hospitals in MCHS was worse
than in CHS hospitals and no different from other system types. Therefore, this
balancing of two somewhat opposing strategies - centralization of leadership and
differentiation of services - may not be effective in achieving superior quality
performance. Porter (1980) characterized organizations that pursue multiple and
somewhat conflicting strategies which result in inconsistent performance as "stuck in the
middle," which may result in inconsistent performance. In conclusion, it is possible to
suggest that hospitals in MCHS may experience a possible misfit of conflicting structures
and processes with their environment, which resulted in unsatisfactory quality
performance.
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In answering the first research question on which type of hospital-led health
system is associated with better quality outcomes, the findings suggest that hospitals in
Centralized Health Systems are associated with lower mortality rates as measured as
Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs) for AMI, CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia.
Hypothesis 5 suggested that hospitals in independent hospital system (IHS) would
produce worse quality outcomes than hospitals in all other types of health systems was
partially supported. Hospitals in IHS were worse quality providers in comparison with
hospitals in centralized health system (CHS). It was found that hospitals in CHS have
lower mortality rates for AMI, CHF, Stroke and Pneumonia patients (Table 1I).
Although quality performance of hospitals in IHS was not statistically different from
quality performance of hospitals in CPIHS, MCHS, and DHS, the direction (i.e., negative
signs) of coefficient estimates for these system types were suggestive of their lower
mortality rates in comparison with IHS hospitals (Table 11). Therefore, it is possible to
conclude that the lack of centralization and differentiation may have contributed to the
poor IHS hospitals' quality performance, i.e. higher mortality rates. Having low levels of
centralization may preclude hospitals in IHS from effective decision making,
communication of policies to their clinical and managerial staff, and coordination of
clinical services and activities with their other system members. Having low levels of
differentiation may preclude these hospitals from maintaining substantial infrastructure,
physician arrangements, and resource base in their submarkets.
In answering the second research question on which type of hospital-led health
system is associated with worse quality outcomes (i.e., higher mortality rates), the
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findings are partially suggestive that hospitals in Independent Hospitals Systems were
associated with lower mortality rates as measured as Inpatient Quality Indicators (IQIs)
for AMI, CHF, and Pneumonia.

Patient Safety Indicator Models
The support for Hypotheses 1-5 was not found in the PSI models (Table 21). It is
possible to conclude that hospital-led health systems' structural characteristics did not
affect patient safety adverse events. On one hand, patient safety improvements may
require clinicians to pay more attention to and to be involved at a greater level in adverse
events' prevention and management. Education and awareness of both clinicians and
patients may reduce the rates of adverse events in system hospitals. Several interventions
may be proposed:
a) training of clinicians on patient safety guidelines;
b) increasing clinicians accountability for making mistakes;
c) introduction of the routine system checks (e.g., set reminders for clinicians to
remove catheters, periodically turn patients with long length of stay over to
prevent pressure ulcers, etc.)
On the other hand, it is possible that the state of the art guidelines and protocols
on the improvement of patient safety and reduction of adverse events are still
underdeveloped. Patient safety is a relatively new issue for hospitals to focus on and
there may be big differences due to reporting patterns among these hospitals. Therefore,
hospital-led systems may not be able to promote improvements in patient safety at this
stage and require more time for the system effect to show up.
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Table 21 : Summary of Hypotheses Tested in the PSI models
Hypotheses
Centralization of structures-+ quality performance

Expected
Direction
Decrease
Mortality

Supported

Decrease
Mortality

No

Decrease
Mortality

No

Decrease
Mortality

No

Increase
Mortality

No

No

H 1: Hospitals in more centralized health systems would
have better quality performance than hospitals in DHS
Tighter physician-hospital integration -+quality
performance
H 2: Hospitals in CPIHS would have better quality
performance than hospitals in CHS
Decentralization to outcomes +quality performance
H 3 : Hospitals in DHS would have better quality
performance than hospitals in more centralized structures
Combination of centralization and differentiation*
quality performance
H 4: Hospital in MCHS would have better quality than
hospitals in other system types
Low centralization and differentiation -+ quality
performance

H 5: Hospital in IHS would have worse quality than
hospitals in other system types performance
Implications of the Findings
This study builds upon the previous empirical work on hospital systems and
quality of care. The study contributes to the general body of knowledge in several ways
described as follows:
Rather than examining the impact of hospital systems generally on quality
and patient safety, the impact of different types of health systems on quality
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outcomes was studied. Hospital-led systems vary considerably in their
structures and ,they have very different effects on these key outcomes.
Whether different system types have different effect on quality is important
for policymakers and hospital managers to know and consider;
The conceptual model provides opposing scenarios and empirical tests
reveal that centralization of health system's structure may decrease mortality
rates in system hospitals;
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient Database (HCUP
SID) quality and patient safety indicators were used as multiple quality
signals, conveying different stories at present (i.e. there were no system
effect in PSI models), which may be useful for future research by suggesting
that conceptual and analytical models should be separately developed and
specified when quality signals are measured by mortality rates and patient
adverse events;
JCAHO variables were proposed as measures of internal clinical process
and integration and it was found that hospital compliance with JCAHO
performance area for availability of patient specific information may be an
important measure of clinical process and integration, which should be used
in future studies along with other possible measures of clinical processes.
Implications to Theory
Contingency theory was used to develop ,the conceptual model. Contingency
theory provided two opposing scenarios on how different types of hospital-led health

192
systems have evolved through either centralization or differentiation of their structures
and services. Contingency theory was usehl and versatile in developing of empirically
testable hypotheses. This research has confirmed that system hospitals' structural
characteristic - centralization - may improve hospital quality performance measured by
Inpatient Quality Indicators. Thus, providing support for Scenario 1, which stated that
the leadership of Centralized Health Systems may pursue centralization of structure in
order to effectively integrate their task, services, production lines at the system level and
result in improved quality performance.
This study has also found no system effects on hospital quality performance
measured by Patient Safety Indicators. This finding may suggest that the centralization
of authority may have a lesser effect on conditions (i.e., patient adverse events) that are
yet less developed, unlike the mortality rates, in terms of correct detecting, reporting,
monitoring, treatment, and preventing. In-hospital mortality has been studied for a long
time; however, patient safety issues are relatively new problems, taking a "center stage"
only after the IOM report in 1999.
Thus, the effectiveness of centralization may be conditioned upon how well
clinical and organizational approaches of quality improvement are defined and the end
results (i.e. quality outcomes) are monitored. However, if there are no such conditions in
place (as yet for patient safety issues), centralization may lack its advantages over other
structural characteristics.
The findings have also partially supported the proposition that health systems
with low centralization and differentiation (i.e., Independent Hospital Systems) may be
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less effective in managing of both internal contingencies of task interdependence and
organizational size. Hospitals in this system type may be disadvantaged in dealing with
their internal pressures to restructure.
In the study, it was not possible to evaluate directly the external environment's
and environmental shifts' effects on system structures and outcomes, because the
proposed cross-sectional study that meant to test these effects was not viable due to data
limitations. In the longitudinal study, the association between the systems' structures and
quality outcomes was evaluated, holding the external environment's characteristics (e.g.,
hospital competition, managed care, and other market conditions) constant. It is possible
to suggest that future studies should test a relationship or the fit between the external
environment, organizational structure, and organizational performance, given data
availability.

Implications to Policy and Management
Public (e.g., federal and state governments), private (e.g., employers, health plans)
organizations, and, in some instances, consumers would probably like to know that
centralized health systems may produce better quality performance in terms of mortality
outcomes, so they can potentially:
a) get better hospital value when making purchasing decisions, weighing quality
differences against costs, or seeking care in these system hospitals;
c) give hospital systems direct or indirect incentives to adopt such a structure;
d) give hospital leaders information about how to structure their system to
improve quality.
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Similarly, health policymakers and hospital managers may draw useful
conclusions from knowing that hospital compliance with JCAHO performance area score
for availability of patient specific information may improve system hospitals' quality
performance. This finding may be suggestive of the importance of continuous hospital
investment in information systems and improvements of their clinical records.
The study also found that system and hospital organizational characteristics were
less dominant in the PSI models in comparison with the IQI models. On one hand, it may
be related to the reporting issues. On the other hand, it may be related to individual
characteristics of clinicians, such as their knowledge of and compliance with patient
safety protocols and guidelines. Both of these issues may be addressed by improving the
hospital information and reporting system, installing routine system checks for adverse
events, and providing additional training and education on patient safety issues to both
clinical personnel and consumers. Future research needs to evaluate a potential Balanced
Budget Act (BBA) effect, changes in the hospital reporting practice, and other
market/policy effects on patient safety adverse events and medical errors.

Implications to Methodology
One possible implication to methodology is as follows. It is proposed that system
hospitals' compliance with JCAHO performance standards may be used in measuring
internal clinical process and integration, such as a use of clinical information systems and
clinical evidence-based practices, guidelines, protocols, and medical registries (Burns,
1999). It is found that one proposed measure of internal clinical process and integration,
i.e. hospitals' compliance with JCAHO performance standards for availability of patient
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specific information, had a statistically significant and negative (i.e., decreasing) effect
on mortality rates. This finding may be useful for measuring structure-process+outcome
relationships and contribute to conceptual and empirical modeling in future studies.
The results demonstrate that as hospital compliance with JCAHO requirement for
availability of patient specific information increases, mortality rates decrease for CHF,
Stroke, and Pneumonia patients. Adverse events for Infection due to medical care may
also be reduced in system hospitals that were in compliance with this JCAHO
performance area.
Availability of Patient Specific Information may ensure that the necessary
information about the patients care is obtained and maintained in the medical record in a
timely manner and readily available for clinicians' use. Therefore, hospitals with greater
compliance with JCAHO performance area for availability of patient specific information
may have a superior system of clinical information sharing and coordinating care delivery
that can be effectively utilized in comparison with hospitals with lesser compliance with
this JCAHO requirement.
However, all other JCAHO variables were not significant predictors of hospital
quality performance in this study. On one hand, the JCAHO accreditation has been
trying to focus their standards on the best practices and evidence-based medicine
(Sprague, 2005). On the other hand, the JCAHO-led accreditation process has been
criticized, because: accreditation is voluntary, it is scheduled in advance (i.e., giving
hospitals time "to put on their best face"), JCAHO is founded by health care industry,
JCAHO does not enforce change, and accreditors rarely deny or terminate accreditation
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(Sprague, 2005). Therefore, some of the JCAHO measures may be more useful for
research purposes than the other measures. At least one significant and possibly useful
measure was found that may be associated with internal clinical process and integration
in hospital-led systems and is helpful for focusing internal quality improvement efforts.
This measure should be used with a set of other possible measures of clinical integration
in future research, linking structure-process-outcomes.
As a result, this study contributed to the general knowledge on how hospital
system integration affects quality of care, which may be useful for the further
development of theoretical and conceptual models, policy and managerial interventions
to decrease in-hospital mortality and patient adverse events, and for improving
methodology by better linking structure-process-outcomes.

However, there is also need

to identify possible limitations of this study and provide directions for future studies in
the following sections.
Limitations of the Study
Taxonomy of health system is largely focused on structural rather than
managerialloperational characteristics. Even though Alexander et al. (2003) discovered
that there was an association between centralization of service, physician arrangements,
and insurance products and centralized decision making in CHS, there were no data
available in this study to directly quantify a leadership style in one or another system
type. Thus, it was assumed that centralization of structures is also reflective of
centralization of leadership and decision making. Also, Luke and Wholey (1 999) in their
commentary suggested that taxonomy was not taking into consideration that multihospital
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systems range fiom local to regional to national in their scope. However, the taxonomy
describes different system types in terms of their geographic location/dispersion. For
example, hospitals in Centralized Health Systems and Centralized Physician/Insurance
Health Systems tend to be located in close geographic proximity, and hospitals in
Decentralized Health Systems are spread over a broad geographic area (Bazzoli, et al.
1999). The taxonomy is work in progress, and thus, future studies may need to research
whether regionalization and systems' geographic dispersion affect organizational
dimensions of hospital systems.
Another potential criticism is that the taxonomy has not been reflective of changes
in the hospital industry. Dubbs, Bazzoli, and colleagues (2004) reexamined
organizational configuration of health systems in the classification, using the 1998 data.
They concluded that "the 1998 cluster categories are similar to the original taxonomy,
however, they reveal some new organizational configurations" (p. 207). They found that
the centralized categories combined into the Centralized Health System and the
decentralized categories split into the Decentralized and Decentralized
Physician/Insurance Health Systems. Their findings may not have an effect on the
current study, since the key structural dimensions remained unchanged for all system
types and the Centralized Health Systems' structure was not affected by re-classification.
Since the panel data were limited to only two time periods (due to a JCAHO data
limitation), it was impossible to use lagged quality outcomes and hospital financial
performance to address a possible feedback issue in the panel model. It was proposed to
use the cross-sectional design using three stage estimation models with lagged quality
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and financial performance measures. Also, it was also planned to evaluate which system
type had developed "better" internal clinical process and integration in this crosssectional study. We hoped to analyze how the external environments and the shifts in
external environments may affect quality outcomes as well.
However, the cross-sectional models were not stable and this design was not
viable due to a large number of missing observations. It was impossible to compare and
validate the results using both longitudinal and cross-sectional designs and control for a
possible feedback problem, evaluate clinical processes by system type, and the external
environment's effects on the hospital system quality performance. Future research needs
to address these issues by collecting more data, ideally for another 3 years from 20002003.
The IQIs and PSIS were used to flag possible quality problems; these indicators
were also generated from the secondary data bases and may have errors inherent in
administrative data bases (Scott, Youlden, & Coory, 2004). The ongoing debate on
reliability and validity of claims data has not been resolved. However, the panel data
were used; and the system hospitals' quality performance was examined using multiple
risk-adjusted indictors, large, well-established data sets, and advanced econometric
models that may improve reliability and validity of findings and help distinguish trends in
hospital quality outcomes by different types of health systems. Therefore, this study has
both strengths and weaknesses as any other empirical study. However, it is believed that
the strengths balance out the weaknesses in this case. The future research possibilities
and conclusion are discussed in the following section.
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Suggestion for Future Research
In conducting the current study, several research possibilities are discovered and
discussed below. Several suggestions are also made that may be of value for other
researchers. In the descriptive study, the increase in the percentage of CHS hospitals
after 1998 was discovered. Reasons for this increase are not yet known and this trend has
not been studied. Future research need to look at further advancement and development
of different types of hospital-led health systems in recent years.
It may be useful to use different conceptual and empirical approaches in studying
hospital quality performance as measured as IQI and PSI. This study found that system
and hospital organizational characteristics were less dominant in the PSI models in
comparison with the IQI models. Thus, future research should evaluate individual patient
and clinician characteristics in their association with patient safety, as well as, possible
effects of and trends in patient safety outcomes in association with the hospital reporting
patterns, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA), or other unobservable market or policy
interventions. Data on leadership styles and direct measures of process of care delivery in
different system types and their effects on quality performance were not available. A
future study may try to collect quantitative andlor qualitative data on
leadershiplmanagement styles and processes of care delivery by different types of
hospital-led systems. Combining quantitative and qualitative data on leadership style and
process of care delivery could provide more insight on how health systems' structure,
process, and outcomes are linked together. JCAHO performance scores in particular
areas should be evaluated further and potentially used as measures of clinical process in
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future research. One of these measures (i.e., hospital compliance with JCAHO
performance area for availability of patient specific information) should be used in
studying structure-process-outcomes relationships in hospitals, as the findings suggested,
it has significant influence on hospital mortality outcomes.
In this study, it was impossible to directly control for system hospital referral
practices to long-term care facilities. It is likely that hospitals in CHS have developed
more efficient referral strategies, and thus, reduced their inpatient mortality. A future
study could use a 30- or 90- day mortality rates or re-admission to hospitals in addition
to in-hospital mortality outcomes.
Another research possibility is to look at a primary care-inpatient care link in
association with hospital quality performance. It is plausible that large centralized health
systems may be more likely to have advanced primary care capacity andlor be capitated
and hence have more capabilitylincentives to provide superior preventive and primary
care services, develop ambulatory surgical and emergency centers to their population in
comparison with other system types. Therefore, CHS may be triaging patients before
their admission to a hospital.
This triaging may allow hospitals concentrate their efforts, time, and resources on
patients with the actual needs for intensive care andlor to get those in need of them the
services required in a timely manner. Less severe patients' care may be effectively
managed on the pre-hospital stage. Therefore, this study provides some ideas on how to
advance future research on system hospitals, their leadership and process of care delivery,
and integration with other health care providers in association with quality of care.
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Conclusion
Using Contingency theory as the conceptual framework, this study provides
evidence for a hospital-led health system effect on quality of care. The findings suggest
that hospitals in Centralized Health Systems were quality "champions", being able to
decrease AMI, CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia mortality rates in comparison with other
hospital system types. Centralization of hospital structures may improve internal clinical
processes by enhanced coordination of activities, communication between providers,
timely adjustments of process of care delivery and structures to external pressures, and
other mechanisms.
System hospital compliance with the JCAHO performance area for availability of
patient specific information system may have improved the process of care delivery for
CHF, Stroke, and Pneumonia patients in system hospitals. System hospitals may have
been continuously investing in their information and clinical record systems that resulted
in improvements in quality of care.
It is also concluded that hospital-led health systems' structural characteristics may
not affect patient safety adverse events. However, a lack of hospital systems' effect on
PSIS may be explained by a newness of the patient safety issues, specific changes in the
hospital reporting patterns of adverse events and medical errors after the IOM report of
1999, and possible characteristics of clinical personnel (e.g., varying levels of knowledge
about and awareness of in-hospital adverse events and medical errors). Thus, patient
safety issues should be further researched in order to identify the directions for quality
improvements and adverse event prevention.
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-0.027
0.015

-0.003
0.006

0.013
-0.025

iqi15
population
over 65 in the
market
total
population in
the market
MDs per 1000
population
MDs in 45-54
age group per
pop
% of female
patients in a
hospital
% of black
patients in a
hospital
% patients
with mortality
risk 3 and 4

of iqi 16
patients)
Volume (num.
ofiqi 17
patients)

iqi16

iqi17

iqi20

psi 03

psi 07

-0.263

-0.266

-0.294

-0.325

-0.085

-0.102

-0.083

0.006

-0.098

0.046

-0.030

-0.126

-0.117

-0.071

0.230

0.092

-0.010

0.085

-0.109

0.033

0.045

0.028

0.075

0.100

0.112

0.219

0.168

0.051

0.025

0.084

0.032

0.026

0.060

0.078

0.107

0.201

0.167

0.071

0.053

0.087

0.157

0.119

0.085

0.133

0.127

-0.015

-0.014

0.065

0.047

-0.056

-0.039

-0.135

-0.063

-0.033

0.367

0.162

0.197

0.210

-0.050

0.128

-0.213

-0.230

-0.270

-0.303

0.142

0.126

0.091

0.116

0.085

0.102

-0.202
-0.173

-0.258
-0.198

-0.284
-0.166

-0.311
-0.200

0.204
-0.003

0.192
0.139

0.111
0.021

0.113
0.006

0.110
-0.016

0.085
0.018

-0.192

-0.123

-0.108

-0.053

0.111

0.197

0.101

0.082

-0.018

0.032

-0.1 14

-0.083

-0.098

-0.004

0.322

0.218

0.182

0.185

-0.082

0.079

-0.097

-0.059

-0.097

0.020

0.202

0.196

0.140

0.089

-0.035

0.020

-

~~~~~~

psi 12

rpps13

psi 15

CHS

HMO
penetration
% of hospital's
patient age <
19

0.054

-0.053

-0.053

0.104

0.145

0.048

0.031

-0.065

-0.004

-0.056

0.192

0.073

-0.123

0.020

0.177

0.097

0.091

-0.164

-0.132

-0.203

serv 0CPIHS

MCHS

0.102

0.088

-0.164

0.050

0.332

0.217

-0.178

-0.095

0.169

-0.040

-0.296

0.051

-0.013

0.006

-0.099

0.171

-0.013

DHS

IHS

% of hospital's
patient age 19 64
% of hospital's
patient age 64

+

0.055

-0.201

-0.080

-0.181

-0.089

0.215

0.128

0.297

0.293

0.067

0.042

-0.090

-0.035

-0.152

-0.077

-0.070

0.068

-0.253

0.240

0.012

0.191

-0.103

0.024

0.110

0.066

-0.048

0.011

0.106

-0.086

0.031

-0.067

0.054

0.379

-0.014

0.122

-0.127

-0.059

-0.180

-0.055

0.013

-0.047

0.059

0.346

-0.032

0.125

-0.119

-0.074

-0.175

patients in a
hospital
% of black
patients in a
hospital
% patients
with mortality
risk 3 and 4
% patients
with severity
risk 3 and 5
CMI

0.107

0.058

-0.112

0.064

-0.192

-0.081

0.125

-0.087

-0.035

0.054

0.050

-0.043

-0.1 18

0.160

0.253

0.206

-0.095

-0.026

-0.034

-0.106

-0.139

-0.132

0.164

-0.030

-0.154

-0.107

-0.131

0.215

0.147

0.192

-0.103
-0.088

-0.159
-0.099

0.174
0.161

-0.023
-0.065

-0.033
0.309

-0.088
-0.141

-0.167
-0.076

0.243
0.175

0.118
-0.042

0.115
-0.179

-

public nonpro-t

serv 20-

10

per capita
income in the
market
-0.079
population
over 65 in the
market
-0.123
total
population in
the market
- 0.143
MDs per 1000
population
-0.043
MDs in 45-54
age group per
POP
% of female

beds

investor

p
p
p
p
p

30
-0.302

CPIHS
Volume (num.
ofiqi 15
patients)
0.052
Volume (num.
of iqi 16
patients)
0.022
Volume (nurn.
of iqi 17
patients)
0.094
Volume (nurn.
of iqi 20
patients)
- 0.059
Volume (num.
of psi 03
patients)
0.089
Volume (nurn.
of psi 07
patients)
0.141
Volume (num.
ofpsi 12
patients)
0.090
Volume (num.
ofpsi 13
patients)
0.054
Volume (num.
ofpsi 15
patients)
0.100
1st time period
0.100
(1995 - 1997)
2nd time
period (1998 2000)
-0.100

MCHS

DHS

IHS

beds

public

nonpro-t

investor

sew 010

serv 2030
-0.332

-0.046

0.020

-0.075

0.613

-0.029

0.000

0.018

-0.092

-0.061

-0.003

0.006

0.642

-0.026

-0.022

0.041

-0.122

-0.173

-0.099

0.035

-0.033

0.694

-0.080

0.008

0.043

-0.123

-0.255

-0.026

-0.030

0.020

0.659

-0.086

0.1 19

-0.078

-0.104

-0.249

-0.005

-0.062

-0.036

0.888

0.010

0.065

-0.079

-0.107

-0.382

0.007

-0.103

0.006

0.891

0.030

0.082

-0.1 11

-0.131

-0.469

0.005

-0.053

-0.017

0.821

-0.094

0.123

-0.077

-0.130

-0.470

-0.002

-0.013

-0.042

0.729

-0.142

0.140

-0.065

-0.135

-0.415

-0.007

-0.076

0.005

0.896

0.001

0.081

-0.091

-0.126

-0.431

-0.100

0.011

-0.026

-0.016

-0.015

-0.061

0.078

-0.066

0.100

0.100

-0.011

0.026

0.016

0.015

0.061

-0.078

0.066

-0.100

+
per capita
income in the
market

-0.365

-0.248

-0.202

0.337

-0.245

-0.147

0.009

-0.009

0.133

0.054

0.173

0.338

0.028

-0.234

0.020

0.174

0.231

-0.231

-0.201

-0.044

serv
30+
population
over 65 in the
market
total
population in
the market
MDs per 1000
population
MDs in 45-54
age group per
pop
% of female
patients in a
hospital
% of black
patients in a
hospital
% patients
with mortality
risk 3 and 4
% patients
with severity
risk 3 and 5
CMI
Volume (num.
of iqi 15
patients)
Volume (num.
of iqi 16
patients)
Volume (num.
of iqi 17
patients)

total
nurse

RNsI
LPNs

0.187

-0.133

-0.145

-0.067

0.067

0.087

0.033

-0.074

-0.028

-0.069

0.176

-0.176

-0.106

-0.058

0.453

0.133

-0.401

0.103

0.215

0.160

-0.160

-0.222

-0.002

0.215

0.390

0.144

-0.371

0.078

0.221

0.119

-0.119

-0.213

-0.006

-0.039

-0.096

-0.057

0.1 11

0.022

-0.001

-0.040

0.040

-0.037

-0.143

0.125

0.284

0.164

-0.324

0.053

0.1 12

0.164

-0.164 -0.109 -0.043

-0.265

-0.160

-0.141

0.226

-0.174

-0.075

0.071

-0.071

0.1 13

0.068

-0.174
0.204

-0.068
0.092

-0.083
0.110

0.117
-0.156

-0.113
0.053

-0.026
0.116

0.118
0.213

-0.118
-0.213

0.131
0.150

0.105
0.190

0.384

0.21 1

0.149

-0.265

0.179

0.238

0.198

-0.198

0.099

0.143

0.235

0.288

0.072

-0.243

0.075

0.199

0.254

-0.254

-0.001

0.094

0.320

0.305

0.085

-0.265

0.104

0.223

0.257

-0.257

0.017

0.140

majteach

minteach

nonteach

-0.202

-0.076

-0.155

0.039

0.071

0.2 13

urban

p
p
p
p
p
p

rural

margin

cashflow
0.105

serv
30+

majteach

minteach nonteach

total
nurse

RNs/
LPNs

urban

rural

margin

cashflow

Volume (num.
of iqi 20
-0.042
-0.332
0.196
0.062
0.248
-0.196
0.396
0.305
0.097
0.165
patients)
Volume (num.
of psi 03
-0.225
-0.107
-0.432
0.130 0.225
0.078
0.252
0.166
0.508
patients)
0.443
Volume (num.
of psi 07
-0.248
-0.485
0.313
-0.100
0.544
0.248
0.071
0.238
0.514
0.185
patients)
Volume (num.
of psi 12
0.304
-0.037
0.218
0.140
0.270
-0.218
0.174
-0.446
patients)
0.543
0.467
Volume (num.
ofpsi 13
0.268
0.005
0.185
0.172
0.255
-0.185
0.158
-0.408
0.490
0.430
patients)
Volume (num.
of psi 15
-0.238
0.303-0.091
0.238
0.099
0.227
0.5 12
0.162 -0.463
0.502
patients)
.
1st time period
-0.089
0.180
0.045
0.143
-0.093
-0.045
-0.047
-0.072
0.036
-0.008
(1995 1997)
2nd time
period (1998
0.089
-0.180
-0.045
-0.143
0.093
0.045
-0.036
0.072
0.047
0.008
2000)
md(45age 19HMO
POP old
POP
incm
age 64+
tot pop tot mds
age 4 9
hhi
penet
64
65+
54)Ipop
1.OOO
HHI
HMO
1.OOO
-0.502
penetration
% of hospital's
patient age <
-0.111
0.010
1.OOO
19

-

-

hhi

HMO
penet

age 19age -49

64

age 64+

POP
incm

POP old
65+

tot pop

tot mds

md(4 554)Ipop

% of hospital's
patient age 19 -

64

-0.126

0.043

0.416

1.OOO

0.064

0.047

-0.863

-0.818

1.000

-0.299

0.294

-0.1 17

0.234

-0.056

1.000

0.148

-0.180

-0.315

-0.423

0.434

-0.025

1.OOO

-0.518

0.255

0.150

0.062

-0.129

0.045

-0.248

1.000

-0.306

0.268

-0.120

0.310

-0.097

0.647

-0.122

0.023

1.000

-0.276

0.236

-0.114

0.300

-0.095

0.635

-0.118

0.023

0.962

1.OOO

-0.01 1

0.039

0.609

0.146

-0.466

-0.217

-0.305

0.142

-0.178

-0.162

-0.22 1

0.097

0.062

0.426

-0.276

0.201

-0.059

0.063

0.321

0.276

-0.049

0.088

-0.730

-0.560

0.773

-0.01 1

0.356

-0.066

-0.003

0.01 1

-0.090
-0.166

0.065
0.137

-0.620
-0.564

-0.456
-0.278

0.645
0.51 1

-0.025
0.059

0.353
0.238

-0.039
-0.050

0.051
0.169

0.058
0.172

% of hospital's

patient age 64

+

per capita
income in the
market
population
over 65 in the
market
total
population in
the market
MDs per 1000
population
MDs in 45-54
age group per
POP
% of female
patients in a
hospital
% of black
patients in a
hospital
% patients
with mortality
risk 3 and 4
% patients
with severity
risk 3 and 5
CMI

hhi
Volume (num.
of iqi 15
-0.162
patients)
Volume (nurn.
of iqi 16
-0.260
patients)
Volume (nurn.
of iqi 17
-0.255
patients)
Volume (nurn.
of iqi 20
-0.250
patients)
Volume (nurn.
of psi 03
-0.257
patients)
Volume (nurn.
of psi 07
patients)
-0.293
Volume (nurn.
of psi 12
patients)
-0.23 1
Volume (nurn.
of psi 13
-0.181
patients)
Volume (nurn.
of psi 15
patients)
-0.266
1st time period
(1995 - 1997)
-0.087
2nd time
period (1998 2000)
0.087

HMO
penet

age 4 9

age 1964

age 64+

0.125

-0.033

-0.021

0.032

0.213

-0.140

-0.022

0.207

-0.060

0.210

POP old
65+

tot pop

tot mds

md(4554)Ipop

0.068

0.046

0.006

0.066

0.061

0.101

0.205

0.1 11

0.106

0.222

0.195

-0.037

0.059

0.178

0.063

0.111

0.211

0.199

-0.013

0.044

-0.016

0.239

-0.023

0.132

0.291

0.271

0.157

0.03 1

0.241

-0.154

0.342

-0.019

0.060

0.402

0.356

0.172

0.268

0.363

-0.371

0.288

-0.130

0.142

0.345

0.320

0.155

0.230
0.110 -0.197
-

0.186

-0.102

0.056

0.352

0.336

0.114

0.048

0.157

-0.118

0.117

-0.074

0.014

0.345

0.319

0.167

0.101

0.276

-0.217

0.306

-0.062

0.089

0.389

0.364

-0.062

0.061

-0.084

0.008

-0.246

0.013

0.097

-0.069

-0.092

0.062

-0.061

0.084

-0.008

0.246

-0.013

-0.097

0.069

0.092

POP
incm

p
p
p
p
p

% of female
patients in a
hospital
% of black
patients in a
hospital
% patients
with mortality
risk 3 and 4
% patients
with severity
risk 3 and 5
CMI
Volume (nurn.
of iqi 15
patients)
Volume (nurn.
of iqi 16
patients)
Volume (nurn.
ofiqi 17
patients)
Volume (nurn.
of iqi 20
patients)
Volume (nurn.
of psi 03
patients)
Volume (nurn.
of psi 07
patients)

%

%

% mort

female

black

34

%sever
34

CMI

Vol iqi
15

Vol iqi
16

Vol iqi
17

Vol iqi
20

Vol psi
03

1.OOO
-0.02 1

1.OOO

-0.381

-0.074

1.OOO

-0.374
-0.634

0.024
-0.003

0.940

0.553

1.OOO
0.604

1.000

-0.229

-0.033

0.093

0.127

0.509

1.000

-0.163

0.295

0.216

0.245

0.352

0.674

1.OOO

-0.155

0.1 13

0.141

0.194

0.417

0.763

0.844

1.000

-0.078

0.132

0.138

0.187

0.302

0.660

0.787

0.825

1.000

-0.245

0.252

-0.046

0.044

0.345

0.697

0.774

0.790

0.753

1.OOO

-0.043

0.252

-0.217

-0.102

0.225

0.719

0.736

0.792

0.784

0.910

p
p
p
p
p
-

YO
female
Volume (nurn.
ofpsi 12
patients)
Volume (num.
ofpsi 13
patients)
Volume (num.
of psi 15
patients)
1st time period
(1995 - 1997)
2nd time
period (1998 2000)

Volume (nurn.
of psi 07
patients)
Volume (nurn.
of psi 12
patients)
Volume (nurn.
ofpsi 13
patients)
Volume (nurn.
of psi 15
patients)
1st time period
(1995 - 1997)
2nd time
period (1998 2000)

YO
black

% mort

% sever

34

34

CMI

Vol iqi
15

Vol iqi
16

Vol iqi
17

Vol iqi
20

Vol psi
03

-0.165

0.074

-0.102

0.008

0.480

0.753

0.616

0.760

0.698

0.837

-0.182

0.028

-0.067

0.037

0.516

0.671

0.507

0.642

0.566

0.748

-0.205

0.230

-0.087

0.016

0.363

0.742

0.775

0.827

0.806

0.950

0.037

-0.069

-0.063

-0.028

-0.015

-0.025

-0.098

-0.005

-0.137

-0.038

-0.037
Vol
psi 07

0.069
Vol
psi 12

0.063
Vol
psi 13

0.028
Vol
psi 15

0.015

0.025
2nd
time

0.098

0.005

0.137

0.038

1st time

1.OOO
0.886

1.OOO

0.746

0.929

1.OOO

0.969

0.921

0.798

1.OOO

-0.078

-0.029

0.041

-0.098

-

1.000
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